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Six years ago, in the spring of 2012, I was first introduced to the topic of ex-post evaluations of 
EU legislation. At first sight the topic did not strike me as particularly engaging: I was simply 
interested in European policies and the only project related to that which my master 
programme offered concerned evaluations. Only when I delved into the subject I found out that 
there was much more to these evaluations than just technical exercises: at the heart of the 
matter were all sorts of interesting questions regarding the political interests of European 
policy-makers, their accountability towards citizens and the use of objective information to 
improve how EU legislation affects citizens and companies. 
 In the six subsequent years I spent the majority of my working time on studying ex-post 
evaluations of EU legislation from an academic perspective, first as a master student, then as a 
junior researcher and finally as a PhD student from September 2014 onwards. The result of all 
this work is this dissertation, in which I attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of and 
explanation for the variation among the evaluations. 
There are many people who deserve credit for helping me to complete this dissertation. 
The most important of those are my three supervisors: prof. dr. Ellen Mastenbroek, prof. dr. 
Anne Meuwese and prof. dr. Sandra van Thiel. Their in-depth feedback and continuous support 
greatly contributed to the quality of my work. I also wish to sincerely thank Thomas van Golen 
LLM MSc and dr. Pieter Zwaan for all their help. Not only are they co-authors of various articles 
included in this dissertation, but their comments also helped me to improve other parts of the 
PhD thesis. 
 Furthermore, I would like to thank the many respondents within the European 
Commission and other organizations that provided data that I could use for my research. 
Throughout my PhD process I have been continuously impressed by the openness of the EU 
institutions to my questions and requests. In particular I would like to mention Daniel Klein of 
the Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition, who provided extensive information 
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about the situation in his own organization and took the time to give useful advice about 
various parts of my theoretical framework. 
Others made smaller or less direct contributions, yet in the end their help was just as 
crucial to complete this dissertation. Prof. Dr. Claudio Radaelli was kind enough to receive me 
at the University of Exeter for a month during my PhD process, which allowed me to discuss 
many questions regarding better regulation and evaluation use with him and other academics 
at his department. Dr. Peter Kruyen provided answers to several detailed statistical questions 
that I had regarding the quantitative part of my research. Sebastian Lemire and Thomas 
Delahais helped me to measure the abstract concept of evaluation capacity, which contributed 
to many chapters of this dissertation. Korné Boerman provided useful feedback on various parts 
of my writing. I would like to thank all these people for their generous and useful assistance. 
 








Introduction of the topic 
Since the year 2000, the European Commission has repeatedly formulated the ambition to 
systematically evaluate all major EU legislation. In 2003 this ambition resulted in the 
introduction of impact assessments: reports assessing the costs and benefits of legislative 
proposals. From 2007 onwards the Commission also started to systematically conduct ex-post 
legislative (EPL) evaluations: reports assessing the functioning of regulations and directives 
currently in force. Some EPL evaluations only study the transposition of EU directives to 
national legislation or their practical implementation; other reports (also) assess the intended 
and unintended effects of EU legislation on society. 
Together with impact assessments and public consultations, EPL evaluations are the 
main components of the Commission’s Better Regulation Agenda. In theory such evaluations 
may fulfil two important functions related to EU legislation. Firstly, by recommending how the 
implementation of legislation can be improved and/or how legislation can be amended to 
increase its effectiveness, EPL evaluations are a potential tool for decision-makers to improve 
their policies. Secondly, EPL evaluations can be used by actors like the European Parliament (EP) 
and the Council of Ministers to hold the Commission accountable for its decisions related to 
legislative implementation. For example, these actors can ask the Commission critical questions 
based on evaluation results.  
 
Results per topic 
This dissertation presents the first large-scale academic research about the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations. Its key assumption is that such evaluations can only contribute to learning and 
accountability if they meet three conditions: systematic initiation, high quality and systematic 
use. The main goal of this dissertation is therefore to describe and explain the variation in the 
initiation, quality and use of the Commission’s EPL evaluations, to assess to what extent the 
Commission’s system for such evaluations is fit to enhance learning and accountability.  
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 The first condition, systematic initiation, means that all major legislation should be 
evaluated periodically. Although EPL evaluations may lead to the improvement of specific 
legislation even if this requirement is not met, in that case they will not enhance legislative 
quality as a whole. If the Commission conducts EPL evaluations selectively it could also create 
the impression that it decides what legislation to evaluate based on political motives. Such a 
reputation could harm the credibility of all its subsequent evaluations. 
 Chapter 4 of this dissertation shows that about 42% of all major EU legislation from 
2000-2004 has been evaluated ex-post by the Commission. This means that more than half of 
the major EU legislation from 2000-2004 has never been evaluated. These findings reveal that 
the Commission only partly meets the requirement of systematic initiation. 
Four factors significantly affect the variance in the initiation of EPL evaluations by the 
Commission. First, the type of legislation matters: directives are more likely to be evaluated 
than regulations. Second, the chances that a piece of legislation is evaluated increase with its 
complexity. Both of these explanations suggest that the Commission may prioritize evaluating 
legislation that grants more freedom to the member states, because for such legislation the risk 
of non-compliance is higher. In other words, EPL evaluations may partly be initiated by the 
Commission to make its task of enforcing EU legislation easier. 
 A third significant explanation for the variance in the initiation of EPL evaluations by the 
Commission is the presence of evaluation clauses: Legislation containing a provision that 
requires it to be evaluated within a given number of years is much more likely to be evaluated 
than legislation without such a provision. The fourth significant explanation for the variance in 
the initiation of EPL evaluations is the evaluation capacity of the responsible Directorate-
General (DG). DGs are the main organizational components of the Commission and have 
considerable freedom in their evaluation policies. DGs with a specialized unit for ex-post 
evaluations and/or specific guidelines for EPL evaluations turned out to evaluate a significantly 
higher proportion of their legislation than other DGs. 
The second condition, high quality, means that EPL evaluations can only contribute to 
learning and accountability if they meet certain methodological standards. If the Commission’s 
EPL evaluations are not valid and reliable, any decisions that take these evaluations into 
account are based on misleading information. Furthermore, a lack of quality can create the 
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perception among decision-makers that evaluation findings misrepresent reality, which makes 
it less likely that such findings will be used for learning in the future. 
 Chapter 5 of this dissertation shows that the quality of the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations that assess effectiveness varies considerably. The vast majority (76%) of the reports 
that were studied used a robust combination of stakeholder input and other forms of data 
collection. However, the evaluations perform less well regarding other aspects of quality. 
Whereas almost all reports (89%) have a well-defined scope in the sense of clearly specified 
research questions, less than 40% of them go beyond this by also describing the intervention 
logic of the legislation that they evaluate. Between 40% and 70% of the EPL evaluations meet 
criteria like the presence of a clear operationalization (internal validity), a clear country 
selection and a clear case selection (external validity) and the presence of substantiated 
conclusions. By far the worst aspect of the evaluations’ quality is their replicability: only 31% of 
the reports contained or referred to all the material that would be required to repeat the 
underlying research, like interview guides and lists of respondents. 
 The key determinant for this variance in evaluation quality is the type of evaluator: EPL 
evaluations conducted by external consultants are of significantly higher quality than 
evaluations conducted internally by the Commission. This suggests that the technical expertise 
of external parties is a crucial asset when it comes to properly evaluating EU legislation. The 
evaluation capacity of the Commission’s DGs, the complexity of the evaluated legislation and 
various political conditions were found to have no effect on the variance in quality. The results 
do show that evaluations of legislation that had to be approved by the Europees Parlement (EP) 
are of higher quality than other evaluations, but more research is needed to find out why that 
causal relation exists. 
 The third condition, systematic use, means that the results of EPL evaluations need to 
be seriously considered during decision-making moments. If this requirement is not met, the 
evaluations are essentially a waste of time and money, as without use there is no way in which 
they can contribute to learning and accountability. 
 Chapter 6 of this dissertation shows that the results of the Commission EPL’s evaluations 
are frequently used in impact assessments (evaluations of the costs and benefits of legislative 
proposals). About 65% of the impact assessments for which a prior EPL evaluation is available 
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make use of that evaluation, although the level of use varies from making a single reference to 
an in-depth forms of analysis. The timeliness of the EPL evaluations turns out to be a necessary 
condition for their use in impact assessments. 
 Chapter 7 of this dissertation studies the effect of political conditions on the use of the 
Commission’s EPL evaluations for the purpose of learning. The results falsify the hypothesis that 
such use varies based on the preferences of actors that the Commission depends on, such as 
the European Parliament, the Council and major interest groups. Instead, it turns out that the 
Commission’s own political priorities are the most important explanation for use. Ever since the 
Juncker Commission entered into office in 2014, the institution has become more reluctant to 
propose new legislation, in part as a response to criticism by Eurosceptics. Especially in policy 
fields that are no priority of the current Commission it has therefore become difficult to 
translate the results of EPL evaluations in policy changes. Conversely, in policy fields that are 
political priorities of the current Commission, there is much opportunity for EPL evaluations to 
contribute to learning. 
 Chapter 8 of this dissertation addresses the use of the Commission’s EPL evaluations in 
questions of the European Parliament. In theory, evaluations are a useful source of information 
for parliamentarians to hold the Commission accountable for its decisions. However, in practice 
only 22% of the EPL evaluations studied in this dissertation turned out to be mentioned in any 
EP questions. The only significant explanation for variation in this regard is the level of conflict 
between the EP and the Commission: the chances that an evaluation is used in questions of the 
EP is significantly higher for evaluations of topics that were controversial during the legislative 
process than for evaluations of other topics. 
 To place the results presented above into perspective, it should be noted that most 
OECD countries do not have systematic procedures for EPL evaluations at all, which means that 
the Commission outperforms them by default. Furthermore, even the few OECD countries that 
have systematic procedures for EPL evaluations in place appear to face problems concerning 
their initiation, quality and use, which shows that such issues are not unique to the 
Commission. Therefore, the Commission is clearly ahead of or on par with most national 





Various academic literature suggests that the European Commission is (partly) driven by its 
interest to maximize its competences. When applied to EPL evaluations, this theory leads to the 
hypothesis that the initiation and quality of such evaluations are lower in those cases where the 
Commission perceives a higher risk that negative evaluation results could lead to criticism on its 
competences. However, the results of this dissertation do not confirm this hypothesis. They do 
show that various other political and technical factors affect the initiation, quality and use of 
the Commission’s EPL evaluations. These factors vary considerably from subject to subject and 
have therefore already been summarized above. 
 Besides these theoretical implications, the results of this dissertation have some 
practical implications as well. First, the findings show that evaluation clauses can be a useful 
tool to encourage the systematic initiation of EPL evaluations in the EU (although they appear 
to have no effect on evaluation quality). Second, the results reveal that extra investments in 
evaluation capacity can help the Commission to evaluate a larger proportion of EU legislation. 
Third, the results show that the timely availability of EPL evaluations is crucial to allow their 
results to be used in impact assessments, which shows the importance of strictly enforcing the 
Commission’s ‘evaluate first’ principle. 
In conclusion, whereas the Commission’s current system for EPL evaluations contributes 
to learning and accountability to some extent, significant further developments regarding the 
initiation, quality and use of these evaluations appear to be necessary for these benefits to 
become more systematic. Hopefully, the specific findings and recommendations presented in 
this dissertation can contribute to such improvements. In this day and age when EU legislation 
increasingly affects that day-to-day activities of citizens and companies and is frequently 
criticized by Eurosceptic actors, it is all the more important to ensure a continuous stream of 
reliable information about the functioning of such legislation is available. If EPL evaluations can 
fulfil this role, they may contribute to step-by-step improvements to the effects of legislation, 
the democratic accountability of the EU’s institutions, and the legitimacy of the European 







Introductie van het onderwerp 
Sinds het jaar 2000 heeft de Europese Commissie herhaaldelijk de ambitie uitgesproken om alle 
belangrijke wetgeving van de Europese Unie (EU) systematisch te evalueren. In 2003 
resulteerde deze ambitie in het opzetten van een systeem voor zogenaamde impact 
assessments: rapporten die de verwachte kosten en baten van wetgevingsvoorstellen 
beoordelen. Vanaf 2007 begon de Commissie ook met het systematisch uitvoeren van ex-post 
wetgevingsevaluaties (vanaf nu: EPL evaluaties): rapporten die reeds bestaande Europese 
verordeningen en richtlijnen beoordelen. Sommige EPL evaluaties beoordelen slechts de 
omzetting van Europese richtlijnen naar nationale wetgeving of hun implementatie in de 
praktijk; andere evaluaties bestuderen (ook) de gewenste en ongewenste maatschappelijke 
effecten van de wetgeving. 
Samen met impact assessments en openbare consultaties vormen EPL evaluaties de 
belangrijkste bouwstenen van de Agenda voor Betere Regelgeving van de Commissie. In theorie 
vervullen zulke evaluaties namelijk minstens twee belangrijke functies rond het Europese 
wetgevingsproces. Ten eerste is dit de functie van leren: de rapporten leveren informatie op 
over de implementatie, naleving en maatschappelijke effecten van Europese regels, die de 
Europese Commissie vervolgens kan gebruiken als basis voor besluitvorming over de 
verbetering van deze wetgeving. Ten tweede spelen EPL evaluaties een rol bij het afleggen van 
(democratische) verantwoording: via hun resultaten kunnen actoren zoals het Europees 
Parlement en de Raad van Ministers de acties van de Europese Commissie rond de uitvoering 
van wetgeving te beoordelen. Op basis van hun oordeel kunnen deze actoren vervolgens 
proberen het gedrag van de Commissie bij te sturen, bijvoorbeeld door het stellen van kritische 
vragen naar aanleiding van evaluatieresultaten. 
 
Resultaten per deelonderwerp 
Deze dissertatie presenteert het eerste grootschalige academisch onderzoek dat heeft 
plaatsgevonden naar de EPL evaluaties van de Europese Commissie. De centrale assumptie van 
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het onderzoek is dat zulke evaluaties alleen kunnen bijdragen aan leren en verantwoording als 
ze voldoen aan drie voorwaarden: systematische initiëring, hoge kwaliteit en systematisch 
gebruik. Het hoofddoel van deze dissertatie is dan ook het beschrijven en verklaren van de 
variantie in de initiëring, de kwaliteit en het gebruik van de EPL evaluaties van de Commissie, 
om zo te kunnen beoordelen in hoeverre en waarom het systeem van de Commissie al dan niet 
aan de gestelde voorwaarden voldoet. 
 De eerste voorwaarde, systematische initiëring, betekent dat alle belangrijke wetgeving 
periodiek moet worden geëvalueerd. Als deze voorwaarde wordt geschonden leiden EPL 
evaluaties wellicht tot leren en verantwoording voor een beperkt deel van de Europese 
wetgeving, maar vinden deze baten niet plaats over de gehele linie. Een gebrek aan 
systematische initiëring kan bovendien de verdenking scheppen dat de Commissie selectief 
evaluaties uitvoert op basis van de verwachte resultaten, wat de geloofwaardigheid van het 
hele systeem voor EPL evaluaties onderuit kan halen. 
 De resultaten van hoofdstuk 4 van deze dissertatie tonen aan dat circa 42% van de 
belangrijke EU wetgeving uit de jaren 2000-2004 is geëvalueerd door de Commissie. Dit 
betekent dat meer dan de helft van de belangrijke Europese wetgeving uit die jaren niet is 
geëvalueerd en dat de Commissie dus slechts ten dele voldoet aan de voorwaarde van 
systematische initiëring. Wel lijkt de proportie belangrijke wetgeving die de Commissie 
evalueert met de tijd toe te nemen. 
Vier factoren blijken te verklaren waarom de Commissie sommige wetgeving wel 
evalueert en andere wetgeving niet. Ten eerste is dit het type wetgeving: richtlijnen hebben 
een veel grotere kans te worden geëvalueerd dan verordeningen. Ten tweede is de complexiteit 
van de wetgeving een verklaring: hoe ingewikkelder de wetgeving, hoe groter de kans op een 
evaluatie. Deze resultaten suggereren dat de Commissie mogelijk prioriteit geeft aan het 
evalueren van wetgeving waarbij de kans op gebrekkige naleving door de lidstaten van de EU 
groter is. Zowel bij richtlijnen als bij relatief complexe wetgeving hebben nationale overheden 
namelijk doorgaans veel ruimte om de uitvoering zelf vorm te geven. EPL evaluaties kunnen in 
zulke situaties een nuttige bron van informatie zijn voor de Commissie om te achterhalen welke 
landen de wetgeving (niet) naleven. 
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 Een derde factor die de variatie in de initiëring van EPL evaluaties verklaart is de 
aanwezigheid van evaluatieclausules: artikelen in EU wetgeving die een evaluatie na een 
bepaald aantal jaren verplichten. De Commissie blijkt wetgeving met een dergelijke clausule 
veel vaker te evalueren dan andere wetgeving, hoewel er ook veel wetgeving met een clausule 
bestaat die niet wordt geëvalueerd. De vierde verklarende factor is de evaluatiecapaciteit van 
de betrokken directoraten-generaal (DGs). DGs zijn de belangrijkste organisatorische 
componenten van de Commissie; in de praktijk hebben zij veel vrijheid bij het vormgeven van 
hun eigen evaluatiebeleid. De resultaten van deze dissertatie laten zien dat DGs die meer 
middelen in EPL evaluaties stoppen en betere procedures voor zulke evaluaties hebben een 
groter percentage van hun wetgeving evalueren.  
 De tweede voorwaarde, hoge kwaliteit, houdt in dat EPL evaluaties alleen kunnen 
bijdragen aan leren en verantwoording als ze voldoen aan standaarden voor degelijk 
onderzoek. Als niet aan deze voorwaarde wordt voldaan kloppen de conclusies van EPL 
evaluaties waarschijnlijk niet, waardoor eventuele besluiten die naar aanleiding van de 
evaluaties worden genomen op verkeerde informatie zijn gebaseerd. Ook kan bij gebrekkige 
kwaliteit de geloofwaardigheid van alle toekomstige EPL evaluaties verloren gaan. 
 Hoofdstuk 5 van deze dissertatie toont aan dat de kwaliteit van de EPL evaluaties van de 
Commissie die de effectiviteit van wetgeving bestuderen aanzienlijk varieert. Het merendeel 
van deze rapporten heeft een duidelijke onderzoeksvraag en gebruikt een robuuste combinatie 
van consultaties met belanghebbenden en andere methoden van dataverzameling. De 
evaluaties doen het minder goed op andere criteria: tussen de 40% en de 70% van de rapporten 
presenteert een duidelijke interventielogica, heeft een valide dataverzameling en formuleert 
heldere conclusies. Het slechtst scoren de evaluaties op betrouwbaarheid, want slechts circa 
30% van de rapporten biedt voldoende gegevens om het onderliggende onderzoek desgewenst 
te kunnen herhalen. 
 De belangrijkste verklaring voor de variatie in kwaliteit ligt bij het type actor dat de 
evaluatie uitvoert: rapporten geschreven door externe partijen in opdracht van de Commissie 
zijn aanzienlijk beter dan intern geproduceerde evaluaties. De gespecialiseerde expertise van 
externe consultants lijkt de kwaliteit van EPL evaluaties dus te verhogen. Verder laten de 
resultaten zien dat evaluaties van wetgeving die tot stand is gekomen met goedkeuring van het 
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Europees Parlement (EP) van hogere kwaliteit zijn dan andere evaluaties, al is nader onderzoek 
nodig om uit te zoeken waarom dit verband bestaat. 
 De derde voorwaarde, systematisch gebruik, betekent dat de resultaten van EPL 
evaluaties door beleidsmakers moeten worden meegewogen in hun beslissingen. Als niet aan 
deze voorwaarde wordt voldaan zijn de evaluaties in feite een verspilling van geld en moeite: ze 
kunnen alleen bijdragen aan leren en verantwoording als hun resultaten daadwerkelijk in 
besluitvorming worden meegenomen. 
 Hoofdstuk 6 van deze dissertatie laat zien dat de resultaten van de EPL evaluaties van de 
Commissie regelmatig gebruikt worden in impact assessments (evaluaties van de kosten en 
baten van Europese wetgevingsvoorstellen). Circa 65% van de impact assessments waarbij een 
EPL beschikbaar was verwijzen naar deze evaluatie, al variëren deze verwijzingen aanzienlijk in 
hun diepgang. De tijdigheid van de EPL evaluaties blijkt een noodzakelijke voorwaarde te zijn 
voor hun gebruik in impact assessments. 
 Hoofdstuk 7 van deze dissertatie onderzoekt het effect van politieke factoren op het 
gebruik van de EPL evaluaties van de Commissie voor het doel van leren. De resultaten 
falsificeren de hypothese dat dit gebruik afhangt van de preferenties van belangrijke actoren 
waar de Commissie van afhankelijk is, zoals het EP, de Raad van Ministers en grote 
belangengroepen. In plaats daarvan blijken vooral de politieke prioriteiten van de Commissie 
zelf grote invloed te hebben. Sinds het aantreden van de Juncker Commissie in 2014 is de 
institutie terughoudender geworden met het doen van nieuwe wetsvoorstellen, onder andere 
om het imago van de EU te beschermen tegen Eurosceptici. Vooral op beleidsterreinen die 
geen prioriteit zijn van de top van de Commissie is het door deze ontwikkeling lastiger 
geworden om de resultaten van EPL evaluaties om te zetten naar nieuw beleid. Op 
beleidsterreinen die wel binnen de prioriteiten van de huidige Commissie vallen is er juist veel 
ruimte voor EPL evaluaties om bij te dragen aan beleidsleren. 
 Hoofdstuk 8 van deze dissertatie behandelt het gebruik van de EPL evaluaties van de 
Commissie in vragen van het EP. In theorie zijn evaluatierapporten een nuttige bron van 
informatie voor volksvertegenwoordigers om de Commissie ter verantwoording te roepen voor 
haar keuzes. In de praktijk blijkt echter slechts 22% van de bestudeerde EPL evaluaties in vragen 
van het EP te worden aangehaald. De enige significante verklaring voor variatie op dit gebied 
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ligt in de mate van conflict tussen het EP en de Commissie: de kans dat volksvertegenwoordigers 
een evaluatie in hun vragen aanhalen is veel groter als het onderwerp van deze evaluatie 
controversieel was tijdens het wetgevingsproces. 
 Een belangrijke kanttekening bij alle bovenstaande resultaten is dat de Commissie als 
het gaat om EPL evaluaties voorop loopt in vergelijking tot veel nationale overheden. De 
meeste landen die lid zijn van de OESO (een organisatie die evaluatiegebruik actief stimuleert) 
hebben in het geheel geen systematische regels voor de initiëring, de kwaliteit en het gebruik 
van EPL evaluaties en de paar landen die wel systematisch zulke evaluaties uitvoeren kennen 
problemen die vergelijkbaar zijn aan die van de Commissie. 
 
Algemene conclusies 
Diverse academische literatuur stelt dat de Europese Commissie (deels) gedreven wordt door 
het belang om haar competenties te maximaliseren. Wanneer toegepast op EPL evaluaties leidt 
deze theorie tot de hypothese dat de initiëring en de kwaliteit van zulke evaluaties lager zijn als 
de Commissie een groter risico loopt dat negatieve bevindingen va zulke evaluaties kunnen 
leiden tot kritiek op haar competenties. De resultaten van de dissertatie bevestigen deze 
verwachting echter niet. Wel laten de bevindingen zien dat diverse andere politieke en 
technische variabelen de initiëring, de kwaliteit en het gebruik van de EPL evaluaties van de 
Commissie beïnvloeden. Deze factoren variëren sterk per deelonderwerp en zijn daarom 
hierboven reeds opgesomd. 
 Naast deze theoretische conclusies hebben de resultaten van deze dissertatie ook 
enkele praktische implicaties. Ten eerste laten de bevindingen zien dat evaluatieclausules een 
nuttig instrument kunnen zijn om de systematische initiëring van EPL evaluaties in de EU te 
bevorderen (hoewel ze geeft effect op de kwaliteit van evaluaties lijken te hebben). Ten tweede 
tonen de resultaten aan dat extra investeringen in evaluatiecapaciteit de Commissie kunnen 
helpen om een groter deel van de wetgeving van de EU te evalueren. Ten derde laten de 
bevindingen zien dat de tijdige beschikbaarheid van EPL evaluaties cruciaal is om hun resultaten 
te kunnen gebruiken in besluitvorming, wat pleit voor een strikte handhaving van het ‘evaluate 
first’ principe dat de Commissie heeft geformuleerd. 
17 
 
Al met al toont deze dissertatie aan dat de EPL evaluaties van de Commissie weliswaar 
een grote bijdrage leveren aan leren en verantwoording, maar dat er ook nog forse 
verbeteringen mogelijk zijn op het gebied van de initiëring, de kwaliteit en het gebruik van deze 
evaluaties. Gezien de grote invloed van Europese wetgeving op het bestaan van burgers en 
bedrijven valt het te hopen dat de rol van EPL evaluaties in het verbeteren van deze wetgeving 
in de toekomst systematischer kan worden. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Stijn van Voorst 
 
In 2007 the European Commission, the main executive institution of the European Union (EU), 
initiated an evaluation of twelve EU directives on seeds and plant propagating material (the 
S&PM legislation). Since the 1960s these directives had sought to increase the safety of seeds 
by regulating their testing and marketing. However, their effectiveness had never been studied: 
it was unclear to what extent the legislation actually contributed to seed safety. This changed 
when the Commission received signals from seed producers that the implementation of the 
directives was causing problems: in some member states seed quality was tested extensively, 
whereas in others this was not the case. These signals led to the evaluation in 2007, which 
aimed to assess how the directives could be improved. 
 To enhance its quality, the evaluation was outsourced to a group of consultants led by 
Arcadia International. After conducting extensive interviews and surveys among stakeholders, 
the consultants delivered their report to the Commission in October 2008 (Arcadia 
International et al., 2008). In many respects the evaluation was of high quality: it presented 
data about all member states and clearly described its research questions, conclusions and 
methodology. However, the evaluation had one main flaw: the response rates of its surveys 
were relatively low. As a result, the Commission and various non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) felt that small seed producers were underrepresented in the results. 
 Despite this limitation, the Commission’s plant health unit still decided to use the 
report: it translated the evaluation’s recommendations into a legislative proposal, which was 
published in 2013. Since the aforementioned NGOs (e.g. IFOAM EU Group, 2013: 6-11) felt that 
this proposal did not represent their views, they lobbied against it at the European Parliament 
(EP). At the EP the evaluation report remained mostly unread - which, as subsequent chapters 
of this dissertation will show, is rather common. A combination of the lobby of the NGOs and 
the upcoming EP elections caused the proposal, which so closely followed the evaluation, to be 
rejected by an overwhelming majority of more than seven hundred votes in March 2014. 
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Although the Commission’s plant health unit would have liked to relaunch the proposal after its 
rejection, by that time a new College of Commissioners had entered into office and the topic 
was no longer a priority. As a result, after a process of more than six years, the S&PM legislation 
remained entirely unchanged (see chapter 7 for more details about this case). 
 The S&PM evaluation is just one instance of an ex-post legislative (EPL) evaluation 
conducted or outsourced by the European Commission. Essentially, such EPL evaluations are 
empirical studies that assess the functioning of existing EU legislation (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 479; 
European Commission, 2015: 271). In theory, they are supposed to contribute to the EU’s 
‘better regulation agenda’, by encouraging the improvement of legislation on the basis of 
objective knowledge (European Commission, 2015: 263; Fitzpatrick, 2012: 479; Luchetta, 2012: 
564). By producing data about if and why legislation achieves its objectives, EPL evaluations can 
be a useful source of information for policy makers to decide if and how this legislation is to be 
amended or repealed (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 479; Vedung, 1997: 109). 
The S&PM evaluation exemplifies the potential problems with the initiation, quality and 
use of the Commission’s EPL evaluations that may limit their contributions to such legislative 
improvement. Concerning initiation, the Commission’s reasons to launch an evaluation at a 
specific moment in time are sometimes illogical or unclear. Regarding quality, the consultants 
that usually conduct the evaluations may not deliver research that is methodologically sound. 
Concerning use, even if the responsible units within the Commission decide to use an 
evaluation, their proposals may be blocked by other institutions in the legislative process, 
which often do not have the time or do not see the need to read evaluation reports. The results 
of EPL evaluations may also be contested by interest groups and other actors in society that are 
affected by the legislation. 
In part due to such problems with the initiation, quality and use of EPL evaluations, 
there is a broad variety of evaluation practices in the Commission. Some EU legislation is 
evaluated by the institution after just a few years, while other legislation is evaluated only after 
decades or not at all. There are evaluations of EU legislation that merely summarise some 
stakeholder opinions, whereas others base their conclusions on a broad range of data. The 
Commission uses some EPL evaluations to fill in every detail of new legislative proposals, while 
it shelves other reports immediately after their publication. This dissertation presents the first 
20 
 
large-scale academic effort to describe and explain such variation in the initiation, quality and 
use of the Commission’s EPL evaluations, with the aim of assessing to what extent the 
Commission’s system for these evaluations is fit to contribute to learning and accountability. 
Section 1 of this introduction outlines the three main research questions of this 
dissertation, which are closely related to the three issues described above. The scope and key 
concepts of the research are discussed in section 2, whereas section 3 addresses the academic 
and practical relevance of the Commission’s EPL evaluations. Section 4 and 5 of this 
introduction proceed with a preview of the main theoretical arguments and methodologies 
used throughout this dissertation. Section 6 concludes with a description of the contributions of 
various co-authors to the research that was conducted for this dissertation. 
 
1. Research questions 
As was explained above, EPL evaluations theoretically have an important role to play in 
informing decision-making about legislation. By producing knowledge about how legislation 
functions in reality, evaluations can be used to decide if and how such legislation should be 
amended or repealed (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 479; Vedung, 1997: 109). EPL evaluations may also 
generate knowledge about how legislation is implemented (Coglianese, 2012: 11; Vedung, 
1997: 102-8). This in turn allows the actors that implement legislation - which are the 
Commission and national authorities in the case of the EU - to be held accountable for their 
actions (Højlund, 2014: 444; 2015: 35; Smith, 2015: 100; Summa and Toulemonde, 2002: 409; 
European Commission, 2007: 3; 2013: 2; 2015: 7). 
For EPL evaluations to properly fulfil these functions of learning and accountability, an 
organization like the Commission must meet (at least) three requirements, each of which 
underpins one of the key research questions of this dissertation. The first requirement is that 
EPL evaluations must be systematically initiated. This means that in principle, all major 
legislation should be evaluated periodically and any exceptions or delays in this regard should 
be explained transparently. If EPL evaluations are not systematically initiated they can only lead 
to the improvement of specific laws and cannot enhance legislative quality as a whole (OECD, 
2015: 120). Furthermore, if EPL evaluations are conducted selectively, the image could arise 
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that the Commission decides to conduct evaluations based on political considerations (Radaelli 
and Meuwese, 2010: 146). This, in turn, could harm the credibility of further evaluations. 
Since 2007 the official procedures of the Commission prescribe that all major EU 
legislation should be evaluated periodically (European Commission, 2007: 22; 2015: 257). In 
reality, however, the Commission does not seem to live up to this promise. According to the 
Commission’s own numbers, in 2013 29% of all important EU regulations had been evaluated, 
with a further 13% of such regulations being evaluated at that moment, 19% of such 
regulations having a future evaluation planned and no numbers being provided for directives 
(European Commission, 2013: 13). These numbers suggest that the Commission does not fully 
meet the requirement of systematic initiation: apparently, it prioritizes some pieces of 
legislation over others when deciding to launch EPL evaluations.  
However, since these numbers only concern regulations, date back to 2013 and are not 
backed up by publicly available data, there is a need for a more complete, up-to-date and 
transparent investigation of the initiation of EPL evaluations by the Commission. Another open 
question is why the Commission prioritizes some EPL evaluations over others. This dissertation 
aims to fill these gaps in our knowledge by studying if and why there is variation in the initiation 
of the Commission’s EPL evaluations. More formally, the first research question of this 
dissertation reads: 
 
Research question 1: How can the variance in the initiation of ex-post legislative evaluations by 
the European Commission be explained? 
 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation briefly answer this question in a descriptive way. Chapter 4 
answers the question more extensively in both a descriptive and an explanatory way. 
 A second requirement for an organization to benefit from EPL evaluations is high quality 
(OECD, 2015: 121). Since evaluations are a form of applied research (Pawson and Tilley, 1997: p. 
xiii), they are supposed to meet criteria of methodological quality (OECD, 2015: 121). If 
evaluations do not meet these criteria the knowledge that they produce may be false or 
incomplete, which potentially leads to wasted resources and undermines the legitimacy of 
evaluations as a tool for policy improvement (Mayne and Schwartz, 2005: 1; OECD, 2015: 121). 
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 To enhance the quality of both its ex-ante and its ex-post evaluations, the Commission 
has produced extensive guidelines that its civil servants must follow when supervising or 
conducting evaluations (European Commission, 2007: 2015). However, academic research has 
shown that the quality of the Commission’s ex-ante legislative evaluations (impact 
assessments) varies greatly (Lee and Kirkpatrick, 2004: 17-20; Renda, 2006: 62-6; Cecot et al., 
2008: 412-6), a finding that has been confirmed by the Commission’s internal Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board (2017: 12-5). Frequent issues with the quality of impact assessments are vague 
problem definitions and an overreliance on subjective data (Regulatory Scrutiny Board, 2017: 
13). As was shown by the case of the S&PM evaluation, methodological problems may also limit 
the quality and credibility of the Commission’s EPL evaluations. However, so far no hard 
conclusions could be drawn about this subject because there has been no research about the 
quality of the Commission’s EPL evaluations. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap in our 
knowledge by studying to what extent the Commission’s EPL evaluations differ in quality and 
how these differences can be explained. In other words, it answers the following question: 
 
Research question 2: How can the variance in the quality of ex-post legislative evaluations by 
the European Commission be explained? 
 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation briefly answer this research question in a descriptive way. Chapter 
5 answers the question more extensively in a descriptive and an explanatory way. 
A third requirement for an organization to benefit from EPL evaluations is systematic use 
(Mayne, 2014). Even if the Commission manages to consistently produce high-quality EPL 
evaluations, their results still need to be considered by decision-makers to be able to contribute 
to aims like learning and accountability (Højlund, 2014).  
Existing research shows that there is much variation in the extent to which actors use 
evaluations, both in general (e.g. Cousins and Leithwood, 1986; Johnson et al., 2009) and in the 
context of the EU (e.g. De Laat and Williams, 2014; Højlund, 2014; Højlund, 2015; Borrás and 
Højlund, 2015). Whereas some evaluation findings are used extensively by decision-makers to 
adapt policies or to improve their implementation, others remain unused. The S&PM evaluation 
described above is an example of an EPL evaluation that recommended significant changes to 
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EU directives, yet did not result in such amendments in the end. This dissertation provides a 
first overview of and explanation for the extent to which the Commission’s EPL evaluations are 
used in practice. More formally, the third research question of this dissertation reads: 
 
Research question 3: How can the variance in the use of the Commission’s ex-post legislative 
evaluations be explained? 
 
Chapter 6, 7 and 8 of this dissertation answer this research question in various ways. Chapter 6 
addresses the use of EPL evaluations by the Commission quantitatively, while chapter 7 studies 
this topic in a qualitative way. Chapter 8 addresses the use of the Commission’s EPL evaluations 
by the EP.  
The third chapter of this dissertation is the only one that provides no direct answer to 
any of the research questions described above. Instead, this chapter measures and explains the 
variation in the Commission’s evaluation capacity, which is an important theoretical 
explanation for variation in the initiation, quality and use of EPL evaluations (Nielsen et al., 
2011: 325; Pattyn, 2014: 348). Therefore, chapter 3 indirectly contributes to answering all three 
of the main research questions of this dissertation. 
The main aim of this dissertation is to answer the three research questions described 
above for the sake of contributing to academic knowledge. Besides this, the results of this 
dissertation should also result in recommendations for how the EU institutions can improve the 
practice of EPL evaluations. These recommendations are provided in the final conclusion of this 
dissertation. 
 
2. Definitions and scope 
This dissertation defines an ex-post legislative evaluation (EPL evaluation) as an empirical study 
initiated by the European Commission that retrospectively assesses the functioning of generally 
binding EU legislation. In this definition, ‘functioning’ can refer to a broad number of criteria, 
such as the implementation, cost-benefit ratio or (un)intended effects of the evaluation’s 
object of study.  
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The concept of ‘generally binding European legislation’ refers to EU regulations, 
directives and treaty articles. Evaluations of decisions about single cases or non-binding rules 
therefore fall outside of the scope of this dissertation. Although such evaluations could be an 
interesting topic for academic research, they differ from EPL evaluations as defined above 
because the Commission’s better regulation agenda and evaluation guidelines do not fully 
apply to them (European Commission, 2015: 35, 73). Moreover, evaluations of single decisions 
are unlikely to result in general policy changes and evaluations of non-binding rules cannot 
result in enforcement actions. Therefore, such evaluations can be expected to be driven by 
different mechanisms than EPL evaluations. 
 It should be noted that the definition provided above deviates from the official 
description of EPL evaluations used by the Commission. Since 2015, the Commission considers 
an evaluation to be a staff working document that assesses the effectiveness, efficiency, 
relevance, coherence and EU added value of a policy (European Commission, 2015: 271, 289). 
Although such documents are often based on reports by external consultants that may also 
bear the title ‘evaluation’, these are not officially recognized as such by the Commission. 
Reports that only assess some of the criteria listed above or only assess the implementation of 
legislation are also not considered full evaluations by the Commission. Instead, they are 
referred to as ‘studies’ or simply ‘reports’.  
There are three reasons to deviate from the Commission’s official definition in this 
dissertation. Firstly, the data presented here mostly concern the years 2000-2014, which was 
before the Commission clarified its definition of an ‘evaluation’ in 2015. Secondly, because 
evaluations and ‘studies’ or ‘reports’ about legislation often differ solely in the number of 
aspects that they assess, there is no reason to assume that different criteria should apply to 
their initiation, quality or use, or that these issues should be studied with different methods. 
Thirdly, an exclusive focus on the Commission’s official ‘evaluations’ would limit the number of 
cases that can be studied, which would negatively affect the causal validity and external validity 
of this dissertation. Out of the 313 cases included in the main dataset used for this dissertation 
(which is further described below), 99 cases bear the official title ‘evaluation’, 56 cases bear the 
official title ‘study’, 120 cases bear the official title ‘report’ and the approximately fifty other 
cases1 bear a variety of other titles, like ‘assessment’ or ‘appraisal’. 
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The reason why this dissertation focuses on EPL evaluations of the Commission is that it 
is the leading executive organization of the EU and therefore bears the main responsibility for 
evaluating European policies (Stern, 2009: 70-1; EC, 2015: 253). For this reason, the 
Commission is the only EU institution that can be expected to initiate and use EPL evaluations 
on a large scale. Indeed, the other main institutions of the EU only conduct evaluations to a 
limited degree. Whereas the EP has had a research service that may conduct EPL evaluations 
since 2012 (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2017: 7), in June 2017 this service had 
only conducted 33 ex-post evaluations in total.2 The Council and the European Council had no 
permanent services for ex-post evaluations at the time this dissertation was completed. The 
European Court of Auditors has produced some performance audits, meta-evaluations and 
special reports that assess EU legislation indirectly, but usually it does not evaluate individual 
pieces of legislation (Stephenson, 2015). The few EPL evaluations that have been conducted by 
these institutions could also be driven by different factors than the Commission’s evaluations, 
which makes it appropriate to exclude them from this dissertation. 
Now that the definition of an EPL evaluation as used in this dissertation has been 
clarified, the question arises why this topic is worthy of academic scrutiny. The next section 
therefore discusses the relevance of the Commission’s EPL evaluations from both a theoretical 
and a practical perspective. 
 
3. Relevance 
Because of its strong reliance on legislative policies, the EU has often been dubbed a ‘regulatory 
state’ (Lodge, 2008: 282; Majone, 1999: 1; Radaelli, 1999: 759). As the Commission plays a 
central role in these policies, most of its legislative tasks have received ample academic 
scrutiny. For example, many scholars have studied the Commission’s role in initiating legislative 
proposals, producing delegated and implementing legislation and enforcing national 
compliance with EU legislation (for an overview of relevant literature, see Kassim et al., 2013; 
McCormick, 2015: 155-74; Schmidt and Wonka, 2013; Wille, 2013).  
In contrast to this extensive attention for the Commission’s tasks to produce and 
enforce legislation, the institution’s role in the final stage of the EU legislative process has 
largely been ignored: there is very little academic work about EPL evaluations in the EU. While 
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various authors have paid attention to ex-post evaluations of EU spending programmes (e.g. 
Bachtler and Wren, 2006; Baslé, 2007; Højlund, 2014; Borrás and Højlund, 2015) and impact 
assessments of proposals for new EU legislation (e.g. Cecot et al., 2008; Radaelli, 2009; Radaelli 
and Meuwese, 2010; Torriti, 2010), EPL evaluations in the EU have received very little academic 
scrutiny. The exception to this are general texts about evaluation in the EU that include some 
paragraphs about EPL evaluations (e.g. Højlund, 2015; Summa and Toulemonde, 2002; Stame, 
2008; Stern, 2009), articles that discuss the Commission’s EPL evaluations as a form of input for 
impact assessments (e.g. Luchetta, 2012; Smismans, 2015), and a paper about such evaluations 
written by a practitioner (Fitzpatrick, 2012).  
This lack of attention is all the more surprising given the theoretical importance of EPL 
evaluations. As explained above, EPL evaluations may produce knowledge about the 
effectiveness and implementation of legislation, thus making them a potential source of 
information for the Commission and other decision-makers when proposing policy changes 
(Fitzpatrick, 2012: 479; Vedung, 1997: 102-9). By doing so, EPL evaluations are both the final 
step in the EU’s legislative process and a potential first step in a process of amendments 
(Smismans, 2015: 19). 
Besides this theoretical relevance, EPL evaluations are also increasingly important for 
the day-to-day activities of the Commission. The institution first emphasized the importance of 
EPL evaluations for legislative improvement and accountability in 2000, after which it started to 
systematize its procedures for such evaluations from 2007 onwards (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 478; 
European Commission, 2007: 3-4). Since 2010 the Commission has also stressed the role of EPL 
evaluations in judging the suitability of entire regulatory frameworks (so-called ‘fitness checks’) 
(European Commission, 2010: 5). Furthermore, from 2012 onwards it has given EPL evaluations 
a central place in its REFIT programme, which aims to identify and remove superfluous rules 
(European Commission, 2012: 4). In 2015 the Commission published a new ‘better regulation 
toolbox’ that included extensive guidelines for EPL evaluations (European Commission, 2015). 
This was a significant development because the Commission’s previous evaluation guidelines 
mostly focused on spending programmes (European Commission, 2004). 
Given the theoretical importance of EPL evaluations and the increased attention that 
they receive in practice at the EU level, it is important for scholars to critically assess if and why 
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the Commission engages in evaluated-related activities. Does the Commission indeed 
systematically initiate and use high-quality evaluations? Is the purpose of the Commission’s 
evaluation-related activities really to improve learning and accountability, or do other motives 
inform these efforts? To answer these questions and more, this dissertation presents a first 
academic effort to systematically describe and explain the initiation, quality and use of the 
Commission’s EPL evaluations. 
 
4. Theoretical framework 
 
Political and technical explanations 
Despite the existence of a vast literature about evaluation methods and techniques (e.g. 
Vedung, 1997; Nielsen et al., 2011; Rossi et al., 2004), there is a lack of comprehensive 
explanatory theories about the initiation, quality and use of evaluations. However, empirical 
research has revealed various individual factors that may explain these phenomena. These 
factors can broadly be divided in two categories: political and technical explanations (Bovens et 
al., 2008: 120; Schwartz, 1998: 295; Weiss, 1993: 94).  
Political explanations, firstly, refer to the interests that actors have in (not) conducting 
evaluation-related activities like initiating an evaluation, investing in evaluation quality and 
using evaluation results. The logic behind these explanations is that evaluation-related activities 
are inherently subjective: they will be supported by actors to which they are advantageous and 
opposed by actors to which they are disadvantageous (Bovens et al., 2008: 120; Schwartz, 
1998: 295; Vedung, 1997: 111; Weiss, 1993: 95-8).  
Following this logic, political actors like the EU institutions can be expected to engage in 
evaluation-related activities that are beneficial to them and to refrain from evaluation-related 
activities for which the opposite is the case. This expectation is especially plausible for EPL 
evaluations, as legislative changes are always discussed in parliament and are therefore likely to 
receive much attention at the political level (Bussmann, 2014: 1; Højlund, 2015: 45). The S&PM 
evaluation that was discussed at the beginning of this introduction is an example of an 
evaluation that failed to change existing policies due to political considerations in the European 
Parliament, such as upcoming elections and active opposition by NGOs. 
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‘Technical’ explanations, secondly, are related to the capacity and formal obligations to 
conduct evaluations. The logic behind these explanations is that some evaluations have to be 
prioritized over others due to limited resources. Therefore, it can be expected that 
organizations that invest more human and financial capital in evaluations will initiate more and 
better EPL evaluations and make more use of their results (Nielsen et al., 2011: 325; Pattyn, 
2014: 348). It can also be expected that organizations will prioritize investing in evaluations that 
are made compulsory by either general procedures or evaluation clauses in specific pieces of 
legislation (Summa and Toulemonde, 2002: 410). 
Concerning evaluation use, slightly different expectations are formulated throughout 
this dissertation. Because decisions concerning legislative changes are always at the discretion 
of the legislator, the use of EPL evaluations is never made compulsory by evaluation clauses. In 
EU legislation such clauses may prescribe when and sometimes how the Commission must 
conduct an EPL evaluation, but not whether it should implement the results. Therefore, in this 
dissertation the presence of evaluation clauses is not expected to affect evaluation use. 
Conversely, a factor that is expected to influence evaluation use in particular is evaluation 
quality: decision-makers are more likely to use evaluations when they trust that their results 
are robust (Johnson et al., 2009: 377-378; De Laat and Williams, 2014: 158-67). 
 These political and technical explanations for evaluation-related activities can be linked 
to different views about the nature of the European Commission. The Commission used to be 
viewed as a technocratic institution that fulfilled the tasks that the EU’s member states 
delegated to it to the best of its abilities (Radaelli, 1999: 759; Wille, 2013; Franchino, 2007: 11; 
Boswell, 2008: 472; Hartlapp et al., 2014: 1). In this context, ‘technocratic’ refers to decision-
making on the basis of objective knowledge (Radaelli, 1999: 759), for which EPL evaluations 
may be a useful tool (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 479). Over time the technocratic perspective has been 
replaced by the view that the Commission is (also) a political institution that pursues its own 
preferences (e.g. Cini, 2015; Franchino, 2007: 11; Wille, 2013: 191-192; Wonka, 2015), for 
example by protecting and increasing its competences (Hartlapp, 2014: 1-14; Majone, 1996: 65; 
Nugent and Rhinard, 2016: 1201; Tallberg, 2003: 28). If the Commission indeed operates as a 
political institution we would expect political factors to best explain its evaluation-related 
decisions, whereas if it operates as a technocratic institution we would expect technical factors 
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to be more important. Therefore, this dissertation also aims to shed some further light on the 
nature of the Commission and its role in EU governance. 
 
Application per chapter 
The political and technical explanations described above are applied in various ways throughout 
this dissertation, depending on the specific content of each chapter. Chapter 2 is descriptive in 
nature and therefore does not have an explanatory theoretical framework. However, this 
chapter’s conclusion does highlight the potential of political and technical explanations for the 
initiation and quality of evaluations. 
 Chapter 3 provides three possible explanations for variation in the capacity of the 
Commission’s directorates-general (DGs) to conduct EPL evaluations: the amount of legislation 
for which a DG is responsible, the presence of a tradition of evaluating spending programmes 
and the sensitivity of a DG’s policy field. The first two of these explanations are technical in 
nature, because they focus on the extent to which DGs must build evaluation capacity due to 
their legislative obligations and the extent to which they have the experience needed to do so. 
The third explanation is political in nature, as it predicts that DGs with policy fields that are 
politically sensitive build less evaluation capacity, since for them evaluation results may be 
particularly threatening. 
 Chapter 4 presents two motives for the Commission to (not) initiate an EPL evaluation: 
an enforcement motive and a strategic motive. Both of these motives are political in nature, as 
they concern the potential advantages and disadvantages of EPL evaluations to the 
Commission’s interests. On the one hand, EPL evaluations may be useful for the Commission to 
check legislative implementation by the member states (enforcement motive), while on the 
other hand they may threaten the Commission’s competences if their findings are negative 
(strategic motive). Technical explanations like the presence of evaluation clauses and the 
evaluation capacity of the responsible DGs are treated as control variables in this chapter. 
 Chapter 5 focuses on the quality of the Commission’s EPL evaluations in relation to their 
suitability to learn about legislative effectiveness. Therefore, factors related to the role of such 
evaluations in enforcement processes were omitted here. However, the strategic motive 
presented in chapter 4 is also considered in this chapter, as the Commission may have an 
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incentive to distort the quality of EPL evaluations when there is a risk that negative findings 
could threaten its competences. The effects of technical variables like the evaluation capacity of 
the responsible DGs, the type of evaluator and the complexity of the evaluated legislation are 
also assessed in this chapter. 
 Chapter 6 studies three technical explanations for the use of the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations in subsequent impact assessments (and vice versa): the timeliness of the EPL 
evaluations, their overall quality and their scope. All of these explanations are related to the 
practical possibilities to use an evaluation in an impact assessments (and vice versa), which is 
expected to be difficult if an EPL evaluation is not available on time or if it does not provide the 
required information. Political explanations for use were not considered in this chapter because 
of a lack of reliable quantitative indicators for such variables. 
 Conversely, chapter 7 focuses specifically on the influence of political factors on the use 
of EPL evaluations by the Commission. In this chapter, technical explanations for use were held 
constant by studying three cases that were all of high quality and were all conducted by the 
same DG. The central theoretical expectation of this chapter is that the absence of opposition 
to an evaluation’s findings by important political actors is a necessary condition for use. In other 
words, if the Commission, the EP, the Council or all major interest groups oppose a 
recommendation provided by an EPL evaluation, we can expect this recommendation to remain 
unused when subsequent legislative proposals are drafted. 
 Chapter 8 provides four possible explanations for variation in the use of the 
Commission’s EPL evaluations by members of the EP (MEPs): the objectivity of the evaluation’s 
results, the communicative quality of the evaluation, the salience of the evaluation’s topic to 
MEPs and the level of conflict during the legislative process. The first two of these explanations 
are technical3 in nature because they are dimensions of evaluation quality - the chances that an 
EPL evaluation is used by MEPs can be expected to increase if they trust its results. The other 
two explanations are political in nature, as they concern MEPs’ interests in controlling the way 






5. Methods and data  
 
Data collection and case selection 
Before the research presented in this dissertation was conducted, no large-scale overview of 
the Commission’s EPL evaluations existed. Therefore, a unique dataset of 313 EPL evaluations 
was constructed for the purpose of this dissertation. The evaluations were collected from a 
large number of sources, including various webpages and reports of the Commission as well as 
the EU Bookshop, Eur-lex, and systematic Google searches. For a full overview of the dataset 
and its sources, see chapter 2 and four of this dissertation.  
The use of this dataset enhances the external validity of the dissertation: most of the 
research findings represent (almost) the entire population of publicly available EPL evaluations, 
at least within the timeframe of the data collection. This timeframe differs somewhat between 
the chapters. In chapter 2 and eight the dataset includes about 220 evaluations from 2000-
2012, as these chapters were completed during 2014. The other chapters were written during 
2015-2017 and are therefore based on the ‘full’ dataset of 313 EPL evaluations from 2000-2014. 
The timeframe per chapter is summarised in Table 1. 
The reason for only including evaluations published since 2000 is that the Commission 
formulated the ambition to systematically evaluate EU legislation for the first time during that 
year (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 478). Furthermore, evaluations published before 2000 are less likely to 
have been published online. The reason to end the data collection at 2014 is that it often takes 
some time before all evaluations from a certain year are published. Therefore, if EPL 
evaluations from 2015-2017 had been studied as well, there would likely have been gaps in the 
data collection for these years. Such gaps could have led to biases in the results. 
Three additional datasets were used for specific chapters of this dissertation. Firstly, 
chapter 3 uses a dataset of seventeen directorates-general (DGs) of the Commission to explain 
variance in their evaluation capacity. Secondly, chapter 4 uses a dataset of 277 major pieces of 
EU legislation from 2000-2004 to study why some of this legislation is evaluated while other 
legislation is not. An initial version of this dataset is also used in chapter 2. Thirdly, chapter 6 
uses a dataset of 225 impact assessments to study the extent to which EPL evaluations feed 
into subsequent legislative processes. Table 1 provides a full list of these additional datasets. 
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Table 1: overview of research methods 
Chapter 
number 




2 Description of 
dataset 








Dataset of 17 DGs 
dealing with legislation 
Interview & qualitative 
document analysis 
QCA 
4 Initiation of 
evaluations 
Dataset of 313 EPL 
evaluation 2000-2014 & 
Dataset of 277 major 














6 Evaluation use Dataset of 313 EPL 
evaluation 2000-2014 & 





7 Evaluation use Dataset of 313 EPL 
evaluation 2000-2014. 
Interviews & qualitative 
document analysis 
Process tracing 










Although most of the research presented in this dissertation is quantitative, case studies were 
used as well for chapter 7. Their main purpose was to delve into the underlying mechanisms of 
the use of EPL evaluations: why do certain variables explain variance in such use? The full 
dataset of EPL evaluations was used to select appropriate cases for this endeavour, thus mixing 
a quantitative and a qualitative approach. 
 
Methods of analysis 
In chapter 4, 5 and 8 of this dissertation various forms of regression analysis are the main 
method of analysis, as this is the most suitable technique to answer explanatory research 
questions based on quantitative data (Field, 2013: 768-810; Long, 1997: 42). The other chapters 
use a variation of other methods of analysis. Chapter 2 is entirely descriptive and therefore 
features no explanatory analysis. Chapter 3 and 6 are based on quantitative datasets that are 
too small or have too few positive scores on their dependent variables to make regression 
analysis viable. Therefore, QCA was used as the method of analysis for these chapters, as this 
technique can be used with small numbers of cases. An additional advantage of QCA is that it 
allows for studying combinations of factors that may explain a certain outcome (Ragin, 2008: 9). 
Chapter 7 is entirely based on in-depth case studies and therefore features process-
tracing as its method of analysis: the detailed examination of sequences of events to study if 
the causal mechanisms implied by a certain theory are indeed present (George and Bennett, 
2005: 9). Table 1 summarises the method of analysis and the other methodological 
characteristics of each chapter. 
 
6. Articles and co-authorships 
The seven substantive chapters of this dissertation (chapter 2-8) were originally written as 
individual articles. At the time this dissertation was completed, six of these articles had been 
published in peer-reviewed journals; the full references to these publications can be found at 
the beginning of the corresponding chapters. The texts of these articles are identical to the 
texts of the associated chapters, although their lay-out and references have been updated to 
make them look more consistent.4 At the time of writing, only the article about evaluation 
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quality that underlies chapter 5 had not yet been accepted for publication. The content of the 
final version of this article may therefore deviate from the corresponding chapter if it is revised 
during its review process. 
Out of the seven substantive chapters, chapter 3 was written without any co-authors. 
The other six chapters include at least some contributions from other academics. For the sake 
of transparency these contributions are listed below. All co-authors have given explicit approval 
to include the articles that they have helped to produce in this dissertation.  
 Concerning chapter 2, Prof. Dr. Ellen Mastenbroek is the first author and Prof. Dr. Anne 
Meuwese is the third author. My main contribution as second author was constructing the 
dataset of EPL evaluations that is presented in this chapter (and is also used in all other 
chapters of the dissertation) under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Ellen Mastenbroek. I also wrote 
most of the methodology and results sections of this chapter and I assisted in writing the other 
parts of the text; the co-authors wrote most of the other sections of this chapter. 
 Chapter 4 and 5 are joint publications with Prof. Dr. Ellen Mastenbroek as the second 
author. Her main contributions to these chapters were developing an initial version of the 
theoretical framework and providing feedback throughout the research and writing process. 
Chapter 6 is a joint publication with Thomas van Golen LLM MSc. The work conducted 
for this study was split equally between both authors and the order of their names on the 
publication was therefore determined alphabetically. Thomas van Golen LLM MSc collected all 
of the data about impact assessments that is presented in this chapter and wrote the parts of 
the text that concern the use of EPL evaluations by impact assessments. Conversely, I collected 
all of the data about EPL evaluations that is presented in this chapter and wrote the parts of the 
text that concern the use of impact assessments by EPL evaluations.  
 Chapter 7 is a joint publication with Dr. Pieter Zwaan as the second author. His main 
contributions to the chapter were developing and drafting parts of the research methodology, 
providing extensive feedback throughout the research process and providing assistance during 
three interviews. 
 Regarding chapter 8, Dr. Pieter Zwaan is the first author and Prof. Dr. Ellen Mastenbroek 
is the third author. My own contributions to this chapter mainly concerned the data collection 
35 
 
and analysis, writing the methodology and results sections and assisting on writing other parts 
of the text; the co-authors wrote most of the other parts of this chapter. 
 The reason to include these seven chapters in this dissertation despite their various sets 
of co-authors is that they all concern different steps in the process of the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations. This makes reading them in combination with each other especially valuable. 
Furthermore, all seven of the chapters are in some way related to the dataset of EPL 
evaluations that is described in detail in chapter 2. Together, the seven chapters aim to provide 
a comprehensive picture of the dataset and the process of EPL evaluation in the Commission, 
which would not have been possible if some of them had been left out. 
Besides the contributions of the various co-authors, full credit is given to Prof. Dr. Ellen 
Mastenbroek for setting up the project about EPL evaluations that led to this dissertation and 
to the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (in Dutch: Nederlandse Organisatie voor 
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, NWO) for funding the project.5 The assistance of these actors 




 The categories mentioned here are not entirely mutually exclusive. For example, there is one case that is called 
an ‘evaluation study’ and one other case that is called an ‘evaluation study report’. This is why the total number of 
cases mentioned in the text is not exactly 313. 
2
 The number of 33 ex-post evaluations was received from the ex-post evaluations unit of the European 
Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) via e-mail contact with eprs-expostevaluation@europarl.europa.eu at 26 
June 2017. According to the e-mail from this unit, 23 ‘European implementation assessments’ had been published 
by the research service before the summer of 2017. These assessments are essentially ex-post evaluations of the 
implementation of European policies. There were ten further reports categorized as ‘other ex-post evaluations’, 
adding up to 33 ex-post evaluations in total. These evaluations usually concern legislation, but not always; exact 
numbers in this regard could not be provided. Two other types of reports from the EPRS that may partly evaluate 
EU legislation are ‘implementation appraisals’ (64 in total) and ‘rolling-check lists’ (13 in total). However, these 
publications take the form of brief notes rather than full reports and are therefore no EPL evaluations as defined in 
this dissertation. 
3 
In chapter 8 these two explanations are called ‘rationalistic’ instead of ‘technical’. This is due to the fact that this 
chapter was published as an article in an early stage of the PhD project - for the later articles the term ‘technical’ 
has been preferred because it is less ambiguous. The meaning of both words is the same in the context of this 
dissertation. 
4
 In particular, all references were made consistent with the APA-style used by the Journal of European Public 
Policy, in which chapter 2 and 7 of this dissertation have been published. This resulted in some significant changes 
to chapter 6, which had previously been published in a journal that uses a completely different style of referencing. 





was added at the end of its text. For the other chapters the changes were relatively minor, although some 
mistakes in the references made in the original articles have been fixed. 
5 
The official title and number of the project that was funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific 
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Abstract 
Theoretically, ex-post legislative (EPL) evaluations play an important role in the European 
regulatory cycle. By critically assessing the administration, compliance or outcomes of 
legislation, they may allow for learning and inform enforcement. At the same time, the 
European Commission may have incentives not to evaluate, as EPL evaluations may lead to 
undesired policy change or repeal. Furthermore, the development of systematic, high-quality 
EPL evaluations is threatened by more technical problems in the sphere of evaluability. Hence, 
the odds are against the systematic production of high-quality evaluations in the European 
Union (EU). This article assesses this argument by conducting a meta evaluation of the coverage 
and quality of ex-post legislative evaluations by the European Commission, using two novel 
datasets. The main findings are that EPL evaluation coverage indeed is patchy, with no clear 
upward trend in recent years. EPL evaluation is primarily a matter of legislative obligation 
instead of own initiative. There is great scope, finally, for enhancing the quality of EPL 
evaluations, by improving methodological quality, stakeholder involvement and transparency. 
 
1. Introduction 
‘Evaluation answers the question of whether a treatment works in terms of reducing a problem’ 
(Coglianese, 2012: 14). By critically assessing the administration, compliance or outcomes of 
legislation, ex-post legislative (EPL) evaluation should enable policy-makers to establish faults in 
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the linkages between law-on-paper and actual effects (Coglianese, 2012: 14). By providing a 
learning opportunity (Smismans, 2015: 12) and a basis for enforcement (Stame, 2008: 124), EPL 
evaluations may play an important role in the regulatory cycle. 
The European Commission (EC) (2000, 2001, 2004, 2010a, 2013, 20151), clearly 
recognizing the potential of EPL evaluations, has repeatedly committed itself to systematic, 
high-quality EPL evaluation. It has offered a range of rationales for doing so, including priority-
setting and resource allocation (European Commission, 2004: 9), enhancing effectiveness 
(European Commission, 2001: 10), accountability (European Commission, 2010a: 2), legitimacy 
(European Commission, 2007: 3) and enforcement (European Commission, 2010a: 7). EPL 
evaluations have come to constitute a key building block of the Commission’s Smart Regulation 
strategy, and its current Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT) programme, according to 
which evaluations should inform legislative review (Smismans, 2015: 11-12; European 
Commission, 2013: 3; 2014: 13-14). 
Despite their theoretically important role in the regulatory cycle, the systematic 
production and high quality of EPL evaluations are not guaranteed. In line with both the 
political and rationalistic view of evaluation (Bovens et al., 2008), two obstacles can be 
identified. First, because EPL evaluations may uncover critical problems in the actual working of 
legislation, they may lead to calls for legislative repeal. This potential outcome clashes with the 
Commission’s alleged strategy of continuous legislative expansion (Lodge, 2008: 286; Majone, 
1999: 2) and creates a risk of selective, biased or even absent evaluations. This way, the 
Commission, seen as an agent of the Council, may try to avoid control by the Council (Pollack, 
1997: 109; Tallberg, 2003: 19). In its role as guardian of the treaties, however, the Commission 
may use evaluations to uncover faults in member state implementation. Second, according to 
the rationalistic view, systematic high-quality evaluation may be hampered by problems of 
evaluability (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 480; Summa and Toulemonde, 2002). In sum, both the political 
and rationalistic perspective on evaluation predict that, despite its theoretical potential, 
systematic high-quality EPL evaluation by the Commission is not likely to materialize, with the 
exception of evaluations aimed at establishing national implementation.  
This article seeks to evaluate the coverage and quality of EPL evaluation through a meta 
evaluation of the EU’s evaluation system (Cooksy and Caracelli, 2005), focusing on its main 
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outputs (Schwartz and Mayne, 2005: 6): specific EPL reports. This meta evaluation is embedded 
in an analytical framework comprising four aspects of evaluation coverage (proportion, 
number, obligatory character and object of evaluation) and four quality variables (evaluation 
type, methodological quality, process quality and usefulness). The meta evaluation is based on 
two novel datasets compiled for this purpose: one containing 216 EPL evaluations: one 
containing 156 major EU directives and regulations. 
By evaluating the EU’s evaluation system, this article paves the way for future theory-
testing studies on this virtually neglected stage in the EU regulatory cycle. It thus seeks to bring 
EPL legislative evaluation2 on a par with, firstly, the well-researched other stages of the EU 
regulatory cycle (Versluis et al., 2011), and, secondly, other types of EU evaluation, most 
notably impact assessment (Renda, 2006; Radaelli, 2009; Radaelli and Meuwese, 2010) and 
programme evaluation (Bachtler and Wren, 2006). 
 
2. EPL evaluations in the EU regulatory cycle 
EPL evaluation in the EU is the province of the European Commission (Poptcheva, 2013: 2) or, 
rather, individual DGs within it (Summa and Toulemonde, 2002: 413). The EU’s Financial 
Regulation (966/2012) stipulates that results of periodic evaluations of community actions 
should be taken into account in budgetary decisions (Art. 30). Accordingly, ex-post evaluations 
of expenditure programmes have been conducted from the 1980s, to the point where this 
became well-established practice (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 478). EPL evaluations, however, have been 
much less common (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 479).3 Therefore, in 2000 the Commission committed 
itself to conduct evaluations on legislation with substantial impacts (Poptcheva, 2013: 2). The 
2001 Mandelkern report triggered the EU’s Better Regulation policy, which seeks to improve 
the quality of EU legislation through regulatory impact assessment, consultation standards and 
simplification programmes (Radaelli and Meuwese, 2009: 640). 
The Commission’s 2001 White Paper on Governance called for more evidence-based 
decision making (Poptcheva, 2013: 2). It established effectiveness as an important principle of 
good governance, arguing that more legislative evaluation clauses were required. Yet, this did 
not increase attention for EPL evaluation. The Commission’s 2002 Communication on Better 
Lawmaking (European Commission, 2002) confirmed systematic ex-ante impact assessment as 
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the tool for enhancing effectiveness. In 2007, the tide seemed to turn as the Commission 
promised an action plan to promote EPL evaluation, revised its evaluation quality standards, 
and emphasized the essential role of ex-post evaluation (European Commission, 2007: 3; 
Fitzpatrick, 2012: 478). Yet, the European Court of Auditors (2010: 42) stated that ‘only 24% of 
ex-post evaluations addressed issues related to the review of existing legislation’. Given the fact 
that legislation is the main policy instrument used by the European Union (Lodge, 2008: 282), 
this suggests that legislation remains an underemphasized component of the Commission’s 
evaluation system. 
The Commission restated its ambitions for ex-post evaluation, including EPL evaluation, 
several times (European Commission, 2010a; 2015: 255). In his political guidelines for 2010-
2014, president Barroso (2009: 29) stressed that the Commission should ‘match this huge 
investment in ex-ante assessment with an equivalent effort in ex-post evaluation’. Partly to this 
end, in 2009 co-ordination of the evaluation system shifted to the Secretariat-General (SG). 
Commission policy documents have come to picture the regulatory process as a ‘cycle’ 
consisting of the following consecutive stages: inception; design; legislation; implementation; 
and review; which should inform a new cycle (European Commission, 2013: 13; Smismans 2015: 
11). The Commission’s current strategy unfolds along the twin lines of evaluations of individual 
legislation and ‘fitness checks’ - evaluations of policy areas (European Commission, 2015: 254). 
 
3. Theoretical expectations 
Despite their theoretical potential, the systematic production of high-quality EPL evaluations 
also presents the Commission with a risk. Since EPL evaluations may uncover critical problems 
in the actual working of legislation, they may function as a ‘dagger in the back’ (Vedung: 1997: 
108) for the European Commission. Member states, interest groups or the European Parliament 
(EP) may use unfavourable evaluations to demand the Commission to change or repeal 
legislation. Although the Commission itself (2013: 8) recognizes legislative repeal as a possible 
consequence, this possibility seems at odds with the Commission’s alleged strategy of 
continuous legislative expansion (Lodge, 2008: 286; Majone, 1999: 2; Majone, 2005: 146). 
According to Majone (2005: 39), the logic of EU integration is one of ‘integration by stealth’ - 
the Commission continuously striving to protect and promote the supranational interest. 
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Accordingly, Majone argues that the Commission is relatively indifferent to actual policy 
outcomes, which instead are more the by-product of actions undertaken to advance the 
integration process (Majone, 2005: 107). Accordingly, as argued by Majone (2005: 107), ‘policy 
evaluation (... plays) a very limited role in the EU policy process’.    
A similar conclusion can be reached when applying principal-agent theory to the EU 
(Tallberg, 2003: 5-6). In this logic, EPL evaluations can be seen as an oversight procedure for the 
Council to control the Commission (Pollack, 1997: 109). Accordingly, the Commission may wish 
to avoid high-quality evaluations in policy areas where it wishes to maintain its information 
advantage (Pollack, 1997: 126).  
The Commission thus faces a dilemma: to capture the potential of systematic high-
quality evaluation it introduces the risk of undermining hard-fought legislative compromises 
and reopening legislative dossiers. This dilemma may diminish the incentive to produce 
objective evaluations aimed at fact-finding (Bovens et al., 2008: 323). Similar trade-offs have 
been shown for EU impact assessments (Boswell, 2008: 485-86; Radaelli and Meuwese, 2010: 
145), and evaluations more generally (Bovens et al., 2008: 320; Vedung, 1997: 111-113).  
At the same time, the Commission can be seen as the principal of the member states. In 
its role of guardian of the treaties, the Commission is responsible for monitoring and enforcing 
EU legislation. Given its lack of inspection powers, the Commission could use EPL evaluations to 
assess policy implementation or administration at the national level (Stame, 2008). 
Turning to the rationalistic perspective on evaluation (Bovens et al, 2008), the 
production of systematic high-quality evaluation is likely to be hampered by problems of a 
more technical nature. The assumption in this literature is that evaluation initiation and quality 
depend on evaluability: how easy or difficult a policy is to evaluate (Summa and Toulemonde, 
2002: 408). In the EU context, evaluability is threatened by divergent implementation by the 
member states (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 480; Summa and Toulemonde, 2002: 408) - which is likely 
when EU legislation contains discretion (Franchino, 2007: 1), or is ambiguous (Mastenbroek, 
2003: 376-377). Furthermore, evaluability is hampered by the absence of a natural moment to 
evaluate regulations or directives - in contrast to policy programmes, which have fixed life 
cycles (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 480-481). 
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In sum, we argue that systematic high-quality EPL evaluation by the Commission is not 
likely to materialize, an exception being evaluations aimed at establishing member state 
implementation. This expectation forms the rationale for a meta evaluation of EPL evaluations 
in the EU setting. 
 
4. Analytical framework 
Our meta evaluation comprises two criteria: systematic coverage and evaluation quality. The 
first evaluation criterion is systematic coverage (Stern, 2009: 71). According to the European 
Commission’s own evaluation standards (European Commission, 2015: 253-7), all activities 
addressed to external parties must be periodically evaluated in proportion with the allocated 
resources and the expected impact. In reality, evaluation coverage is seldom complete, because 
resources for evaluations are likely to be focused (Radaelli and Meuwese, 2010: 146). In line 
with our general expectation, we expect to see patchy evaluation, with no clear trend over 
time, and several politically sensitive laws not being evaluated. Owing to the political costs of 
evaluation, we expect evaluation to be primarily obligatory in nature, necessitated by a 
legislative evaluation clause. Additionally, since directives are likely to be more prone to 
divergent implementation by the member states than regulations (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 480), we 
will also explore whether the Commission prioritizes this type of evaluation. 
Our second evaluation criterion is evaluation quality. Political pressures on evaluators 
may reduce evaluation quality (Schwartz and Mayne, 2005: 2; Versluis et al., 2011: 223). The 
European Commission, in its role as an agent, is expected to hide information from its principals 
to maximize its autonomy (Tallberg, 2003: 19). Turning to the rationalistic perspective, 
‘technical’ impediments to methodological quality in the EU are limited availability of data 
owing to a lack of inspection powers for the Commission, and problems inherent to the 
methodologically daunting task of establishing the working and outcomes of legislation in an EU 
of 28 member states (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 480). 
 Given the underlying idea that EPL evaluations are to inform subsequent revision and 
possibly even repeal of legislation, evaluation quality is, firstly, a matter of the type of 
evaluation conducted. If evaluations are to seriously gauge the extent to which ‘a treatment 
works in terms of reducing a problem’, they must incorporate the administration, compliance, 
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and outcomes of legislation (Coglianese, 2012: 14) and go beyond mere process evaluations 
focusing on transposition, implementation and enforcement of EU legislation.  
A second quality variable (European Commission, 2007: 5; Forss and Carlsson, 1997: 
488; Schwartz and Mayne, 2005: 1-2) is methodological in nature. If evaluations are to credibly 
inform learning and adjustment, the evaluator must produce findings with a great degree of 
plausibility, which implies standard methodological conditions (Forss and Carlsson, 1997; 
Schwartz and Mayne, 2005). Yet, in light of our general expectation, the methodological quality 
of EPL evaluations is likely to be limited. 
The first methodological quality aspect is well-defined scope, implying clear evaluation 
objectives (Schwartz and Mayne, 2005: 6). The second aspect is measurement validity, holding 
that operationalization and scoring adequately reflect the researcher’s concept of interest 
(Adcock and Collier, 2001: 529; Schwartz and Mayne, 2005: 6). The third aspect is external 
validity: the degree to which results can be generalized to the entire population. Fourth, 
reliability means that the results of research are not distorted by random errors (Babbie, 1986: 
109; Schwartz and Mayne, 2005). Hence, it is important that an evaluation can always be 
replicated (Golafshani, 2003: 599). The fifth aspect is robust methodology, which implies 
justification of the choice of methods (Schwartz and Mayne, 2005: 6). The final aspect concerns 
the actual analysis; the findings of the evaluation should be impartial and based on the 
evidence gathered (Schwartz and Mayne, 2005: 6). A key strategy for ensuring this is 
triangulation: using different types of data.  
A third quality variable is evaluation process quality. Here, the first aspect is stakeholder 
involvement. Stakeholders can provide practical information about problems and solutions and 
helps to disseminate results (European Commission, 2015: 280-1; Schwandt, 1990: 178; Rossi et 
al., 2004: 35-36). A second process aspect is public availability of the report. This allows for 
external scrutiny and use of the insights by stakeholders, which enhances an evaluation’s 
impact on the regulatory cycle. 
The final quality variable concerns usefulness (Rossi et al., 2004: 35): if evaluations are to 
play a role in the regulatory cycle, they must address those in power to revise or repeal 
legislation. Accordingly, an evaluation report should contain (a) a clear executive summary, and 
(b) useful recommendations (Forss and Carlsson, 1997: 495). 
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5. Methods and data 
 
Data 
The method of this article is a meta evaluation: ‘a systematic review of evaluations to 
determine their processes and findings’ (Cooksy and Caracelli, 2005: 2). Unlike Adelle et al. 
(2012: 401), who performed a meta-study of evaluation literature, this article focuses on EPL 
evaluation reports. We encountered two obstacles to this research strategy. First, the EU does 
not have a fully operational database of evaluation reports (Smismans, 2015: 13). The official 
sources available mostly contain studies that are evaluations by the Commission’s standards,4 
but lack broader studies with evaluative aspects following our more-encompassing definition. 
Second, assessing EPL evaluation coverage is complicated given the EU’s vast legislative output. 
Therefore, we developed two novel datasets.   
First, we constructed a dataset containing EPL evaluation reports. This dataset contains 
216 EPL evaluations commissioned or conducted by the European Commission from 2000 to 
2012. Evaluations merely containing prescriptions for foreign actors or the EU institutions 
themselves were excluded.5 Six evaluations only available in French were left out so as to 
prevent bias owing to varying degrees of language abilities. Evaluation reports that only 
reported the results of other studies were discarded. Interim evaluations were incorporated 
unless an EPL evaluation by the same evaluator about the same law existed. 
The evaluation reports were collected from the Commission’s multi-annual evaluation 
overview (European Commission, 2010b), Commission annual evaluation overviews (European 
Commission, 2011), annexes of the Commission reports on the financial regulation (the so-
called 318 report; European Commission 2012b), Commission work programmes,6 and 
overviews on websites of the Directorates-General (DGs). We complemented this information 
with a dataset compiled by Eureval, a private evaluation company.7 To maximize coverage, we 
conducted Google searches for evaluation reports of all directives and regulations adopted 
between 1996 and 20048. Finally, we used the evaluation search engine from the Commission9 
and the online EU bookshop,10 the latter of which yielded no additional studies. However, we 
did identify various new studies when searching for background documents underpinning 
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legislation adopted.11 We double-checked our data-gathering method with the SG of the 
European Commission, which did not reveal any omissions. 
To assess evaluation coverage, we constructed a second dataset containing a 
manageable set of important legislation adopted from 2000 through 2002.12 Given the 
assumption that evaluation spending should be proportionate to the legislation concerned 
(Stern, 2009: 71), we excluded all delegated acts, because they generally are less important 
(Franchino, 2007: 80), as well as rectifications, amendments and secondary Council 
legislation.13 We also excluded legislation addressing government institutions and non-EU 
members. The resulting dataset consists of 156 pieces of major directives and regulations. 
 
Operationalization 
Table 1 summarizes the operationalization. Concerning systematic coverage, we appended the 
EPL evaluations found to the dataset containing major legislation to establish the proportion of 
legislation evaluated. It should be stressed that one EPL evaluation report may cover multiple 
pieces of legislation. Additionally, we charted the number of evaluations per year and assessed 
how many evaluations were obligatory in nature, owing to the presence of an evaluation 
clause. We then established the object of evaluation, distinguishing between evaluations of 
regulations, of directives and of treaty articles.  
Turning to the quality aspects, we analyse the type of evaluation by distinguishing 
between process and product evaluations (Vedung, 1997: 137, 165). Process evaluations either 
involve what Coglianese (2012: 14) calls regulatory administration or behavioural compliance. 
They may, in the EU context, concern transposition of directives into national law, 
operationalization by implementing authorities, actual application of the rules to specific cases, 
and/or enforcement by (sub)national authorities. Studies of behavioural compliance concern 
the extent to which the behaviour of regulated entities indeed is in line with the new standards. 
Product evaluations, on the other hand, focus on the actual outcomes of legislation. This type 
of evaluation may focus on four different types of evaluands: goal achievement; effectiveness; 
efficiency; and/or (side-)effects (Vedung, 1997: 54-55; 96). All evaluations were categorized as 





Table 1: Operationalization of meta evaluation aspects 
Variable Aspect Indicator Source 
Systematic 
coverage 
Proportion Proportion of major legislation 2000-2002 covered 
by EPL evaluations 
Dataset 1 
Number Number of EPL evaluations per year, 2000-2011 Dataset 2 
Obligatory Proportion of obligatory evaluations Evaluation clause in 
evaluated legislation 
Object Regulation, directive or treaty article Evaluation report 
Type of evaluation Process Transposition, realization, implementation, 
compliance, enforcement, as reflected by central 
goal/question 
Evaluation report 
Product  Achievement, effectiveness, efficiency, effects, as 




Well-defined scope Clear problem definition: 1 point Evaluation report 
Measurement 
validity 
Operationalization into clear indicators present 
before presentation of the results: 1 point  
External validity Justified selection of member states: 1 point  
 
Representative selection of cases within member 
states: 1 point 
 
Less than 50% non-response at surveys or 
interviews: 1 point  
Reliability Replicability: 1 point  
 
Robust methodology Justification of methods: 1 point  
Substantiated 
findings 
Triangulation: 1 point  
Aggregate quality Aggregate score on the eight dimensions 
Process quality Stakeholder 
involvement 
No stakeholder involvement, stakeholder 
involvement for empirical information or 
stakeholder involvement for evaluation process as 
stated by the evaluation report  
Evaluation report  
Availability Evaluation report made available by SG, DG, or 
elsewhere 
European Commission SG 
and DG websites 
Usefulness Clear executive 
summary  
Executive summary of no more than 10 pages or 




Possible actions within the power of the 




Given the quantitative nature of this article, operationalization of methodological quality was 
driven by the need for indicators that can be efficiently applied to a large number of cases, 
using the reports.14 The problem in doing so is that evaluation quality can be compromised in 
many ways that are hard to observe without in-depth knowledge of the legislation evaluated. 
For example, selection of respondents may be biased, problem definitions restricted or analysis 
subjective. Because such biases are hard to identify in a quantitative fashion, we settled for 
formalistic indicators, which do not form a full guarantee against subjective evaluation. This 
choice is based on the principle that at least all methodological choices must be clear and 
transparent, so as to allow for replicability by third parties. 
Concerning well-defined scope, we assessed whether the evaluation was guided by a 
clear problem definition. To assess measurement validity, we established whether the 
evaluation used a clear operationalization, i.e., stating clearly on what empirical observations 
its findings will be based. We used three indicators of external validity: arguments for selecting 
member states; arguments for selecting cases within member states; and a response rate for 
interviews or surveys above 50%.15 
To measure reliability, we assessed whether an evaluation report publicly indicates its 
sources. All questionnaires, interview guides and lists of respondents or their organizations had 
to be attached to the report. As for robust methodology, we required the evaluation to explain 
why it used certain evaluation techniques. A simple explanation of the goal of the methods 
used was considered sufficient. To assess substantiated findings, we established whether 
evaluations used at least two of the following types of sources: written material; observations; 
surveys; and interviews. In cases where this was impossible, such as in the case of 
macroeconomic analysis, two different types of written sources were also considered sufficient. 
Consultation rounds with stakeholders were viewed as a type of interviews in case they were 
aimed at producing empirical information. 
 Turning to process quality, stakeholder involvement was measured by searching the text 
of each report for the terms ‘stakeholder’, as well as the most common forms of stakeholder 
involvement during evaluations.16 We distinguished between three situations: (1) no 
stakeholder involvement; (2) stakeholder involvement in data provision; and (3) stakeholder 
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involvement in other phases of the evaluation process, such as methodological design or 
formulation of recommendations. Regarding availability, we identified were a report was 
found: on the website of the SG; a DG; or elsewhere. 
Concerning usefulness, finally, we judged the clarity of the executive summary by 
assessing whether a summary of no more than 10 pages (University of South California, n.d.) 
was included in or attached to the report (Poptcheva, 2013: 4).17 Reports with less than 10 
pages of main text scored automatically on this condition. Concerning useful recommendations, 
we assessed whether the conclusion of each report suggested specific actions to be taken by 
the Commission in response to the findings of the evaluation. 
 
Reliability 
To improve the reliability of our results, 20 reports were double-coded using a codebook. 
Critical comparison of our scores did not yield systematic differences in scoring approach. This 
was substantiated by the fact that all kappa values in our subsequent intercoder reliability 
calculation were significant and higher than 0.4 (Neuendorf, 2002: 143) Therefore, we 





Our data allow for systematic insights into how much important EU legislation was actually 
evaluated ex-post. Out of the 156 important pieces of legislation adopted between 2000 and 
2002, 44 were evaluated once, while 8 were evaluated twice. This means that 33% of important 
EU legislation has been covered by an EPL evaluation. Accordingly, almost seven out of ten 
important legal rules have not been evaluated.18 This figure is close to self-reported data of the 
Commission, according to which 29% of EU regulations have been evaluated ex-post (European 
Commission, 2013: 3). Amongst the 104 pieces of legislation that have not been evaluated, we 
find some politically sensitive pieces of law, such as the directives on facilitation of illegal 
immigration (2002/90) and on privacy and electronic communications (2002/58). 
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The evaluations conducted were not distributed equally over the years. As shown in 
Figure 1, relatively large numbers of evaluations were conducted in 2007 (30), 2010 (34), 2011 
(33) and 2012 (28). For all other years, 25 evaluations or less were identified. The number of 
evaluations in the years 2000-2005 was relatively small (13.4%), which may be indicative of the 
increasing attention by the Commission to EPL evaluation from 2006 onwards. However, the 
increase has not been consistent- neither the 2007 Grybauskaité report, nor the move of co-
ordination responsibilities to the SG or the attention provided to EPL evaluation by Barroso 
(2009: 29), seem to have affected output.19 The proportion of product versus process 
evaluations varies somewhat from year to year, but the data do not show any clear trend 
towards one type of evaluation over time. 
Turning to the origins of our evaluation reports, the large majority (81%) of the 
evaluations were based upon an evaluation clause. This suggests that legal obligation is the 
main motive to evaluate, and that the Commission’s own initiative is a limited driver, in line 
with our expectations.  
 




As to the object of study, the majority of evaluations (57%) concerned directives, as expected. 
Evaluations of regulations were less frequent (42%); only one evaluation (report on EU 
citizenship 2012) concerned a treaty article. Some 21% of the 216 reports in our sample are 
product evaluations, some 31% of the evaluations containing both product and process 
elements. The remaining 48% of the studies are process evaluations, covering transposition, 
realization, implementation, compliance, and/or enforcement. So, although product 
evaluations constitute a larger share than expected, which indicates that the Commission goes 
beyond the production of mere ‘enhanced implementation reports’ (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 480), 




Table 2 shows the variation in methodological quality. The average score on quality is 4.1 on an 
eight-point scale. Some 43% of the reports received a score of 5 or higher, which could be 
considered ‘sufficient’ in the limited sense of an indication of overall quality. The average score 
was identical for process and product evaluations. However, communications to the EP and the 
Council differed in quality from other evaluations: the first group scored an average of 3.41 for 
methodological quality, while the second group scored an average of 4.46. As shown in the 
table, two cases scored no points at all. Both reports20 indicate that the Commission considered 
the evaluation fairly pointless- either because a decision to repeal it had already been taken or 
because the law had been evaluated often before- but performed the evaluation nevertheless 
because of a legal obligation. The two reports scoring an 821 were both external studies of 
average length (60 pages), applying a combination of a large number of in-depth interviews 
with analysis of documentation provided by the member states.  
To put these findings in (rough) comparative perspective, how do our general scores on 
quality compare to other studies of evaluation quality? Klein Haarhuis and Niemeijer (2009: 
403) found that 79% of Dutch legislative evaluations were of sufficient quality, which is a more 
positive result. Studies about impact assessments are generally more negative and show that in 
some time periods over half are insufficient (Cecot et al., 2008: 414; Lee and Kirkpatrick, 2004: 
17-19; Renda, 2006), which is closer to our result. 
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Table 2: Quality of evaluation reports 
Score Frequency Percentage 
0 2 1 
1 7 3 
2 25 12 
3 42 19 
4 47 22 
5 57 26 
6 21 10 
7 13 6 
8 2 1 
Total 216 100 
 
Table 3 summarizes the scores of the evaluation reports regarding the quality and usefulness 
conditions. Most reports scored well on justified selection of member states (73%), problem 
definition (67%), and triangulation (65%). Triangulation usually took the form of a mix of 
content analysis and either interviews or surveys. Some 62% of the reports had a clear 
operationalization. Representative case selection and response rate gained a positive score in 
50% and 51% of the cases, respectively. Replicability (29%) and robust methodology (15%) were 
most problematic. Although most reports mentioned methods, motivation of the choice of 
methods was rare. When it came to replicability, few reports provided all the information 
needed to repeat the study- more often than not, either questionnaires or interview guides 
were absent.  
 
Process quality 
Some 39% of the 216 reports showed no sign of stakeholder involvement. In 51% of the cases, 
stakeholders provided information for the empirical part of the evaluation, but did nothing else. 
Only 9% of the reports showed that stakeholders were involved more deeply in the evaluation 
process, providing feedback on various aspects of the study. In sum, about 60% of the 
evaluations reported some kind of stakeholder involvement, without a large difference 
between process (60%) and product evaluations (61%). 
Availability was not full for all evaluations. Some 44% of the evaluation reports could be 
found at the website of the Secretariat General, either through annual overview documents or 
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the search engine.22 Out of the remaining 120 studies, 14 (7%) were available on general 
evaluation pages of individual DGs, 80 (37%) were only available on DGs’ websites, such as web 
pages about specific policies, and 26 (12%) were only available elsewhere online. This means 
that in many cases reports are not communicated to the broadest possible audience. Out of all 
DGs with more than two reports in the dataset, DG Enterprise and Industry (ENTR) had the 
highest percentage of its evaluations listed in the Commission’s search engine or centralized 
documents (13 out of 18 reports, or 72%), while DG Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion 
(EMPL) scored the lowest in this regard (3 out of 15 reports, or 20%) 
 
Usefulness 
As shown in Table 3, the majority of the reports (76%) contained useful recommendations. For 
instance, the evaluation of regulation 2679/98 (strawberry regulation) clearly recommends the 
Commission to choose one out of four policy options, both in its main text and in a brief 
summary. Conversely, the evaluative study of directive 1997/81 on part-time work provides 
neither a summary nor final recommendations, despite its length of 276 pages. Accessibility of 
the reports scored lower, with 64% of the reports having a concise executive summary. 
 
Table 3: Scores on methodological quality and usefulness 
Aspect Number of reports that scored positively (%) 
Well-defined scope (clear problem definition) 145 (67) 
Measurement validity (operationalization) 133 (62) 
External validity 1 (justified selection of 
member states) 
158 (73) 
External validity 2 (representative case 
selection) 
108 (50) 
External validity 3 (response rate) 111 (51) 
Substantiated findings (triangulation) 140 (65) 
Reliability (replicability) 62 (29) 
Robust methodology (justification of methods) 32 (15) 
Usefulness (clear executive summary) 139 (64) 






On paper, the European Commission attaches great importance to ex-post legislative 
evaluation, owing to its potential for the EU regulatory cycle in terms of legislative review and 
enforcement. At the same time, theory on EU governance informs us that EPL evaluations may 
present the Commission with a dilemma, given its strategy of continuous legislative expansion 
and problems of evaluability in the EU’s multilevel setting. This article, therefore, has addressed 
the question whether the European Commission systematically produces high-quality EPL 
evaluations. To this end, it has reported on a meta evaluation of EPL evaluation reports against 
the background of a dataset of important EU legislation, producing the following insights. 
First and foremost, coverage of EPL evaluations is patchy indeed: a mere 33% of major 
legislation adopted from 2000 to 2002 has been evaluated ex-post, despite the Commission’s 
repeated pledges to evaluate all important legislation. Although the number of evaluations has 
shown an upward trend, this trend has not been clear and consistent, and seems unrelated to 
attempts of the Commission to enhance evaluation. Evaluation primarily seems a matter of 
obligation, given the importance of evaluation clauses. Although product evaluations constitute 
a larger share of reports than expected, process evaluation overall seems more important than 
product evaluation, which is in line with our expectations. 
The methodological quality of the legislative evaluations was rather disappointing: only 
43% of the evaluations scored sufficiently on a scale of 8 fairly conservative methodological 
conditions. Whereas most reports justified country selection and contained a clear problem 
definition, the majority of studies lacked replicability and robust methodology, which makes it 
hard to assess the objectiveness of results. Third, stakeholder involvement was completely 
lacking in 39% of the cases, with only 9% of the reports indicating real involvement of 
stakeholders in the evaluation process. Additionally, transparency of evaluation results was 
limited: only 44% of all EPL evaluations identified were available in the Commission’s 
centralized search engine and annual overviews. Many reports thus are not communicated to 
the broadest possible audience. Usefulness of evaluations, finally, scored better than 
methodological quality, the majority of reports containing useful recommendations and having 
a concise executive summary.  
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In sum, it seems fair to conclude that the European Commission indeed has not yet lived 
up to its promise to close the regulatory cycle through EPL evaluation. A main recommendation 
to the Commission would be to enhance the coverage of evaluations, so that indeed all major 
regulations and directives are evaluated retrospectively. Methodological improvements of 
reports are called for as well, so that the findings of evaluations can withstand external scrutiny 
and credibly underpin future problem-solving. There also is great scope for enhancing external 
scrutiny by involving stakeholders in evaluation processes. To show the results of these 
investments to the public, finally, greater transparency is required, which could be achieved by 
including all EPL evaluations in the Commission’s centralized search engine.  
Furthermore, this research raises three crucial avenues for further research. First, the 
question of transparency begs closer scrutiny: what are the reasons for not fully publishing EPL 
reports? Is there a relationship with sensitivity of findings? Second, the concept of quality could 
be deepened by going beyond the formalistic quality conditions covered in our study. We 
propose to study a smaller number of EPL reports in depth, detailing qualitatively the sources of 
evaluation bias in EU legislative evaluations. Third, our results raise a crucial explanatory 
question: how can the observed variance in the initiation and quality of the ex-post legislative 
evaluations between pieces of legislation be explained? We intend to carry out follow-up 
research to establish the relative weight of political and more technical factors in producing 
variance in evaluation initiation and quality. 
As pointed out throughout this article, principal-agent theory is a first useful framework 
to analyse the political perspective on evaluation. EPL evaluation can be a tool for the 
Commission to enforce its policies towards individual member states, but evaluation can also 
serve as a ‘dagger in the back’ when results are negative. Therefore, we would expect EPL 
initiation and quality to be a function of both the chances of non-compliance by the member 
states and the chances of policy reversal. Accordingly, we would expect initiation and quality of 
evaluations to be lower in policy areas where the EP is involved and the Council votes through 
unanimity, as these conditions make it harder to amend or repeal legislation. 
Alternatively, initiation and quality may be affected by technical hurdles. In this 
perspective, legislative ambiguity and complexity, involvement of various implementers, as well 
as lack of resources, could combine to reduce the number and quality of evaluations. For 
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example, we would expect the initiation and quality of EPL evaluations to be higher if an impact 
assessment about the same topic was conducted before, as impact assessments often provide 
useful information for EPL evaluations (Smismans, 2015: 13). In addition, evaluation coverage 
may vary owing to differences in evaluation capacity of the Commission’s DGs, which bear the 
main responsibility for EPL evaluation. The question is how demand for evaluation and supply 
for evaluation, in the sense of human capital and evaluation technology, interact at the various 
DGs and affect cross-DG variance in evaluation initiation and quality. 
Taken together, these follow-up questions constitute a new research agenda on this so 




 This article uses a broad definition of ex-post evaluation, comprising the actual outcomes of EU legislation, 
regulatory administration and compliance by regulated entities. This definition is broader than the one used by the 
European Commission (2007: 20). 
2
 Exceptions are Fitzpatrick (2012), Summa and Toulemonde (2002), Toulemonde et al., (2005), Stame (2008), 
Stern (2009), and Poptcheva (2013). 
3
 Although both EPL evaluations and programme evaluations are subject to the SG’s evaluation guidelines 
(European Commission, 2015: 252-98), they differ in three respects: 1) While programme evaluations are often a 
shared responsibility between the Commission and the member states, the responsibility for legislative evaluation 
lies entirely with the Commission (Stern, 2009: 69); 2) While for programmes the moment to conduct an ex-post 
evaluation is fixed - usually at six years - EPL evaluations allow for more variation (European Commission, 2015: 
256; Stern, 2009: 70-71); and 3)EPL evaluations are generally considered to be methodologically more difficult 
(Fitzpatrick, 2012: 481). 
4
 See note 1 above. 
5
 We excluded evaluations of legislation on reporting requirements for European institutions, on communication 




 http://www.eureval.org  
8
 We searched for the following key words: report on legislation; report on implementation legislation; evaluation 
legislation; evaluation implementation legislation; review legislation; review implementation legislation (replace 




 https://bookshop.europa.eu/en/home/  
11
 The exact search method in the old version of Eur-lex was simple search→ prepatory acts→ search for the 
number of the legislation as keywords (e.g. 2004/82)→ refine search→ choose the European Commission as 
author. 
12
 These years were chosen so as to maximize the chances of an evaluation having taken place. One should allow 
for transposition, in case of directives, as well as an average period of some five years before ex-post evaluation 
makes sense. Since the study was conducted in 2012, 2002 seemed a safe endpoint for the dataset. 
13






 It must be noted that some information may be in the terms of reference instead of the report. Given the fact 
that terms of reference are not publicly available, we resorted to using the reports. 
15
 This is in the middle of the percentages suggested in the literature, which vary between 20% (Valentine, 2009: 
135) and 80% (Fowler, 2009: 51). 
16
 The keywords used were ‘stakeholder’, ‘consult*’ and ‘focus gr*’ 
17
 Although the Commission’s guidelines (2004: 60) prescribe five pages maximum, we used a higher number, 
because the standards were adopted four years after our dataset’s starting point. 
18
 It must be noted that it is not unthinkable that these evaluations follow later. However, given our conservative 
timeframe, this is not very likely. 
19
 Because we only entered the most recent version of evaluations that appear periodically (17 cases in the 
dataset), it is also possible that the numbers are slightly biased towards the more recent years. 
20
 [COM(2007)253] and [COM(2007)287]. 
21
 Evaluations of the Measures under Regulation (EC) No. 951/97 and of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC). 
22
 One explanation for this is the more restricted definition of evaluations used by the Commission. At the same 
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Chapter 3: Evaluation capacity in the European Commission 
 
Stijn van Voorst 
 




Ex-post evaluations are a potential tool to improve regulatory interventions and to hold rule-
makers accountable. For these reasons the European Commission has promised to 
systematically evaluate its legislation, but it remains unclear if actual evaluation capacity is 
being built up in the Commission’s Directorates-General (DGs). This article describes and 
explains the variation in evaluation capacity between the DGs by applying a theoretical model of 
evaluation capacity developed by Nielsen et al. (2011) to the European context. To gain an in-
depth understanding of the Directorates-General’s evaluation capacity, 20 Commission officials 
were interviewed. The results show that there is much variation in the extent to which 
Directorates-General prioritize evaluation as well as in the amount of human and technological 
capital that they invest in evaluation. Further analysis using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis reveals that part of this variation can be explained by the Directorates-General’s total 
budgets, suggesting that Directorates-General with a tradition of evaluating spending 
programmes also attach more importance to legislative evaluations. 
 
1. Introduction 
Ex-post evaluations are a potential tool for improving legislation, as they can be used to learn 
about the implementation and the actual impact of regulatory interventions (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 
480). Evaluations can also help to hold regulators accountable for their actions (Summa and 
Toulemonde, 2002: 409) and to control those who implement legislation (Stern, 2009: 76). 
These purposes of evaluation are especially relevant for EU, which has limited access to financial 
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and communicative instruments and therefore relies heavily on legislative policies (Fitzpatrick, 
2012: 489; Majone, 1999: 1).  
Legislative evaluation is of particular importance to the European Commission, which 
bears the main responsibility for evaluation in the EU (Stern, 2009: 71). As an unelected body, 
the Commission has the constant need to show the added value of its policies (Scharpf, 1999: 
187), for which ex-post evaluations can be a useful tool (Mastenbroek et al., 2016). Therefore, it 
is not surprising that the Commission has repeatedly stepped up its rhetoric in the field of ex-
post legislative evaluations (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 489; Højlund, 2015: 40-4). In 2007 it pledged to 
evaluate not only its spending programmes, the evaluation of which has been common practice 
since the 1980s, but also non-spending activities like legislation (European Commission, 2007: 4; 
Højlund, 2015: 44). More recently the Commission (2013: 7; 2015: 17) has even promised to 
conduct evaluations of entire regulatory frameworks. However, existing research shows that 
these high ambitions may not always be realized. Available figures from the Commission (2013: 
3) and academic research (Mastenbroek et al., 2016) indicate that the Commission has only 
evaluated about a third of the legislation that it should evaluate. Moreover, the quality of these 
evaluations seems to vary (Mastenbroek et al., 2016).  
Theoretically, one explanation for variation in the initiation of evaluations lies in 
variation in evaluation capacity (Mastenbroek et al., 2016; Pattyn, 2014: 348). Evaluation 
capacity can be defined loosely as the presence of sufficient means and procedures for ensuring 
that evaluation and its appropriate uses are ordinary and ongoing (Stockdill et al., 2002: 14). It is 
a topic that has been studied in various settings, including non-profit organizations (e.g. Carman 
and Fredericks, 2010; Taylor-Ritzler et al., 2013), local and national governments (e.g. Bourgeois 
and Cousins, 2013; Nielsen et al., 2011) and international organizations (e.g. Taut, 2007). 
However, aside from a few sections in texts about the evaluation system of the EU (Stern, 2009: 
71-2, 79-82; Summa and Toulemonde, 2002: 420-22; Toulemonde et al., 2005: 77-9) and 
evaluation use in the EU (Borrás and Højlund, 2015: 111; Technopolis, 2005: 45), there is little 
literature about the European Commission’s capacity to evaluate, in particular when legislative 
evaluations are concerned. 
Information provided by official sources is equally scarce. In 2007, the Commission 
reported that it had 140 full time equivalents (fte) working on evaluation, with a total budget of 
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€45 million (European Commission, 2007: 17), and that these numbers were gradually 
increasing because of investments made in trainings and networks (2007: 15-8). However, from 
this time onward the Commission has presented no more systematic data on its evaluation 
capacity, and it has never presented data on its capacity for legislative evaluations specifically. 
 This article seeks to fill this gap in our knowledge by answering the following questions: 
(1) to what extent do the Commission’s Directorates-General (DGs) vary in their evaluation 
capacity? and (2) how can this potential variance be explained? The focus on DGs stems from 
the fact that they bear the main responsibility for conducting and outsourcing evaluations in the 
Commission (Stern, 2009: 71). The Commission’s (2015: 268-88) guidelines for evaluation - 
which were first adopted in 2004 and updated by the Commission’s Secretariat-General (SG) in 
2015 - require each DG to maintain an evaluation function with sufficient financial and human 
capital. However, in the end it is up to the DGs how they fulfil these requirements (Stern, 2009: 
71). Therefore, variation between the Commission’s DGs is crucial for understanding the 
functioning of legislative evaluation in the EU.  
Building on an existing model (Nielsen et al., 2011: 326-327), this article splits evaluation 
capacity between evaluation demand and evaluation supply. Both concepts are quantified on a 
scale of one to fifty points to allow for comparisons between DGs and to make the results useful 
for future research. Data were collected through in-depth interviews with twenty evaluation-
related officials from seventeen DGs responsible for legislation. The results not only provide a 
complete overview for 2014, but also show how evaluation capacity in the DGs has developed 
since 2000. The findings show that there is much variation between DGs in both the way in 
which they organize their evaluation-related procedures and the means which they invest in 
evaluation. Further analysis using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) reveals 
that part of this variation can be explained by differences in the budgets of DGs, suggesting that 
DGs with a strong tradition in the field of evaluating spending programmes also have more 







2. Theoretical framework 
 
Selection of a model 
A commonly used definition of evaluation capacity is that it is ‘a system of guided processes and 
practices for ensuring that evaluation and its appropriate uses are ordinary and ongoing’ 
(Stockdill et al., 2002: 14). Beyond such general definitions, however, evaluation capacity is a 
very ambiguous concept, with frequent debates among authors about what its main 
components are and how they should be measured (Nielsen et al., 2011: 324; Taylor-Ritzler et 
al., 2013: 192). In this article, the model of Nielsen et al. (2011: 328) will be used to measure 
evaluation capacity, as it has four key advantages which are relevant in the context of the 
European Commission. Firstly, the model is meant to measure evaluation capacity at the 
organizational level (Nielsen et al., 2011: 326). Since the aim of this article is to measure 
variation among the DGs of the Commission - organizational entities with their own evaluation 
policies - this focus on organizational aspects makes the model suitable for the research 
question at hand. Secondly, the model of Nielsen et al. (2011: 330) was created in the context of 
public sector organizations. Many other models published in recent years (e.g. Bourgeois and 
Cousins, 2013; Taylor-Ritzler et al., 2013) focus on non-profit organizations in the US, which only 
conduct programme evaluations and are therefore hard to compare to the EU. Thirdly, the 
model allows evaluation capacity to be quantified on a scale of one to one hundred points, 
making it easy to compare capacity between organizations and making the results useful for 
future research. Fourthly, the validity of the indictors of the model of Nielsen et al. (2011: 334-
7) was thoroughly tested using factor analysis. 
Besides these four advantages, there are three potential drawbacks to Nielsen et al.’s 
model. Firstly, as the model is focused on organizational aspects, it ignores aspects of capacity 
related to single evaluations, such as the value that individual evaluation managers attach to 
learning (Bourgeois and Cousins, 2013: 299; Taylor-Ritzler et al., 2013: 192). However, because 
more than 200 ex-post legislative evaluations have been conducted in the EU between 2000 and 
2012 alone (Mastenbroek et al., 2016), it would be impossible to measure indicators for every 
single evaluation. Secondly, the model is mostly focused on the minimum requirements that 
must be in place for evaluations to be embedded in an organization. Even when all these 
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requirements are met, there is no guarantee that this will result in sound evaluations being 
produced and put to use. This should be remembered when interpreting the results. Thirdly, the 
model was developed in the context of Danish local governments, meaning that it cannot be 
applied entirely to the EU level. In particular, the fact that most of the Commission’s evaluations 
are outsourced (Stern, 2009: 69) had to be accounted for, resulting in some adaptions to the 
operationalization of the model which are further described below. However, most aspects of 
Nielsen et al.’s model could be applied to the Commission, as its evaluation staff is explicitly 
required to be able to conduct internal evaluations and to scrutinize external evaluators 
whenever needed (European Commission, 2015: 268, 288).  
 
Describing the model 
Following other authors (e.g. Boyle et al., 1999: 11), Nielsen et al. distinguish between 
evaluation demand and evaluation supply (2011: 327). Evaluation demand refers to the fact that 
an organization considers evaluations valuable, while evaluation supply refers to the presence 
of sufficient means to evaluate (Nielsen et al., 2011: 326-7; Summa and Toulemonde, 2002: 422-
3). In this context, ‘means’ refer to the staff responsible for evaluation and its methodological 
tools. Supply-side and demand-side conditions are equally important in determining evaluation 
capacity, as evaluations only come into existence when both interact, and therefore both are 
awarded fifty points in the model (Nielsen et al., 2011: 330).  
Evaluation demand consists of two dimensions: the extent to which an organization has 
the explicit aim to evaluate (evaluation goals) and the extent to which evaluation is embedded 
in the daily functioning of an organization (structure and processes) (Nielsen et al., 2011: 326-
7). Both dimensions are considered equally important in determining demand and are therefore 
awarded exactly 25 points (Nielsen et al., 2011: 330).  
Evaluation goals, the first dimension of evaluation demand, consists of three main 
aspects (Nielsen et al., 2011: 328). The first is the amount of formalization: do official 
documents describe if and when evaluations must be conducted? A second aspect is the 
utilization of results, as evaluations are ultimately meant to be used, at least officially. Finally, 
the number of evaluation purposes stated by an organization is relevant. After all, evaluations 
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can be used not only to create policies, but also to allocate resources, improve accountability 
and set priorities for the future (Nielsen et al., 2011: 180-84). 
 Structure and processes, the second dimension of evaluation demand, can be split into 
two aspects: the presence of an independent evaluation unit and the amount of financial 
priority that an organization attaches to evaluation (Nielsen et al., 2011: 330). Nielsen et al. also 
include the number of functions which an evaluator performs besides his core task in this 
dimension, but this aspect is left out in this article because in the EU most evaluations are 
conducted by external consultants.  
Evaluation supply, the second condition of evaluation capacity, consists of two 
dimensions: the skills of those performing evaluations within an organization (human capital) 
and the non-human tools that allow evaluations to be performed (evaluation technology) 
(Nielsen et al., 2011: 327). Human capital (35 points) is more important than technology (15 
points), as non-human tools are ultimately useless if there are no people who can apply them 
properly (Nielsen et al., 2011: 330). 
When it comes to human capital, the first dimension of evaluation supply, three aspects 
are important: the number of full-time employees working on evaluations, the evaluation 
trainings completed by these employees and their evaluation-related expertise (Nielsen et al., 
2011: 330). Nielsen et al. also include the formal education level of an organization’s employees 
in this dimension, but this aspect is left out here as all the Commission’s staff should have a 
master’s degree, meaning there is little variation.  
Evaluation technology, the second dimension of evaluation supply, consists of two 
aspects: the number of different evaluation methods (e.g. interviews, questionnaires) that are 
used and the application of any explicit evaluation models by an organization (Nielsen et al., 
2011: 327; for examples of models, see Fitzpatrick, 2012: 481). Nielsen et al. also include the 
presence of evaluation software in this dimension, but since EU evaluations are usually 
outsourced this aspect was irrelevant for this study. Table 1 summarizes the model as it was 














Explaining evaluation capacity 
Besides describing the variation in evaluation capacity between the Commission’s DGs, this 
article also seeks to explain it. Although there is no single theoretical framework for this 
purpose, three separate explanations can be derived from the literature: the amount of 
legislation to be evaluated (functionalist logic), the presence of a tradition of evaluating 
spending programmes (historical institutionalism) and the sensitivity of the DG’s policies 
(political rationality).  
Firstly, following a functionalist logic, the amount of legislation that has to be evaluated 
by a DG could influence its evaluation capacity. Since evaluation is compulsory for most EU 
legislation (European Commission, 2015: 261), it can be expected that DGs responsible for more 
legislation will have more evaluation demand (hypothesis 1) and supply (hypothesis 2). 
Secondly, the extent to which an organization has a tradition of evaluating spending 
programmes is a possible explanation for variation in evaluation capacity, since building such 
capacity is a long-term investment (Preskill and Boyle, 2008: 451). Because EU evaluations have 
their origins in the field of spending programmes, the DGs that spend most money have the 
longest experience with evaluation (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 479; Stern, 2009: 69). Therefore, it is 
expected that DGs with a stronger tradition of evaluating spending programmes also have more 
demand (hypothesis 3) and supply (hypothesis 4) for legislative evaluations. This argument 
follows the logic of historical institutionalism: the policies of an organization are bound by the 
decisions which it made in the past (Nugent, 2010: 438). 
Condition Dimension Aspect 
Evaluation demand 
 
Evaluation goals (25p) Evaluation purposes (8p) 
Formalization (7p)  
Utilization (10p)  
Structure and  
processes (25p) 
Evaluation unit (9p)  
Financial priority (16p) 
Evaluation supply  Human capital (35p) Number of full-time employees (10p) 
Evaluation training (10p) 
Evaluation-related expertise (15p)  
Evaluation  
technology (15p)  
Evaluation methods (10p)  
Evaluation models (5p) 
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Thirdly, evaluation capacity could be influenced by the political sensitivity of the DG’s 
policy area. The Commission is often assumed to follow a strategy of legislative expansion: 
because it lacks strong financial or communicative instruments, it tends to focus on expanding 
EU law to encourage European integration (Majone, 1999: 65). Evaluations are a potential 
threat to this strategy, as they can be used as an argument to roll back policies in case their 
findings are negative (Weiss, 1993: 94). This idea is closely linked to the political rationality of 
evaluations: evaluations are not neutral objects, but can be used to threaten or defend the 
interests of actors in the policy process (Bovens, 2008: 320; Nielsen et al., 2011: 94). 
Bureaucracies may try to avoid them when they threaten to undo the results of previous 
political investments or negotiations (Weiss, 1993: 95-6). Following this logic, it can be expected 
that DGs dealing with sensitive policies areas will have less evaluation demand (hypothesis 5) 
and supply (hypothesis 6). 
 
3. Methods and data 
 
Data collection 
Empirical data were gathered through face-to-face interviews with the main coordinator of ex-
post legislative evaluations in each DG (seventeen in total). Although it was attempted to also 
speak with the head of the evaluation function of each DG, this was only possible in three cases: 
most heads of unit referred back to their coordinator for legislative evaluation because the 
requested information was highly detailed. Interviews with three DGs could only be conducted 
by phone or e-mail1. The data provided by the respondents were always checked by using 
available documentation about the evaluation policies of the DGs (such as guidelines and annual 
activity reports). Such documents were usually found on the DGs’ websites, but respondents 
were also asked to provide additional documents. In three cases, an indicator could be 
measured only through online documents2. 
 Since this article focuses on legislative evaluations, only DGs responsible for major 
legislation were included. To find out which DGs meet this requirement, a self-constructed 
dataset of European regulations and directives from 2000-2014 was used (see chapter 2 of this 
dissertation for a detailed description). The dataset excludes amendments, rectifications, 
75 
 
implementing legislation, repeals, and legislation concerning individual countries, because such 
small acts are rarely evaluated (Stern, 2009: 71). Using the online database Eur-lex, each piece 
of legislation was linked to the DG which initiated it. Only DGs appearing at least once in this 
way were included in the research. DGs dealing with foreign affairs or the Commission’s internal 
functioning were excluded, as their legislation is not aimed at citizens and therefore follows a 
different logic concerning evaluation. Applying these criteria, the study focusses on seventeen 
DGs existing in 2014: Agriculture (AGRI), Communications and Technology (CONNECT), 
Competition (COMP), Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN), Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion (EMPL), Energy (ENER), Enterprise and Industry (ENTR), Environment (ENV), Eurostat 
(ESTAT), Home Affairs (HOME), Justice (JUST), Maritime Affairs (MARE), Internal Market 
(MARKT), Mobility and Transport (MOVE), Health and Consumers (SANCO), Taxation (TAXUD) 
and Trade (TRADE).  
 
Operationalization 
To operationalize the aspects of evaluation capacity described in the theoretical framework 
section, the indicators used by Nielsen et al. (2011: 330-1) and their relative weights were used 
as much as possible (Ramboll Management Consulting, 2011: 2). However, four adaptions were 
made to fit the model to the specific context of this study. Firstly, since the exact number of 
evaluations conducted by the Commission is unclear (Mastenbroek et al., 2016), all indicators 
requiring knowledge about numbers of evaluations were removed. Secondly, since evaluations 
in the EU are often outsourced (Stern, 2009: 71), two different indicators were used to measure 
evaluation-related expertise. Thirdly, the indicators for evaluation-related trainings and 
utilization were dichotomized because some collected data for these indicators were unspecific. 
Fourthly, the indicator for evaluation models was changed to specify what an ‘evaluation model’ 
means in the context of the EU. When an indicator was removed or added to the model, the 
number of points awarded to the other indicators inside the same dimension was increased or 
decreased proportionally.  
The aspect of formalization was measured by asking if the DG has an official planning for 
future legislative evaluations (4 points) and any formal rule for when legislation should be 
evaluated when this is not compulsory (3 points). The aspect of utilization was measured by 
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asking if there is a standardized procedure for employees of the DG to respond to results of 
legislative evaluations (10 points). Evaluation purposes were measured by asking the 
respondents what aims legislative evaluation has in their DG. Improving policies, increasing 
accountability, efficient resource allocation, political supervision, long-term learning and setting 
priorities all qualify as different purposes (8 points).  
 The presence of an independent evaluation unit was measured by asking if the DG has a 
unit or subunit for which ex-post evaluation and related issues (like ex-ante evaluation) are its 
core task (9 points). Although each DG must have an evaluation function (European 
Commission, 2007: 16), this does not necessarily take the form of a specialized unit, so there is 
room for variation here. Financial priority was mapped by asking how much money each DG 
spends on an average ex-post evaluation of one regulation or directive (16 points). There are no 
hard standards for this kind of expenditure in the EU, so the DG with the highest expenditure 
per evaluation was used as a benchmark and other scores were adapted proportionally.  
The number of fte working on evaluation was measured by asking how many people (in 
fte) work for the centralized evaluation function of each DG (10 points). Although other 
employees can also spend time on evaluations, their work is too fragmented to measure. The 
aspect of evaluation training was measured by asking if the DG organizes any evaluation 
trainings (10 points). Evaluation-related expertise was measured by asking in how many 
evaluation-related networks the DG’s employees participate, as such networks are an important 
way of building expertise (Stern, 2009: 71) (9 points). To measure the external expertise 
available to each DG, the average number of external companies that bid for its legislative 
evaluation was asked for (6 points).  
The aspect of evaluation methods was measured by checking if the DG has guidelines on 
how to conduct ex-post legislative evaluations in its policy field, with 2 points awarded per 
method described (10 points). The number of methods is relevant here because Commission 
officials must be able to scrutinize a broad range of external evaluations (European Commission, 
2015: 288). The aspect of evaluation models was measured by checking if the DG has any 
written guidelines for modelling causal effects in legislative evaluations (5 points). Since all 
legislative evaluations of the Commission (2015: 53) are supposed to map causality, this 
indicator is relevant for each DG. For both evaluation methods and models, the number of 
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points awarded is halved if the DG only has guidelines for ex-post evaluation in general. The 
operationalization is summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: operationalization of evaluation capacity. Indicators highlighted with an asterisk were measured 
specifically for legislative evaluations; other indicators could only be measured for ex-post evaluation in general 
 
 




Evaluation purposes (8p) Number of purposes of legislative evaluation stated (2p per 
purpose)*. 
Formalization (7p)  Presence of evaluation planning (4p, yes/no)*. 
Presence of guidelines about when to evaluate legislation 
(3p, yes/no)*. 
Utilization (10p) Presence of a procedure for responding to legislative 




Evaluation unit (9p) Presence of a unit for which ex-post evaluation is a core 
task (yes/no). 
Financial priority (16p) Money spent on an average evaluation of one regulation 
or directive as a % of the money spent by the DG with the 
highest expenditure*.  
Human capital 
(35p) 
Number of full-time 
employees (10p) 
Number of fte working for centralized evaluation function 
(2p per fte). 
Evaluation training (10p) Existence of a DG-level evaluation training (yes/no).  
Evaluation-related 
expertise (15p) 
Number of evaluation-related networks (9p maximum, 3p 
per network).  
Number of external companies that bid for legislative 




Evaluation methods (10p) Presence of internal guidelines on evaluation methods 
(10p, 2p per method)*.  
Evaluation models (5p) Presence of internal guidelines on evaluation models 
present (yes/no)*.  
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As for the explanatory conditions, the amount of legislation was measured via the number of 
major regulations and directives initiated by each DG over the period 2000-2014. To measure 
this, the self-constructed dataset of legislation which was already described above was used. 
The extent to which a DG has a tradition of evaluating spending programmes was estimated 
through the size of its budget, which was retrieved from the annex of each DG’s annual activity 
report3. The political sensitivity of the DG’s policy area was measured by looking at the policy 
field which is handled by each DG. In the EU, some policy fields are (partly) dealt with through 
unanimity voting in the Council because they are related to the sovereignty of the member 
states, which means they are considered sensitive issues. This mostly concerns justice and home 
affairs, social policies and taxation, so the DGs dealing with these topics (JUST, HOME, EMPL and 




Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) was used to explain evaluation capacity4, for 
two reasons. First, this method is useful for mapping the various combinations of causal 
conditions that can explain variation in a given outcome (in this article: evaluation demand and 
supply). Second, while the sample of seventeen DGs is too small to allow for regression analysis, 
it is large enough to make fsQCA a feasible method (Ragin, 2008: 9). 
FsQCA allows for the use of continuous scales if they are transformed to vary between 
zero and one. Through the so-called direct method of transformation, conditions can be 
transformed if appropriate values are derived from the literature for the scores of zero (non-
membership), 0.5 (cut-off point) and one (full membership) (Ragin, 2008: 85). Since the 
presence of political sensitivity is measured dichotomously in this article, the only conditions 
that require transformation are the presence of a large amount of legislation, the presence of a 
large budget, and the two outcomes (the presence of high evaluation demand and high 
evaluation supply). 
DG Environment (ENV) is a prime example of a DG with a large amount of legislation. 
Because the aim of environmental policy is to regulate and prevent polluting behaviour from 
citizens and companies, the DG is responsible for a large number of regulations and directives in 
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the fields of waste, water quality, chemicals, noise, genetic manipulation and biodiversity 
(Nugent, 2010: 346-50). Therefore, the observed number of legal acts of DG Environment (76), 
the second highest in the data, was used as the score for full membership.  
DG Agriculture (AGRI) is the classic example of a DG which relies heavily on spending. To 
support European farmers and make their activities sustainable, the DG uses a mix of direct 
payments, refund operations, rural development programmes and other subsidies. Together 
agricultural policies account for 40% of the EU budget. Therefore, the observed budget of DG 
AGRI (about €58 billion in 2013) represents full membership (Nugent, 2010: 353-63). 
DG Home Affairs (HOME) is a prime example of a DG with a medium-sized amount of 
legislation and a medium-sized budget. The DG aims to halt crime and illegal migration, which 
requires numerous regulations about cooperation between member states - the Dublin 
regulation on migration being one example (50 observed legal acts in the data). However, the 
DG also manages financial activities such as the European refugee fund and the European return 
fund (observed budget: about €1 billion) (Nugent, 2010: 335-9). Therefore, the observed values 
of DG Home Affairs were used to represent the cut-off points for the explanatory conditions. 
This leaves four DGs which spend several billions in the group with ‘high budgets’ (the DGs for 
agriculture, technology, employment and enterprise), and a larger group of eleven DGs which 
spend ‘just’ a few hundred million euros in the group with ‘low budgets’. The second group of 
DGs includes many DGs that rely on a large amount of legislation (70-90 acts) rather than high 
budgets for their policies (i.e. the DGs for environment, the internal market, health affairs and 
infrastructure).  
There is also a group of seven DGs with neither a high budget nor a high amount of 
legislation. DG Competition is a prime example of this. Its main activities are decisions to allow 
or forbid state aid and company mergers, which requires only a handful of regulations (7) and a 
small budget (about €5.6 million in 2013) (Nugent, 2010: 327-8). Therefore, its observed values 
were used to represent non-membership for the explanatory conditions. 
Evaluation demand and supply are transformed by dividing their scores by fifty, which 
can be done for such self-constructed scales (Kogut et al., 2004: 123). Because all the cut-off 
points presented in this section are to some extent arbitrary – there is no strong set-theoretical 
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knowledge for any of these conditions – alternative cut-off points will also be tested during the 
analysis to see how this affects the results. 
 
4. Results 
This section presents the empirical results for the indicators for evaluation capacity listed above. 
For DG ECFIN, data on all indicators measured specifically for legislative evaluations are missing, 
as this DG will only start evaluating its legislation in the near future. For DG ESTAT there is no 
data on the number of external companies bidding for legislative evaluations and the amount of 
money spent on an average evaluation, as all its legislation is evaluated internally and no 
consultant is paid. Table 3 and 4 summarize the results. 
Concerning evaluation purposes, all DGs mentioned the improvement of policies and the 
need to be accountable to the Council and the European Parliament as important aims of 
legislative evaluation. About half of all DGs also mentioned setting political priorities as a 
purpose of legislative evaluation. Some DGs mentioned other aims as well, such as basic 
learning (COMP, TAXUD) and efficient resource allocation (AGRI). 
As for formalization, all DGs have a planning for future legislative evaluations as a part of 
their annual management plans, as this practice is enforced by the SG. Some DGs publish this 
part of their annual management plan online, while others keep it internal. Seven DGs have 
guidelines stating after how many years a piece of legislation should be evaluated, which was 
between five and seven years in all cases. For other DGs an evaluation is generally initiated only 
when an evaluation clause makes this compulsory or when revision appears necessary.  
Concerning utilization, nine DGs have an official follow up-procedure which applies to 
legislative evaluations. This usually takes the form of a requirement to write an action plan or 
fiche by the main policy unit involved in the evaluation, although in DG SANCO the plan is 
sometimes written by the evaluation unit and in DG EMPL it is a joint responsibility. Such actions 
plans usually require approval at the management level. For DGs without a follow-up 
procedure, legislative evaluations are often followed directly by an impact assessment (an 





Table 3: results for evaluation demand (2014) 
DG Evaluation 
purposes 






AGRI 3 Yes Yes No Yes (1998) 400.000 
CONNECT 3 Yes Yes Yes No 200.000 
COMP 4 Yes No No No 225.000 
ECFIN - - - - Yes (2005) - 
EMPL 2 Yes No Yes Yes (1998) 300.000 
ENER 2 Yes No Yes No 250.000 
ENTR 3 Yes Yes Yes No 260.000 
ENV 3 Yes Yes No No 250.000 
ESTAT 2 Yes No Yes Yes (2005) - 
HOME 3 Yes No No No 350.000 
JUST 2 Yes Yes No No 200.000 
MARE 2 Yes No No No 200.000 
MARKT 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes (2008) 240.000 
MOVE 2 Yes No Yes Yes (2007) 195.000 
SANCO 2 Yes Yes Yes No  200.000 
TAXUD 2 Yes No No Yes (2010) 210.000 
TRADE 3 Yes No Yes No 175.000 
 
Of all the DGs examined, only DG AGRI has a unit fully dedicated to ex-post evaluation. DG 
ECFIN, EMPL, ESTAT, MARKT, MOVE and TRADE have units responsible for ex-post evaluation 
and related issues (like impact assessments), while for other DGs the evaluation function is 
located together with broad support functions like finances or strategy. DG AGRI also leads 
when it comes to financial priority, reporting the highest budget for an average evaluation of 
one regulation or directive (€400.000) because it often requires case studies in each member 
state. DG HOME also reports a high budget per evaluation (€350.000), while the other DGs vary 
between €175.000 and €300.000. This data should be interpreted with some caution, as 











Table 4: results for evaluation supply (2014) 
DG Evaluation 
training 
Fte Number of 
networks 
Number 





AGRI No 15 3 5 None No 
CONNECT Yes (2013) 2 3 10 10 (2011) Yes (2011) 
COMP Yes (2013) 2 3 2 None No 
ECFIN Yes (2008) 2 1 - - - 
EMPL Yes (2004) 4.5 3 4 6 (2001) Yes (2001) 
ENER No 1 1 5 None No 
ENTR No 2 2 1 12 (2002) Yes (2002) 
ENV Yes (2007) 1.4 1 20 None Yes (2003) 
ESTAT No 2 2 - None No 
HOME No 1.3 2 5 12 (2011) Yes (2011) 
JUST Yes (2011) 0.25 1 5 None Yes (2011) 
MARE No 0.5 2 1 None No 
MARKT Yes (2008) 1 1 6 15 (2008) Yes (2008) 
MOVE No 2.5 1 4 None No 
SANCO No 2 1 3 None None 
TAXUD Yes (2012) 2.5 1 3 None No 
TRADE Yes (2011) 1 1 6 3 (2008) No 
 
As Table 4 shows, nine DGs organized an evaluation training in 2014. Most of these trainings 
were set up during the last few years. Other DGs only participate in the centralized training 
organized by the SG (five days total), which is compulsory for all evaluation-related staff. 
Because trainings at the DG-level usually last one day at most, they are more suitable to reach a 
broad audience of policy makers. 
Concerning the number of fte working for the evaluation functions, it turned out that in 
some DGs coordinating evaluations in only a part of the job of a single person (MARE, JUST), 
while others dedicate a small team to the issue (EMPL, ENTR, TAXUD, MOVE). Staff differences 
are present in relative terms as well: DG Agriculture has about 1.4% of its staff working on 
coordinating evaluations, while for DG JUST this is 0.05%.5 It should be noted, however, that the 
high numbers for DG AGRI and CONNECT are partly caused by the fact that their evaluation 




Concerning evaluation expertise, all DGs participate in the central evaluation network 
organized by the SG, but beyond that there is much variation. DG COMP, HOME, MARE and 
EMPL have internal evaluation networks in which their various directorates are represented, 
while DG AGRI and EMPL organize networks with member state evaluation experts. DG COMP 
contributes to an OECD evaluation network, while DG ESTAT, ENTR and CONNECT participate in 
evaluation-related networks of all DGs working in a specific policy area. Other DGs only work 
with infrequent (lunch) sessions to discuss evaluation. 
 Concerning external expertise, most DGs work with framework contracts for their 
legislative evaluations, meaning that only a limited number of preselected companies (between 
three and six) may bid for contracts. DG CONNECT and DG ENV usually allow open competition 
between companies, which explains the high number of average bids they receive. Using open 
competition can take twice as much time as using framework contracts, which is why most DGs 
prefer the latter, although most respondents do believe that going to the market offers extra 
quality. 
As for evaluation methods and evaluation models, only DG CONNECT and DG MARKT 
have guidelines about these topics specifically for legislative evaluation. DG EMPL, ENTR, ENV, 
HOME, JUST, SANCO and TRADE have internal guidelines for ex-post evaluation in general. 
While DG MARKT, CONNECT, HOME and ENTR discuss ten or more methods in their guidelines, 
the guidelines of other DGs discuss only a small number of methods or no methods at all, and 
the document of DG SANCO discusses neither methods nor models.  
A question that remains is whether these results based on 2014 are still up-to-date, as 
the SG published new evaluation guidelines in May 2015 (European Commission, 2015). None of 
the respondents believed that the new guidelines would lead to immediate human or financial 
investments in evaluation at the DG-level. However, as the new guidelines do specify rules for 
writing follow-up action plans (European Commission, 2015: 297-298), the current variation 
among DGs on that aspect might be reduced. Furthermore, at the beginning of 2015 DG HOME 
and DG TRADE have created units dealing specifically with evaluation and related matters to 
reflect the growing importance of these topics. 
Using the relative weights of the indicators listed in Table 2, Figure 1 provides the final 
scores for each DG on evaluation demand, evaluation supply and total evaluation capacity. DGs 
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are ranked from highest to lowest, but the scores should be seen as descriptions rather than 
judgements. The results show a large group of DGs receiving between 45 and 55 points in total, 
with a few outliers having higher and lower scores. Values for evaluation demand are generally 
a little higher than for evaluation supply, especially for the DGs at the lower end of the 
spectrum, indicating that these DGs may deem evaluation important but have little means to 
invest in it.  
 
Figure 1: scores on evaluation supply and demand for each DG. Values for ESTAT are adapted proportionally to 







When applying fsQCA, a useful first step is to test if any individual explanatory conditions are 
either necessary or sufficient to let the outcome occur. Therefore, Table 5 shows which 
conditions provide consistent explanations for high evaluation demand and supply (benchmark: 
>0.80) and which consistency scores above the threshold are probabilistically significant 
(benchmark: <0.05). Unlike the consistency threshold, the probabilistic test also takes the 
number of cases in which a condition leads to an outcome into account (Ragin, 2008: 120), 
which makes it useful for this article because some of the conditions are only present in a 
handful of cases. Since in fsQCA the absence of an explanatory condition does not necessarily 
have the opposite consequences of the presence of that condition, the negation of each 
condition is also included in the table, recognizable by the symbol ~. 
As the results show, neither the amount of legislation nor the political sensitivity of a DG 
nor their negations are necessary or sufficient conditions for high evaluation demand or supply 
(hypotheses 1, 2, 5 and 6 are falsified). This outcome is also apparent if we look at the four DGs 
with the highest overall capacity: DG EMPL, CONNECT, MARKT and AGRI. In the first two of 
these DGs the condition of having a large amount of legislation is clearly absent (both DGs 
initiated about 25 regulations and directives, while the cut-off point is 50), and out of the four 
cases only DG EMPL deals with a policy field that is considered politically sensitive. 
However, in line with hypothesis 3, the presence of a high budget is a sufficient condition 
for high evaluation demand. In other words, when a DG has many financial resources we can 
expect it to attach much importance to legislative evaluation. The four DGs with budgets of 
more than €1 billion (EMPL, CONNECT, ENTR and AGRI) all have high evaluation demand as well. 
The corresponding coverage score is 0.44, showing that the high budget condition accounts for 
a little less than half of the cases with high evaluation demand.  
The presence of a high budget is also a sufficient condition for high evaluation supply, in 
line with hypothesis 4. This relationship does not pass the probabilistic test, but when taking a 
closer look at the data that fact is explained entirely by the case of DG AGRI, which has a very 
high budget and only a medium score (24 points) on evaluation supply. Generally speaking, it 
therefore seems that DGs with a high budget also invest a large amount of human and 
technological capital in legislative evaluations. The corresponding coverage score is 0.51, 
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showing that the high budget condition accounts for about half of the cases with high 
evaluation supply. 
According to the theoretical framework of this article, these results indicate that DGs 
with a tradition of evaluating spending programmes also have high capacity for legislative 
evaluations. This interpretation is supported by statements made by several respondents during 
the interviews. For example, one evaluation coordinator from a low-budget DG stated that 
evaluation used to be a low priority in his organization because the evaluation culture in the 
Commission was so focused on accounting for how money was spent. Only in the last four years 
a shift began towards legislative evaluations, and since then his DG has slowly started building 
evaluation capacity. Another respondents emphasized that his DG already conducts evaluations 
since the 1990s, starting with spending programmes, and has therefore become a frontrunner 
concerning all kinds of ex-post evaluations in the Commission.  
 
Table 5: results of QCA analysis for evaluation demand / evaluation supply. The level of significance for all 
proportions > 0.80 is provided in parenthesis. ~ represents the negation of a condition. 
Condition Consistency (necessary 
conditions) for evaluation 
demand / evaluation supply 
Consistency (sufficient 
conditions) for evaluation 
demand / evaluation supply 
High legislative amount 0.63 / 0.63 0.79 / 0.62 
~High legislative amount 0.63 / 0.72 0.69 / 0.61 
High budget 0.44 / 0.51 0.95 (0.001)* / 0.84 (0.65) 
~High budget 0.85 (0.56) / 0.82 (0.85) 0.70 / 0.51 
High sensitivity 0.23 / 0.30 0.54 / 0.55 
~High sensitivity 0.78 / 0.70 0.61 / 0.43 
  
Besides looking at individual conditions, fsQCA also allows for analysing combinations of causal 
conditions (Ragin, 2008: 125). The truth table (Table 6) shows all combinations that appear in 
the data with their corresponding cases. Only those combinations with a consistency score of 
more than 0.8 were included in the analysis, to ensure that the results remain undistorted by 





To analyse the truth table, the intermediary method was used (Ragin, 2008: 164)6. The 
results show that the absence of political sensitivity in combination with the presence of a large 
amount of legislation consistently leads to high evaluation demand (consistency = 0.77) and that 
this solution covers about one-third of the cases with high demand (unique coverage = 0.29). 
This result indicates that DGs will usually value legislative evaluation if they have a strong 
legislative responsibility in a policy field which is not so sensitive that evaluations might be 
threatening. However, more research is needed to confirm if this interpretation is correct. 
When including the presence of high budgets, the entire solution for high evaluation 
demand has a consistency of 0.80 and a coverage of 0.73, meaning that it covers about three-
quarters of the cases with high evaluation demand. No combinations of conditions were found 
which explain the presence of high evaluation supply.  
To check the robustness of these findings, various higher and lower cut-off points for the 
explanatory conditions were tested7. The results were largely unaffected by these changes: the 
presence of a high budget kept being a sufficient condition for high demand (consistency > 0.9), 
while most other individual conditions remained neither necessary nor sufficient. However, if 
the cut-off point for high budgets is put below €775 million, which is close to the medium-sized 
budget of a case like DG MARE, it seizes to be a sufficient condition for high evaluation supply.  
The analysis so far focused on explaining the presence of high evaluation demand and 
supply, which in fsQCA is not the same as explaining the absence of these outcomes (Ragin, 
2008: 102). A similar analysis was therefore conducted for the negations of the outcomes. Its 
results cannot be fully presented here due to word constraints, but it can be said that its results 
were in line with the previous findings. The absence of high budgets turned out to be a 
necessary condition for both low evaluation demand (consistency = 0.96; α = 0.00) and low 
evaluation supply (consistency = 0.92; α = 0.05), indicating that almost all DGs with low 
evaluation capacity also have low budgets (DG AGRI being the only exception). No other 
individual conditions consistently explained the absence of the outcomes, nor did any 

























No No No 5 COMP, ENER, 
ESTAT, MARE, 
TRADE 
No No 0.69 / 0.48 
Yes No No 4 ENV, MARKT, 
MOVE, SANCO 
Yes No 0.83 / 0.60 
Yes Yes No 2 AGRI, ENTR Yes Yes 1.00 / 0.95 
No No Yes 2 JUST, TAXUD No No 0.72 / 0.72 
No Yes Yes 1 EMPL Yes Yes 0.98 / 1.00 
No Yes No 1 CONNECT Yes Yes 0.99 / 0.88 
 
6. Conclusion 
This article addressed the questions how the DGs of the European Commission vary in their 
capacity for legislative evaluations and how this variance can be explained. Through in-depth 
interviews with twenty Commission officials, data were collected about both evaluation supply 
and demand. The results reveal much variance in capacity between DGs. On the demand side, 
some DGs have very clear aims and procedures for all the stages of legislative evaluation, while 
for other DGs this is not the case. On the supply side, while for some DGs coordinating 
evaluation is a part-time job of one person, others devote a small team or even a whole unit to 
the task. Over the last few years the number of DGs supporting their staff with their own 
evaluation-related trainings, networks and guidelines has gradually increased, but each of these 
features is still present in only about half of the DGs. The highest overall evaluation capacity for 
2014 was found in DG EMPL, MARKT, CONNECT and AGRI. 
 How can this variance be explained? The analysis shows that the presence of a high 
budget is a sufficient condition for high evaluation demand and supply, indicating that DGs with 
a long tradition of evaluating spending programmes attach more importance to and invest more 
means in legislative evaluations than other DGs. Theoretically there could be other explanations 
for the relationship between high budgets and high capacity, but the qualitative information 
from the interviews confirms that DGs with a long tradition of evaluating spending activities also 
89 
 
pay more attention to legislative evaluations today. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that 
DGs with have a strong legislative responsibility in a policy field which is not very sensitive 
usually have high evaluation demand. However, more qualitative research should be conducted 
to verify this interpretation. 
 Two other possibilities for future research stand out. First, this article was mostly 
focused on the presence of certain minimal organizational requirements to systematize 
legislative evaluation in the Commission’s DGs. It has not studied the extent to which the tools 
and procedures available for legislative evaluations are applied in practice by the DGs, nor the 
question for which aims legislative evaluations are used in the Commission. These topics would 
be worthy of further investigation. 
Second, future research could take a look at the consequences of capacity differences for 
the initiation and the quality of legislative evaluations. From a technical perspective we could 
expect that DGs which invest more human and technological capital in legislative evaluations 
(i.e. DGs with high evaluation supply) produce more and better evaluations. From a more 
political perspective, we could expect that DGs which attach more value to evaluation (i.e. DGs 
with high evaluation demand) show better evaluation outputs (Mastenbroek et al., 2016). By 
further studying these topics, the data on evaluation capacity presented in this article could 
help to enhance our understanding of both the nature of the European Commission and the role 




 This concerned the DGs ESTAT (phone), ECFIN (phone) and MOVE (e-mail). 
2
 Respondents from DG ENTR, MARKT and MOVE were unable to provide average evaluation costs, so for these DGs 
this information was collected by taking the average of three cost indications mentioned in tender or contract 
specifications published at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-fundings/tenders/index_en.htm 
3
 Annual activity reports for 2013-2014 are available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/aar-
archived/aar_2013_en.htm. Activities categorized as both spending and non-spending activities were counted as 
half a spending activity. 
4
 The analysis was mostly conducted with the fuzzy add-on in Stata. For details about this add-on, see 
http://www.stata-journal.com/sjpdf.html?articlenum=st0140 
5
 Based on 2015 staff figures: http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/europa_sp2_bs_cat-sexe_x_dg_en.pdf 
6
 The intermediary solution, which is the recommended approach for fsQCA is most circumstances (Ragin, 2008: 
164), only takes configurations which do not appear in the data into account if they meet certain assumptions. 





legislation and high budgets and the outcomes, while negative relations were assumed between high political 
sensitivity and the outcomes. 
7
 The cut-off point for the amount of legislation was decreased and increased by up to twenty pieces of legislation; 
the cut-off point for budgets was decreased and increased by up to €500 million. In both cases, the most extreme 
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Abstract 
Whereas the European Commission officially intends to periodically evaluate all major EU 
legislation in force, in practice it only evaluates a minority of major regulations and directives. 
This article tries to explain the variation in the initiation of such ex-post legislative evaluations 
by the Commission with the help of two theoretical motives: an enforcement motive and a 
strategic motive. Based on two novel datasets and binary logistic regression analysis, the results 
show that the type and complexity of the legislation, the presence of an evaluation clause and 
the evaluation capacity of the responsible DG enhance the chances of evaluation. These findings 
indicate that ex-post legislative evaluations are at least partly driven by the Commission’s need 
to enforce legislation. 
 
1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is often described as a ‘regulatory state’ due to the important role of 
legislation in the European policy process (Majone, 1999: 1). A marked feature of the European 
legislative process is the centrality of one supranational executive actor: the European 
Commission. The Commission has a number of crucial tasks related to European legislation. 
Firstly, it is responsible for the development and formulation of legislative proposals (Schmidt 
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and Wonka, 2013: 2). Secondly, it produces delegated and implementing acts (McCormick, 
2015: 169-72). Thirdly, in its role of ‘guardian of the European treaties’, the Commission is 
responsible for monitoring and enforcing national compliance with European legislation 
(McCormick, 2015: 169-72; Schmidt and Wonka, 2013: 2).  
These three tasks of the Commission in the EU’s legislative process have received ample 
academic scrutiny (e.g. Kassim et al., 2013; Schmidt and Wonka, 2013; Wille, 2013). Conversely, 
the literature has hardly touched upon a fourth key task of the Commission, which is to conduct 
ex-post evaluations that assess the functioning and effectiveness of European legislation. So far, 
such ex-post legislative (EPL) evaluations have mostly been neglected by scholars (but see 
Fitzpatrick, 2012; Mastenbroek et al., 2016; Zwaan et al., 2016), which is all the more surprising 
given both their theoretical importance and their growing role in the Commission.  
Theoretically speaking, EPL evaluations may fulfil two important functions in legislative 
processes. Firstly, by recommending how the implementation of legislation can be improved 
and/or how legislation can be amended to increase its effectiveness, EPL evaluations are a 
potential tool for decision-makers to improve their policies (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 479; Vedung, 
1997: 109). Secondly, EPL evaluations can be used to judge the performance of the actors that 
implement legislation, thus holding them accountable for their actions (Coglianese, 2012: 11; 
Vedung, 1997: 102-108).  
Over the years the Commission has increasingly recognized the importance of EPL 
evaluations. It first emphasized the role of such evaluations in legislative improvement and 
accountability relationships in 2000, after which it started to make its procedures for EPL 
evaluations more systematic in 2007 (European Commission, 2007: 3-4; Fitzpatrick, 2012: 478). 
Since 2010 the Commission has also stressed the importance of EPL evaluations for judging the 
suitability of entire regulatory frameworks (so-called ‘fitness checks’) (European Commission, 
2010: 5). Furthermore, from 2012 onwards it has given EPL evaluations a central place in its 
REFIT programme, which aims to identify and remove superfluous rules (European Commission, 
2012: 4).  
In 2015 the Commission published new guidelines that outline the methods, follow-up 
procedures and institutional responsibilities for carrying out EPL evaluations (European 
Commission, 2015). In principle, all the Commission’s EPL evaluations must use some form of 
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stakeholder consultation to map the views of those actors that are directly affected by EU 
legislation (European Commission, 2015: 299-336). Aside from this, EPL evaluations can use 
different combinations of methods, such as expert interviews, document analysis and 
quantitative modelling (European Commission, 2015: 337-414; Fitzpatrick, 2012: 490-7).  
Concerning the follow-up of EPL evaluations, the Commission is supposed to produce an 
action plan based on the main recommendations of each evaluation to ensure that its results 
feed back into the ‘regulatory cycle’ (European Commission, 2015: 297-298). Existing research 
has shown that the extent to which this happens varies in practice, such that about half of the 
ex-ante evaluations (impact assessments) attached to proposals for legislative amendments 
make use of information from EPL evaluations when available (Van Golen and Van Voorst, 2015: 
388).  
Concerning the institutional responsibility for EPL evaluations, the Commission’s 
guidelines specify that such evaluations are the responsibility of the Directorates-General (DGs), 
with a coordinating role for the Commission’s Secretariat-General (SG) (European Commission, 
2015: 257; Stern, 2009: 70-71). EPL evaluations are usually based on reports written by external 
consultants to enhance their independence, but when this is more practical the whole 
evaluation process may also be conducted internally (European Commission, 2015: 282-9). 
Importantly, since 2007 the Commission’s guidelines also prescribe that both financial 
and legislative activities must be evaluated periodically, in proportion to their allocated 
resources and expected impact (European Commission, 2007: 22; 2015: 257). In reality, 
however, not all important EU legislation is evaluated. Academic research has shown an 
initiation ratio of 33% for major EU regulations and directives from the period 2000-2012 
(Mastenbroek et al., 2016: 1338). The Commission (2013: 13) has produced similar figures: in 
2013, 29% of all important EU regulations had been evaluated, with a further 13% of these 
regulations being evaluated at that moment, 19% of these regulations having a future 
evaluation planned and no numbers being provided for directives.  
These figures show that the Commission is apparently selective in which legislation it 
evaluates, for reasons that the institution itself does not explain. This finding is problematic 
because an evaluation system is only credible if its procedures for initiating evaluations are 
systematic and transparent (OECD, 2015: 120). If this is not the case, legislative quality may 
97 
 
diminish in policy areas that are evaluated less frequently (OECD, 2015: 120) and/or the image 
could arise that the Commission decides what legislation to evaluate based on political 
considerations (Radaelli and Meuwese, 2010: 146). This, in turn, could harm the credibility of 
evaluations in the eyes of the legislator and other actors (Poptcheva, 2013: 4). 
Therefore, this article looks into the question of what drives the initiation of EPL 
evaluations by the Commission. In other words, why does the Commission evaluate some pieces 
of law while it does not evaluate others? By answering this question, we not only seek to shed 
light on the unexplored topic of EPL evaluations in the EU, but also aim to further explore the 
motives that drive the Commission’s behaviour (Boswell, 2008: 472; Franchino, 2007: 11; 
Hartlapp et al., 2014: 1; Radaelli, 1999: 760-2; Wille, 2010: 1098-1100).  
Two potential motives (not) to initiate an evaluation are studied in this article, each of 
which is linked to a specific theoretical image of the Commission. The first motive, which is in 
line with the image of the Commission as the ‘guardian of the European treaties’, is the effective 
enforcement of EU legislation. Since EPL evaluations are a potential tool to check how 
legislation is implemented by the member states (European Commission, 2015: 296; Stame, 
2008: 124), we can expect that legislation for which the chances of non-compliance are higher is 
more likely to be evaluated. The second motive is the strategic protection of competences, 
which is in line with the image of the Commission as a political actor (Boswell, 2008: 472; 
Hartlapp et al., 2014: 1; Majone, 2005: 65). Following this logic, we would expect that the 
Commission refrains from evaluating legislation if this could result in a reduction of its powers. 
The hypotheses flowing from these two motives are tested with the help of two 
datasets, the first containing all major EU legislation from 2000-2004 and the second containing 
all EPL evaluations conducted by the Commission during 2000-2014. With these data, we are 
able to draw conclusions about the decisions to evaluate European legislation over a 15-year 
period. The 10-year gap between our datasets is needed to give the Commission enough time to 
evaluate, thus avoiding any bias in our data in favour of legislation that was evaluated sooner. 
Binary logistic regression was used for the analysis.  
Our results show that EU legislation is more likely to be evaluated if it is a directive 
rather than a regulation and if it is more complex, which is in line with the enforcement motive. 
Both of our control variables - the presence of evaluation clauses and the amount of evaluation 
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capacity of the DG to which a piece of law belongs - also provide significant explanations. 
However, we did not find evidence that the strategic protection of competences explains the 
Commission’s initiation of EPL evaluations. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Whereas evaluation-related topics are frequently discussed in the academic literature, there is 
no comprehensive approach to explaining why organizations decide to evaluate or not 
(Mastenbroek et al., 2016: 1343; Pattyn, 2014: 351). Therefore, this article develops such an 
approach in the context of the EU, building on two potential motives for the Commission: an 
enforcement motive and a strategic motive. These motives are closely linked to ongoing 
academic debates about the nature of the Commission (Boswell, 2008: 472; Franchino, 2007: 
11; Hartlapp et al., 2014: 1; Radaelli, 1999: 760-2; Wille, 2010: 1098).  
 
Enforcement motive 
In its role of ‘guardian of the European treaties’, the Commission has the task to monitor and 
enforce member state compliance with EU legislation (Schmidt and Wonka, 2013: 2). EPL 
evaluations are potentially useful for this purpose, as they can collect and present information 
about how rules are implemented in practice (Coglianese, 2012: 11). This, in turn, makes EPL 
evaluations useful to hold those actors responsible for the implementation of legislation 
accountable (Vedung, 1997: 102). Therefore, EPL evaluations are a potential tool for the 
Commission to detect non-compliance by the member states and to address such non-
compliance via enforcement measures (European Commission, 2015: 292; Stame, 2008: 124). 
The role of EPL evaluations in enforcing European legislation is also evident from earlier 
research about this topic. Mastenbroek et al. (2016: 1339) found that out of 216 EPL evaluations 
conducted or outsourced by the Commission between 2000 and 2012, 79% assessed the 
processes of legislative implementation, enforcement and/or compliance. Zhelyazkova et al 
(2016: 833) found EPL evaluations to be the most detailed source of information about the 
compliance of member states with 24 directives of interest. 
Those EPL evaluations that study member state compliance often assess the legal 
implementation of directives by systematically comparing national transposition measures, 
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while they tend to assess the practical implementation of European legislation via surveys and 
interviews among stakeholders. In some cases, infringement data are also used as a source 
(Smith, 2015: 92-93). EPL evaluations that address member state compliance also tend to 
include recommendations for the Commission. Often these recommendations focus on ‘soft’ 
measures like increased monitoring, sharing best practices or publishing guidelines for national 
implementing authorities, but evaluations may also recommend the Commission to launch 
infringement procedures (Mastenbroek et al., 2016).  
If the Commission can use EPL evaluations for enforcement purposes, we can expect that 
the chances than an evaluation is initiated are higher for pieces of law where there is a greater 
need to scrutinize the member states. In other words, we can expect that the chances that an 
evaluation is initiated are higher for legislation that offers more opportunities for non-
compliance.  
Three specific variables may be important in this regard. Firstly, the type of legislation 
may affect the chances of non-compliance. Directives offer the member states more discretion 
than regulations because they need to be transposed into national law (Treib, 2014: 6). In turn, 
this discretion offers the member states more opportunities to delay or prevent implementation 
(Kaeding, 2006: 232; König and Mäder, 2014: 247; Mastenbroek, 2003: 372; Steunenberg and 
Rhinard, 2010: 495; Treib, 2014: 6). Therefore, we expect directives to be more likely to be 
evaluated than regulations (Stame, 2008: 124).  
 
Hypothesis 1: Directives are more likely to be evaluated than regulations. 
 
Secondly, the complexity of legislation can affect the chances of non-compliance. Since the 
European legislative process includes multiple veto players - notably the Commission, the 
Council and the EP - decision making often produces compromises that are laid down in long 
and ambiguous texts (Häge, 2007: 307-308; Hofmann, 2013: 99). Such complexity offers 
member states more leeway for interpretation, and, therefore, makes it more difficult to 
establish whether they are complying with legislation or not (Kaeding, 2006: 242; König and 
Mäder, 2014: 253-254; Mastenbroek, 2003: 376; Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2010: 501). This in 
turn can be expected to increase the chance that legislation is evaluated by the Commission. 
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Hypothesis 2: The more complex a piece of law, the higher its chances of being evaluated. 
 
Thirdly, the political sensitivity of legislation may affect the chances of non-compliance. The 
more controversial a regulation or directive, the more likely it is that some member states who 
opposed it during the legislative process will not implement it correctly (Mastenbroek, 2003: 
376). Since the Council represents the member states, politicization in the Council is especially 
likely to increase the chances of non-compliance (Treib, 2014: 14), and, therefore, the chances 
that an evaluation is initiated.  
 




The hypotheses presented above are in line with the image of the Commission as a ’guardian of 
the European treaties’. However, in recent years scholars have increasingly viewed the 
Commission as an actor that not only fulfils the tasks that the member states have delegated to 
it (such as enforcing European legislation), but also strategically pursues its own preferences 
(Franchino, 2007: 11; Hartlapp, 2014: 1-14; Wille, 2010: 1099). According to this political view 
on the Commission the institution has a perpetual interest to protect its competences, as 
without these competences it would not be able to achieve any of its (temporary) political aims 
(Hartlapp, 2014: 1; Majone, 2005: 65; Pollack, 2008: 9).  
The Commission has been shown to deal strategically with ex-ante evaluations of 
legislation (impact assessments) (Poptcheva, 2013: 4; Torriti, 2010: 1065) and expert knowledge 
in general (Boswell, 2008: 472), so we can expect strategic considerations to play a role in 
decisions about the initiation of EPL evaluations as well. Ex-post evaluations are not just neutral 
instruments that can be used to stay informed about policy implementation, but also potential 
strategic tools that can strengthen or weaken the positions of actors (Bovens et al., 2008: 320; 
Schwartz, 1998: 295; Vedung, 1997: 111). As evaluations suggest changes to existing 
arrangements, they are inherently advantageous to some actors and disadvantageous to others 
(Bovens et al., 2008: 320; Weiss, 1993: 95-98). Negative evaluations can be particularly 
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disadvantageous to actors that are responsible for delivering policies, as such evaluations may 
lead to demands to roll back their competences or to put them under closer supervision 
(Vedung, 1997: 102-8). This, in turn, may be an incentive for such actors to avoid evaluations 
that may have negative consequences (Schwartz, 1998: 295, Weiss, 1993: 95). 
Therefore, we can expect the Commission to be reluctant to initiate EPL evaluations in 
situations where the results of such evaluations could be harmful to its interests. The 
Commission’s better regulation agenda officially endorses the idea that EU legislation should be 
significantly amended or even repealed if an evaluation shows that it has no added value 
(European Commission, 2012: 3; 2013: 1; 2015: 254). In reality, however, we can expect that the 
Commission wants to avoid such situations to protect its competences (Majone, 2005: 65). In 
other words, we expect the chances that a piece of law is evaluated to be lower if the potential 
evaluation is more likely to be used to argue for significant amendments to the law. 
 Involvement of the European Parliament (EP) in decision making decreases the chances 
of significant amendments and is therefore expected to increase the chances that an evaluation 
is initiated. The reason for this is that the EP provides an extra veto player that can block 
amendments (Häge, 2007: 307; Hofmann, 2013: 102). As a majority of EP members generally 
supports further European integration (Pollack, 2008: 9), it can also be expected that the EP will 
usually oppose reducing the competences of supranational institutions like the Commission. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Pieces of law that can only be amended with the approval of the European 
Parliament are more likely to be evaluated than pieces of law that can be amended without the 
approval of the European Parliament. 
 
The voting procedure in the Council is also expected to influence the chances of legislative 
amendments. If unanimity is required in the Council it is significantly harder to change 
legislation, as it is difficult to make all member states agree on a proposal (Häge, 2007: 308). We 
therefore expect the chances that an evaluation is initiated to be higher when the Council 




Hypothesis 5: Pieces of law decided upon by unanimity in the Council are more likely to be 
evaluated than pieces of law decided upon by qualified majority voting. 
 
Control variables 
Aside from the two theoretical explanations described above, this research controls for two 
other potential explanations for decisions to initiate EPL evaluations. The first control variable is 
the presence of an evaluation clause. Many EU regulations and directives contain provisions that 
oblige the Commission to evaluate them after a number of years, which are usually inserted by 
the Council and the EP to ensure that they will stay informed about the legislation (Summa and 
Toulemonde, 2002: 410). We can expect legislation containing an evaluation clause to be 
evaluated more often than legislation without such a clause.  
The second control variable is the evaluation capacity of the responsible DG. In this 
context, evaluation capacity is defined as the presence of sufficient means and processes to 
ensure that evaluation is an ongoing practice in an organization (Nielsen et al., 2011: 325). 
Evaluation capacity includes the presence of organizational structures and procedures that 
support evaluations, the presence of sufficient financial and human capital to evaluate and the 
presence of proper (methodological) tools to conduct evaluations (Nielsen et al., 2011: 326-7). 
Since evaluation capacity varies primarily between the DGs of the Commission (Van Voorst, 
2017: 25), we expect that legislation under the responsibility of DGs with higher evaluation 
capacity is more likely to be evaluated than other legislation.  
We could also expect the Commission to be more likely to initiate an EPL evaluation if an 
ex-ante evaluation (impact assessment) of the same legislation was carried out, as impact 
assessments often contain a section prescribing that legislation should be evaluated ex-post 
(European Commission, 2015: 246-51). However, this variable cannot be studied in this research 
because the Commission’s system for impact assessments was only set up in 2002-2003 







3. Methods and data 
 
Data collection 
Although multiple datasets of EU legislation already exist (e.g. Hofmann, 2013: 102; Treib, 2014: 
27), none of them suited the specific aims of our research. Therefore, we created two datasets 
for the task at hand, one containing major European legislation and one containing EPL 
evaluations (also see chapter 2 of this dissertation). 
The dataset of legislation covers the years 2000-2004. This period was chosen to give the 
Commission sufficient time to evaluate. While academic literature indicates that legislation is 
usually evaluated after about five years (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000: 355) and evaluation 
clauses in EU legislation also tend to give the Commission five years or less to evaluate, we 
decided to double this period to avoid concluding that any legislation has not been evaluated 
while an evaluation was in fact still upcoming. Therefore, our dataset of legislation stops at the 
end of 2004, but it should be emphasized that our article concerns decisions to initiate EPL 
evaluations over a period of fifteen years (2000-2014), which is further explained by the 
description of our second dataset below.  
Because the Commission follows the logic that the resources spent on an evaluation 
must be proportionate to the importance of a measure (European Commission, 2007: 22; 2015: 
255-6), minor EU legislation does not have to be evaluated (European Commission, 2015: 253). 
Therefore, our dataset of legislation only includes major regulations and directives. We 
excluded all delegated and implementing acts,1 which are generally considered less important 
than primary legislation (Franchino, 2007: 80), as well as all rectifications, amendments and 
secondary Council legislation. Because of the explicit link between evaluations and improving 
the effects of legislation on European citizens and companies (European Commission, 2007: 3; 
2012: 2; 2013: 1-2), we also excluded legislation without direct relevance for national actors. 
This includes legislation that only addresses EU institutions or foreign countries. Together, the 
selection criteria led to a dataset of 277 major directives and regulations adopted in the period 
2000-2004. Our dataset of evaluations (see below) contains only eight evaluations of legislation 
that we did not consider ‘major’ (2% of all evaluations), indicating that our selection criteria 
were fairly appropriate.  
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To assess the initiation ratio of evaluations, our dependent variable, we extracted 
information from a second dataset. This dataset contains 313 EPL evaluations of regulations, 
directives and treaty articles conducted or outsourced by the Commission between 2000 and 
2014 (updated version of the dataset described in chapter 2 of this dissertation).2 Evaluations 
completed before 2000 were omitted because of a lack of data, and evaluations merely studying 
prescriptions for foreign countries and EU institutions were excluded for the same reasons as 
discussed above. We also discarded those evaluation reports that merely summarize other 
evaluations. 
The evaluations were gathered from different sources: The Commission’s multi-annual 
evaluation overview (2010), the Commission’s search engine for evaluations,3 the Commission’s 
work programmes,4 EU bookshop,5 annexes to Commission’s financial reports,6 and lists of 
evaluations found on the websites of DGs. We checked our data using an existing list of 
evaluations produced by expertise centre Eureval, by running Google searches for evaluations of 
all major legislation adopted between 1996 and 2010, by searching for background documents 
of legislation in Eur-lex,7 and by discussing our data-gathering method with the SG (for a further 
description of the dataset of EPL evaluations, see chapter 2 of this dissertation). 
 
Operationalization 
Starting with the enforcement motive, the type of legislation (hypothesis 1) was measured as a 
dichotomous variable (directive or regulation). The complexity of legislation (hypothesis 2) was 
measured through its number of recitals, as more complex legislation generally requires a larger 
number of explanations (Franchino, 2000: 74; Kaeding, 2006: 236; Steunenberg and Rhinard, 
2010: 501; Treib, 2014: 26). Politicization in the Council (hypothesis 3) was measured by 
determining if a legislative proposal was on the Council’s agenda as a B-point, as B-points 
represent the topics that are actively debated at the political level (Häge, 2007: 303; Hofmann, 
2013: 126; König, 2008: 149).  
Concerning the strategic motive, involvement of the European Parliament (hypothesis 4) 
was measured by looking at the formal procedure used to enact the legislation as stated by Eur-
lex. In case of the ordinary legislative procedure (former codecision and cooperation 
procedures) this involvement was considered high, while in case of the consultation procedure 
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it was considered low (Häge, 2007: 316). The voting procedure in the Council (hypothesis 5) was 
also measured as a dichotomous variable (QMV or unanimity) using Eur-lex.  
Concerning the control variables, we searched each piece of law using specific keywords8 
to establish the presence of an evaluation clause (yes/no). We also checked the last five articles 
of each regulation or directive, as this is the most common place for evaluation clauses. 
Concerning evaluation capacity, we measured twelve indicators derived from a model 
developed by Nielsen et al. (2011: 326-30) via interviews with the European Commission (Van 
Voorst, 2017: 29-31). However, only the presence of a specialized evaluation (sub-)unit (yes/no) 
and the presence of evaluation guidelines (yes/no) could be established per DG per year and 
were, therefore, useful as indicators. For legislation that has been evaluated, the data used 
concern the year when the evaluation was published. For legislation that has not been 
evaluated, we assumed that this decision was made five years after the legislation was 
published (the modal value of the time between publication dates of legislation and publication 
dates of evaluations is six years in our dataset, from which we subtracted one year as 
evaluations usually take that long to conduct) and determined the scores for evaluation capacity 
accordingly. However, because this assumption of five years is somewhat arbitrary we also 
experimented with other time periods, which affected our results to some extent.9  
The operationalization of all our variables is summarized in Table 1. Because of the 
binary nature of our dependent variable, logistic regression was used for the analysis. The 
variables belonging to the two motives to evaluate were entered as blocs to allow for 























Evaluation initiated 0 = no evaluation 
1 = at least one evaluation 
0 = 161 cases 
1 = 116 cases 
Enforcement 
motive 
Legislation type (H1) 0 = regulation 
1 = directive 
0 = 136 cases 
1 = 141 cases 
 
Complexity (H2) Number of recitals 
Mean = 22.2 
σ = 13.1 
Range = 4-73 
 
Politicization Council (H3) 0 = not discussed as B-point 
1 = discussed as B-point 
0 = 100 cases 




EP involvement (H4) 0 = consultation procedure 
1 = ordinary legislative procedure 
0 = 111 cases 
1 = 166 cases 
Council voting procedure 
(H5) 
0 = QMV 
1 = unanimity 
0 = 242 cases 




0 = no evaluation clause 
1 = evaluation clause present 
 
0 = 112 cases 
1 = 165 cases 
Evaluation capacity 
0 = no evaluation unit 
1 = evaluation unit present 
 
0 = 186 cases 
1 = 96 cases 
0 = no evaluation guidelines 
1 = evaluation guidelines present 
0 = 166 cases 
1 = 111 cases 
 
4. Results 
Out of the 277 major regulations and directives in our dataset, 116 have been evaluated ex-
post. This is an initiation ratio of 41.9%, meaning that about six out of ten major pieces of EU 
law from 2000-2004 have not (yet) been evaluated by the Commission. This initiation ratio is 
higher than the 33% found during earlier research about major legislation from 2000-2002 
107 
 
(Mastenbroek et al., 2016: 1338), indicating that legislation published during 2003-2004 was 
evaluated more often than older legislation. This is a sign that the proportion of legislation 
evaluated by the Commission may be increasing over time. 
A few pieces of law in our dataset were evaluated multiple times over the years: fifteen 
pieces of law were evaluated twice, four pieces of law were evaluated thrice and two pieces of 
law were evaluated four times. Due to the binary nature of our dependent variable, these 
pieces of law with more than one evaluation have no special impact on our analysis: they were 
simply coded as 1. Their number was also too low to conduct an additional analysis of the 
number of times that a piece of law was evaluated. 
Figure 1 depicts the initiation ratio per DG. The three DGs with the highest initiation 
ratios are DG Eurostat (71.4%), DG Competition (66.0%) and DG Internal Market (65.2%). DG 
Trade and DG Economic and Financial Affairs have not evaluated their few major pieces of law 
from 2000-2004 at all; besides this the three DGs with the lowest initiation ratios are DG Energy 
(28.6%), DG Home Affairs (28.0%), and DG Agriculture (20.8%). The variation among DGs is 
included in the analysis through the evaluation capacity variables; the data do not suggest other 
patterns concerning the size or policy areas of the DGs that warrant investigation. 
Table 2 presents the explanatory analysis. The results show that the model with the 
variables belonging to the enforcement motive and the control variables only passes the chi-
square test and is therefore significant. Aside from politicization in the Council all the individual 
variables included in this model are also significant. Table 2 furthermore shows that if the 
variables related to the strategic motive are added, the model as a whole and the individual 
variables that were significant before are still significant. However, neither the involvement of 
the EP nor the voting procedure in the Council provides an explanation for variation in the 




























ES CM MK EM SA JU EV TA ME CN MV ET ER HO AG TR EC
DG
 
Notes: Legend of DGs: AG = Agriculture, CM = Competition, CN = Communications and Technology, EC = Economic 
and Financial Affairs, EM = Employment, ER = Energy, ES = Eurostat, ET = Enterprise and Industry, EV = 
Environment, HO = Home Affairs, JU = Justice, ME = Maritime Affairs, MK = Internal Market, MV = Transport, SA = 
Health and Consumers, TA = Taxation, TR = Trade. Some DGs have merged and/or changed their names since 2014. 
 
Starting with the type of legislation, the first variable belonging to the enforcement model, 
Table 2 shows that the odds of being evaluated are about 2.05 times higher for directives than 
for regulations. In terms of predicted probabilities - which are easier to interpret than odds 
ratios - the chances of an evaluation taking place are 14.0% higher for directives than for 
regulations, if all other variables are kept at their observed values. In terms of descriptive 
statistics, out of the 141 major directives in our dataset, 51.8% have been evaluated; out of the 
136 major regulations, only 31.6% have been evaluated. In line with hypothesis 1, these findings 
indicate that the Commission prioritizes evaluating directives over regulations. 
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The complexity of legislation, the second variable belonging to the enforcement model, 
also significantly increases the chances of an evaluation occurring. For every extra recital, the 
odds of a piece of law being evaluated increase by about 3%. Figure 2 presents the effect of this 
variable in terms of predicted probabilities. The figure shows that the chances of an evaluation 
occurring increase from about 0.3 to 0.7 as the number of recitals grows, with an average 
growth in predicted probability of 0.06% per recital, if all other variables are kept at their 
observed values. These findings are in line with hypothesis 2.  
Politicization in the Council, the third variable belonging to the enforcement model that 
was measured by the occurrence of the legislative proposal as a B-point on the Council’s 
agenda, is not significant. Accordingly, we reject hypothesis 3. 
Turning to the political variables, the results in Table 2 show that neither the 
involvement of the EP nor the voting procedures in the Council provides a significant 
explanation for variation in the initiation of EPL evaluations. This means that hypotheses 4 and 5 
are rejected. These results indicate that the chances of a piece of law being significantly 
amended do not affect the Commission’s decision to evaluate this legislation or not. 
 



































Conversely, both control variables turn out to be significant. Table 2 shows that the odds of a 
piece of law being evaluated become about 4.69 times higher if an evaluation clause is present 
as compared to legislation without such a clause. In terms of predicted probabilities, the 
chances of an evaluation taking place are 30.9% higher for legislation with an evaluation clause 
than for legislation without such a clause, if all other variables are kept at their observed values. 
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  277 
  
Chi2 62.70   64.62   
Sig 0.00   0.00   
McFadden R2 0.17   0.17   
AIC 1.184   1.191   
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Despite the significance of this variable, it should be noted that only 92 out of 165 pieces of law 
with an evaluation clause (55.8%) were evaluated, while 24 out of 112 pieces of law without 
such a clause (21.4%) were evaluated as well. The first number shows that the Commission only 
complied with a little more than half of the evaluation clauses inserted in major legislation from 
2000-2004, indicating that the presence of such clauses is not a guarantee that legislation will 
be evaluated. The numbers also show that the presence of evaluation clauses only explains a 
part of the variation in the initiation of EPL evaluations. 
Table 2 also shows that both indicators for evaluation capacity are significant. The odds 
of a piece of law being evaluated are about 2.59 times higher for legislation of a DG with an 
evaluation unit as compared to legislation of a DG without such a unit, and 2.26 times higher for 
legislation of a DG that has evaluation guidelines as compared to legislation of a DG without 
such guidelines. In terms of predicted probabilities, the chances of an evaluation taking place 
are 18.3% higher in the first case and 15.9% higher in the second case, if all other variables are 
kept at their observed values. 
When interpreting these results, however, it should be noted that high evaluation 
capacity may be a consequence as well as a cause of evaluation-related activities. For example, 
it is possible that DGs that initiate more EPL evaluations also invest more in evaluation 
guidelines to support such evaluative activities. It should also be noted that the results 
concerning evaluation capacity somewhat depend on our assumptions about the number of 
years after which it was decided not to evaluate certain legislation (as explained in our 
methodology section and Note 9). Therefore, more research is needed to establish the exact 
effect of evaluation capacity on the initiation of EPL evaluations in the EU. 
 
5. Conclusion  
This article has sought to describe and explain the variance in the initiation of EPL evaluations by 
the European Commission. Although the Commission officially endorses EPL evaluations 
(European Commission, 2007: 3; 2013: 11; 2015: 296), little was known about how 
systematically the institution conducts such evaluations in practice (but see Mastenbroek et al., 
2016). This study aimed to shed light on this underexplored topic by developing a theoretical 
approach based on two motives for the Commission to evaluate - an enforcement and a 
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strategic motive - while controlling for other potential explanations. We tested these 
explanations with the help of binary logistic regression, based on two self-developed datasets. 
The results show that less than half of all major EU legislation from 2000-2004 (41.9%) 
was evaluated. However, the proportion of evaluated legislation has increased over time. Only a 
small proportion of the major legislation was evaluated more than once. 
Concerning the enforcement motive, our results suggest that the odds of being 
evaluated are significantly higher for directives than for regulations, and that these odds also 
increase significantly as legislation becomes more complex. This indicates that the Commission 
prioritizes evaluating legislation for which the chances of non-compliance are relatively high, 
and that evaluations may at least partly be initiated to scrutinize member state implementation. 
Concerning the strategic motive, however, we did not find any significant results. This indicates 
that the risk of EU legislation being significantly amended does not affect its odds of being 
evaluated.  
Two control variables also turned out to be significant. Firstly, the odds of legislation 
being evaluated increase significantly if that legislation contains an evaluation clause. However, 
our data also revealed that the Commission only complies with such clauses in about half of all 
cases. Secondly, the evaluation capacity of the DG that is responsible for the legislation 
significantly increases the odds of that legislation being evaluated. 
 In conclusion, our analysis indicates that the initiation of EPL evaluations by the 
Commission is best explained by a mix of its need to enforce EU legislation towards the member 
states, its formal obligations to evaluate and its evaluation capacity. However, these conclusions 
should be viewed in the light of two possible limitations of this research. Firstly, the quantitative 
nature of our study required us to use indicators that could be measured efficiently for a large 
number of cases. Some of these indicators may not entirely cover the abstract concepts that 
they are supposed to represent, such as evaluation capacity and politicization. Therefore, to 
sustain the conclusions of this article, a follow-up case study with more sophisticated indicators 
would be useful.  
 A second limitation of this study is its time period. As explained above, EPL evaluations 
may be conducted a decade or more after a piece of law enters into force, so we could not yet 
assess the extent to which legislation from after 2004 has been evaluated without risking a bias 
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in our data. Whereas our dataset of 277 major regulations and directives (initiated by seventeen 
DGs) is so broad that our findings are probably not affected by any particular political choice 
made during 2000-2004, it still seems worthwhile to repeat this research in the future to assess 
to what extent post-2005 legislation is evaluated. 
Two other possibilities for future research stand out. Firstly, since this article showed 
that the Commission does not always comply with evaluation clauses, a follow-up study about 
the reasons for this seems worthwhile. Secondly, it could be examined to what extent the 
factors presented in this study also explain variance in the quality of EPL evaluations, as this is 
another important characteristic of a proper evaluation system and previous research has 





1. This refers to all legislation having its legal basis in another regulation or directive. 
2. Evaluations published in 2013 and 2014 were added to the dataset used in chapter 2 of this dissertation, 
resulting in a total of 313 cases. Six further evaluations published in French were excluded because of our lacking 
language skills. However, including these evaluations would not have changed the results, since they did not study 




6. SWD(2013)228 and SWD(2012)383. 
7. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html 
8. ‘evalu*’, ‘repo*’, ‘stud*’ and ‘research’. 
9. As described in the methodology section of our article, for legislation that was not evaluated we entered our 
evaluation capacity data based on the assumption that decisions not to evaluate were taken five years after the 
publication date of the legislation. We experimented with other time periods than five years for this as well (four, 
six, seven and eight years). If we assume decisions not to evaluate to be taken after six years instead of five the 
presence of an evaluation unit is no longer significant, and if we assume this period to be seven years or more both 
indicators for evaluation capacity seize to be significant. However, assuming a lesser number of years than five does 
not change the significance of either indicator. The reason for these different findings appears to be that some of 
the earliest DGs to develop evaluation units and/or guidelines (DG Eurostat, DG Internal Market and DG 
Employment in particular) also have the highest initiation ratios (as listed in Figure 1). Around 2010 many DGs that 
have smaller initiation ratios also started to develop such evaluation capacity. Therefore, belonging to a DG that 
was a frontrunner in building evaluation capacity could be more important than belonging to a DG with high 
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Abstract 
Ex-post legislative (EPL) evaluations are a potentially important tool for the European 
Commission to learn how EU legislation can be improved. To prevent such learning from taking 
place based on false or incomplete information, the evaluations must be of sufficient 
methodological quality. This paper therefore describes and explains the variance in the quality 
of the European Commission’s EPL evaluations. A number of potential political and technical 
explanations for this variance are tested with a self-constructed dataset of 153 EPL evaluations. 
The results show that the Commission’s EPL evaluations do well in terms of applying a robust 
methodology, but that the clarity of their scope, the accuracy of their data and the foundations 
of their conclusions are problematic. The variance in this quality is mainly explained by the type 
of evaluator: EPL evaluations conducted by external actors are of higher quality than 
evaluations conducted internally by the Commission. 
 
1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is frequently called a ‘regulatory state’ because of its reliance on 
legislation as its main policy instrument (Majone, 1999: 1; Scharpf, 1999: 189). Although the 
EU’s legislative output has decreased in recent years, it still produces dozens of regulations and 
directives per year (European Commission, 2016: 2-3). On paper, this legislation is supposed to 




To improve the effectiveness of EU legislation in solving such problems, the European 
Commission (2007: 3; 2013: 6; 2015: 7; 2016: 2) has developed a ‘better regulation’ programme 
since 2000. The first key element of this programme was the introduction of impact 
assessments (IAs): forward-looking evaluations aimed to increase the quality of legislative 
proposals (European Commission, 2007: 4). Initially, however, the effectiveness of legislation in 
practice received less attention. This changed in 2007, when the Commission (2007: 3; 2015: 
253) pledged to further develop its system for ex-post legislative (EPL) evaluation: reports that 
retrospectively assess the effects of EU legislation. 
EPL evaluations are supposed to produce evidence that allows the Commission to learn 
whether or not legislation achieves its intended goals and how its impact can be improved 
(Fitzpatrick, 2012: 479; Vedung, 1997: 109). Theoretically, this learning function is important 
because the policies created by modern-day governments are so complex that their effects on 
society are inherently uncertain (Bunea and Ibenskas, 2017: 592; Sanderson, 2002: 1, 7). In 
order to make sound decisions about which instrument is best suited to achieve certain 
objectives at a given moment in time, governments require systematic and continuous 
evidence about the working of their policies (Böhme, 2002: 99; Bunea and Ibenskas, 2017: 592; 
Sanderson, 2002: 3, 5). Arguably this requirement is especially pertinent for EU legislation, 
which has highly uncertain effects because it needs to be implemented in almost thirty member 
states with very different policy traditions (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 480-481). 
Theoretically, the Commission’s EPL evaluations may contribute to evidence-based 
policy making in at least four ways. First, the evidence produced by EPL evaluations is supposed 
to feed into the IAs that the Commission attaches to legislative proposals (European 
Commission, 2015: 258; 2016: 3). In particular, IAs can use findings from EPL evaluations to 
compare the effectiveness of existing legislation to the costs and benefits of alternative 
policies. Research has shown that about 65% of the Commission’s IAs use results from EPL 
evaluations when they are available, which suggests that this regulatory cycle functions in 
practice to some extent (Van Golen and Van Voorst, 2015: 402). Second, evidence provided by 
EPL evaluations can be used by the Commission to improve delegated acts or to develop 




information to stakeholders about a particular piece of legislation and allow them to push for 
changes accordingly (European Commission, 2015: 280). Fourth, EPL evaluations can allow 
national governments to learn what is the best way to implement EU legislation. 
However, EPL evaluations will not automatically lead to learning. This link is contingent 
on a key necessary condition, central to this paper: high evaluation quality (Forss and Carlsson, 
1997: 481). Evaluation quality is a key precondition for learning for two reasons. Firstly, the 
information provided by EPL evaluations only enhances learning if it is accurate and clear. 
When actors try to learn what policies work based on evaluations containing false or misleading 
data, the decisions that they make are unsubstantiated, which may lead to poor decision-
making (Cooksy and Caracelli, 2005: 31; Mayne and Schwartz, 2005: 7; Sanderson, 2002: 13). 
Secondly, since evaluations claim to describe reality objectively, their credibility is thwarted if 
actors find out that they contain misleading information. When this happens, decision-makers 
are likely to distrust further evaluations and the potential of such reports for learning is lost 
(Cooksy and Caracelli, 2005: 31; Mayne and Schwartz, 2005: 7). Therefore, EPL evaluations only 
enable policy learning if they observe certain standards of methodological quality.  
 The Commission’s system for EPL evaluation is designed to enhance quality in three 
main ways. Firstly, whereas EPL evaluations are primarily the responsibility of the Commission’s 
Directorates-General (DGs), its Secretariat-General (SG) may set quality standards that all DGs 
must observe (European Commission, 2007: 22-24; 2015: 252-298). Secondly, DGs outsource 
most of their EPL evaluations to specialized consultants to boost their technical quality 
(European Commission, 2015: 282-9; Van Voorst, 2017: 33-34). In such cases the consultants 
conduct most of the evaluation, while the responsible DG monitors the quality of their work 
(European Commission, 2015: 337-414; Fitzpatrick, 2012: 490-7). Thirdly, the Commission’s 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) (2018: 11) annually judges the quality of a small number of EPL 
evaluations. These reports are often revised when the RSB’s (2018: 12) opinion is negative. 
Despite the theoretical importance of the topic, empirical research about the quality of 
the Commission’s EPL evaluations has so far been limited. Whereas both academics (Cecot et 
al., 2008: 412-6; Lee and Kirkpatrick, 2004: 17-20; Renda, 2006: 62-66) and the RSB of the 




standard, similar research about the quality of the Commission’s EPL evaluations is less 
systematic. While an earlier explorative study (Mastenbroek et al., 2016: 1340) and the reports 
from the RSB (2018: 11) showed the quality of the Commission’s EPL evaluations to vary 
considerably, a more comprehensive and explanatory analysis of the topic is missing. This paper 
aims to fill this gap by answering the following research question: how can the variance in the 
quality of ex-post legislative evaluations by the European Commission be explained? 
In answering this question, we consider two sets of factors that may compromise the 
quality of EPL evaluations and, hence, their potential to inform learning. A first potential threat 
is political influence. Evaluation results can be used strategically in the political arena, for 
example to shift blame between actors or to criticize policies (Bovens et al., 2008: 319; Versluis 
et al., 2011: 213-214; Weiss, 1993: 94). The criticism that results from repeated negative 
evaluations can threaten the legitimacy of public organizations (Weiss, 1993: 95). This risk may 
be especially threatening for the Commission, as its unelected nature and the existence of 
Euroscepticism cause its activities to be constantly scrutinized (Versluis et al., 2011: 207). The 
Commission may therefore have an incentive not to learn to what extent its legislation is 
effective, especially when it expects the results of such assessments could be negative and 
hence open up discussion about its own role. 
One way to deal with unwelcome evaluations is to not initiate them in situations where 
negative outcomes are likely (Van Voorst and Mastenbroek, 2017: 645). However, in some 
cases this may be impossible, for example because an EPL evaluation is made compulsory by 
legal requirements. When an evaluation with potentially negative outcomes must be 
conducted, institutions like the Commission may have an incentive to manipulate their content, 
for example by selecting evaluation questions and methods that make convenient outcomes 
more likely (Chelimsky, 2008: 404; House, 2008: 418). In such cases, evaluation quality is 
compromised. 
 Secondly, the quality of the Commission’s EPL evaluations may be thwarted by 
‘technical’ factors, inherent to the methodological difficulties of evaluating legislation. A first 
technical explanation is evaluation capacity: DGs that have more/better resources and 




resources and procedures allow for extra investments in every phase of the evaluation process 
(Forss and Carlsson 1997: 498; Nielsen et al., 2011: 325-327; Rossi et al., 2004: 414).1  The type 
of evaluator could also matter: external parties may produce evaluations of higher quality than 
internal ones, given the fact that they have better expertise (Vedung, 1997: 117). A third 
technical explanation is complexity: for some legislation it is more difficult to produce a high-
quality evaluation than for other legislation (Bussmann, 2010: 281). 
The hypotheses flowing from these two types of explanations are tested using a dataset 
of 153 EPL evaluations conducted or outsourced by the Commission during 2000-2014. The 
results show that the Commission’s EPL evaluations do well in terms of applying a robust 
methodology, but that the clarity of their scope, the accuracy of their data and the foundations 
of their conclusions are problematic. The variance in this quality is mainly explained by the type 
of evaluator: EPL evaluations conducted by external actors are of higher quality than 
evaluations conducted internally by the Commission. 
 
2. Conceptualizing evaluation quality 
This paper uses four methodological criteria to assess the quality of the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations. These criteria have been derived from Mayne and Schwartz (2005: 304-305), who 
developed them based on the standards used by countries and international organizations that 
are frontrunners in the field of policy evaluation. These standards in turn are often based on 
general methodological criteria from the social sciences, as evaluations are essentially a form of 
applied social research (Mayne and Schwartz, 2005: 305).  
The first criterion is a well-defined scope: the purpose and the topic of an evaluation 
must be properly specified (Mayne and Schwartz, 2005: 304). If this criterion is not met, it 
remains unclear what an evaluation’s results are about and how broadly they can be applied. 
These issues in turn make it difficult to learn from an evaluation. In the context of this paper, 
the criterion of a well-defined scope means that the Commission’s EPL evaluations should 




The second criterion is accurate data: the raw information presented by an evaluation 
must be valid and reliable (Mayne and Schwartz, 2005: 305). Validity refers to the absence of 
systematic errors in research results; reliability concerns the absence of random errors (Adcock 
and Collier, 2001: 531). Validity can be further split into two types. The first type is internal or 
content validity: the correct measurement of abstract concepts (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 538). 
The second type is external validity: the degree to which results based on a sample represent a 
whole population (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 529).  
In the context of this paper, validity and reliability mean that the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations should avoid both systematic and random errors when assessing the effectiveness 
of legislation. If this is not the case, learning about this effectiveness occurs based on false 
information. This in turn may lead to poor or unsubstantiated decision-making (Cooksy and 
Caracelli, 2005: 31; Mayne and Schwartz, 2005: 7). External validity also matters for the 
Commission’s EPL evaluations because they must often make some selection of member states 
or stakeholders (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 490). For such evaluations to contribute to learning about 
the effectiveness of an entire piece of legislation, the results for the selected countries or actors 
must correctly represent the situation in the whole EU. 
The third criterion is robust methodology:2 evaluations should use methods that fit their 
research objective (Mayne and Schwartz, 2005: 305). In the context of EPL evaluations 
experimental methods are often impossible, as legislation is universal and therefore leaves no 
room for a control group (Bussmann, 2010: 281; Coglianese, 2012: 404). Conversely, 
methodologies that involve stakeholders are highly fitting when evaluating EU legislation, as 
there are many different actors involved in the implementation of such policies (like member 
states, local governments and interest groups) (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 481, 489). Stakeholders who 
implement policies in their daily work presumably have the best view on how they function in 
reality (Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000). Therefore, considering the views of a multitude of 
stakeholders is essential to learn if and why EU legislation works. 
The fourth criterion is substantiated findings: an evaluation’s conclusions should be 
based on its underlying data (Mayne and Schwartz, 2005: 305). This criterion matters because 




entirely and may therefore rely on its conclusions only (Vedung, 1997: 281). When such 
conclusions are not clearly related to the underlying data, decision-makers may have 
insufficient details to fully learn how a policy works (Coglianese, 2012: 62-63). Furthermore, if a 
conclusion is not clearly supported by underlying data, this may create distrust in the validity of 
evaluations’ findings, making them less useful for learning (Forss and Carlsson, 1997: 481, 490). 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
Although much academic literature about policy evaluation exists, there is no comprehensive 
theory that explains variation in evaluation quality (Mastenbroek et al., 2016: 1343). Therefore, 
this paper develops an explanatory model for evaluation quality based on broader theories 
about EU governance and policy evaluation. In this model we considers two types of variables 
that may affect evaluation quality: political and technical explanations. 
 
Political explanations 
EPL evaluations can be perceived as strategic tools in the hands of decision makers. This idea is 
rooted in the theoretical view that evaluations are never entirely neutral: their results are 
always advantageous to some actors while being disadvantageous to others (Bovens et al., 
2008: 319; Chelimsky, 2008: 400; Versluis et al., 2011: 213-214; Weiss, 1993: 95-96). For 
example, evaluations can be used strategically to delay decisions, to shift responsibilities for 
mistakes and to provide a semblance of rationality (Vedung, 1997: 111-13).  
Political pressure is generally considered a threat to evaluation quality (Cooksy and 
Mark, 2012: 82; Datta, 2011: 281). Potentially, it has a negative effect on all four quality criteria 
described above (Mayne and Schwartz, 2005: 314-316). Political influence may prevent a well-
defined scope when an evaluation’s client prescribes vague or suggestive research questions to 
serve his own interests (Chelimsky, 2008: 404; Vedung, 1997: 93-94). Accurate data is difficult 
to collect when actors refuse to provide evaluators with information that could harm their 
political position (Chelimsky, 2008: 404; Weiss, 1993: 96) or this information gets distorted 




321; House, 2008: 417). The criterion of robust methodology is not met when unwelcome parts 
of data are ignored (Chelimsky, 2008: 401; House, 2008: 418). Finally, political pressure may 
have a negative effect on substantiated findings when the conclusion of an evaluation is 
rewritten to include findings favourable to specific actors or to drop results that are unwelcome 
to them (Chelimsky, 2008: 404; House, 2008: 418).  
Previous research has shown that the Commission deals strategically with the initiation 
and use of both impact assessments (Poptcheva, 2013: 4; Torriti, 2010: 1065) and EPL 
evaluations (Van Voorst and Mastenbroek, 2017: 653; Zwaan et al., 2016: 688). Therefore, we 
can expect strategic considerations to influence the quality of the Commission’s EPL evaluations 
as well. Below this general expectation is translated into a number of specific hypotheses. 
Arguably, the risk of strategic considerations affecting evaluation quality is especially 
high when an evaluation’s topic is politically controversial (Boswell, 2008: 473-476). According 
to this logic, the sensitivity of a piece of legislation increases the stakes of the actors involved in 
the evaluation process, which in turn increases the chances that they will take note of the 
evaluation and will attempt to distort its results in some of the ways that were described above. 
This may reduce the quality of the evaluation. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The more politicized the topic of an EPL evaluation, the lower the quality of that 
evaluation. 
 
A second important strategic consideration is that evaluations with negative results can lead to 
demands to reduce the role of actors responsible for policy implementation (Vedung, 1997: 
102-108). In the context of the EU, EPL evaluations may be used by the European Parliament 
(EP), the Council and other stakeholders to scrutinize the Commission’s activities (Radaelli and 
Meuwese, 2010: 138; Versluis et al., 2011: 208; Zwaan et al., 2016: 688). Therefore, EPL 
evaluations with negative findings may lead such actors to call for the Commission’s 
competences to be reduced and/or for policies to be ‘repatriated’ to the national level. We thus 
expect that the Commission will particularly wish to influence the results of EPL evaluations 




 Involvement of the EP in decision making decreases the chances of significant 
amendments and is therefore expected to have a positive effect on evaluation quality. The 
reason for this is that the EP provides an extra veto player that can block amendments (Häge, 
2007: 307). As a majority of EP members generally supports further European integration 
(Pollack, 2008: 9), it can also be expected that the EP will usually oppose reducing the 
competences of supranational institutions like the Commission. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Evaluations of pieces of legislation for which the European Parliament has veto 
powers are of higher quality than evaluations of pieces of legislation for which the European 
Parliament does not have veto powers. 
 
The voting procedure in the Council is also expected to influence the chances of legislative 
amendments. If unanimity is required in the Council, it is significantly harder to change 
legislation, as it is difficult to make all member states agree on a proposal (Häge, 2007: 308). 
Theoretically, this difficulty to amend legislation reduces the risk that negative evaluation 
results will threaten the Commission’s competences and therefore decreases the incentive for 
the Commission to distort evaluation results. We therefore expect the quality of an evaluation 
to be higher when the Council applies unanimity voting, as compared to when it applies 
qualified majority voting (QMV). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Evaluations of pieces of legislation decided upon by unanimity in the Council are 
of higher quality than evaluations of pieces of legislation decided upon by qualified majority 
voting. 
 
The quality of the Commission’s EPL evaluations may also be affected by the presence of 
evaluation clauses in the evaluated legislation. Such clauses include legal obligations to 
evaluate the legislation in a certain way and at a certain moment in time (Summa and 
Toulemonde, 2002: 410). These legal obligations may cause EPL evaluations to become ‘tick-




efforts to learn about policies (Cooksy and Mark, 2012: 82; Radaelli and Meuwese, 2010: 146). 
When there is a lack of enthusiasm to evaluate, the quality of EPL evaluations may suffer. 
Evaluation clauses also prevent flexibility, as the timeframe of three to five years that they tend 
to prescribe may be too short to conduct a proper EPL evaluation.3 
 
Hypothesis 4: Evaluations of pieces of legislation containing an evaluation clause are of lower 
quality than evaluations of pieces of legislation containing no evaluation clause. 
 
Technical explanations 
Besides the political variables described above, evaluation quality may also be affected by 
‘technical’ factors. Such factors are rooted in an apolitical or rationalistic view on policy 
evaluation. This perspective encompasses the idea that evaluations can produce objective 
knowledge when the correct procedures are followed and the right evaluators are involved in 
the process, regardless of political context (Bovens et al., 2008: 325).  
Three specific technical factors may affect the quality of the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations. The first is evaluation capacity: the means and procedures meant to ensure that 
high-quality evaluations are ongoing practices within organizations (Nielsen et al., 2011: 325). 
Higher evaluation capacity can be expected to positively affect evaluation quality (Cooksy and 
Mark, 2012: 81), as it allows for more investments in every stage of an evaluation process. For 
example, having a staff that is trained well in evaluation methods can lead to better data 
collection and analysis (accurate data and robust methodology) (Nielsen et al., 2011: 327). 
Furthermore, more evaluation capacity allows for extra investments in writing high-quality 
reports (Forss and Carlsson 1997: 498; Rossi et al., 2004: 414), which could lead to a more 
thorough description of the evaluated policy (well-defined scope) and to results being 
presented in a way that clearly links them to the underlying data (substantiated findings). 
Within the Commission, the DGs are the main organizational units that conduct 
evaluations (Stern, 2009: 71). Existing research (Van Voorst, 2017: 33) shows that the capacity 
of these DGs to conduct EPL evaluations varies greatly: some DGs have clear procedures for EPL 




less capacity is available. We expect that these capacity differences between DGs (partly) 
explain the variance in the quality of the Commission’s EPL evaluations. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The higher the evaluation capacity of the DG that conducts an evaluation, the 
higher the quality of that evaluation. 
 
A second technical factor that may affect evaluation quality is the type of evaluator. Although 
the Commission’s DGs outsource most of their EPL evaluations, they may also conduct them 
internally (European Commission, 2015: 282-289). External evaluations can be expected to be 
of higher quality than internal ones, as they are generally conducted by more experienced 
evaluators (Vedung, 1997: 117). Most DGs sign multi-annual framework contracts with 
specialized consultants, which allows these companies to gain expertise in evaluating EU 
legislation (Van Voorst, 2017: 33-34). This expertise may result in improvements to all elements 
of evaluation quality, including the presence of a well-defined scope, accurate data, robust 
methodology and substantiated findings. Although DGs must also employ some evaluation 
experts internally, this is usually a small coordinating staff that has less experience with 
conducting full evaluations (Van Voorst, 2017: 33). 
Some academics (e.g. Vedung, 1997: 117) suggest that external evaluators also produce 
better reports because they are more impartial than internal evaluators. Other literature 
disputes this claim, as the fact that consultants depend on policy makers for their future 
funding may give them an incentive not to be too critical (Conley-Tyler, 2005: 7). On the other 
hand, if external evaluators are too sensitive to their clients’ interests, this may work as a 
‘boomerang’, by affecting a core building block of their reputation: producing objective reports. 
All in all, we do not expect the difference in impartiality to affect the quality of EPL evaluations 
in the context of this paper. 
 





The third technical factor that may affect quality is legislative complexity. Legislation is often 
difficult to evaluate because it contains multiple overlapping interventions with different goals 
(Bussmann, 2010: 281). This is especially the case in the context of the EU, where regulations 
and directives are based on extensive compromises between different member states and 
supranational institutions (Delahais, 2014: 7, 9; Fitzpatrick, 2012: 480-481; Häge, 2007: 307-
308). The implementation of EU legislation also typically involves a complex web of actors 
(Delahais, 2014: 9; Fitzpatrick, 2012: 480; Steunenberg, 2006: 294-295).  
Such complexity can make it difficult to conduct high-quality EPL evaluations 
(Bussmann, 2010: 281; Delahais, 2014: 1; Fitzpatrick, 2012: 480-481). In particular, the fact that 
EU legislation often contains multiple goals and interventions can make it challenging to clearly 
delineate the topic of an EPL evaluation (well-defined scope). For complex legislation it may 
also be more difficult to identify and gain access to all stakeholders and to find other 
appropriate sources of information (accurate data and robust methodology) (Bussmann, 2010: 
281; Fitzpatrick, 2012: 480-481). Furthermore, for more complex legislation it may be harder to 
define when it should be considered successful, which makes it more difficult to draw 
conclusions about its effectiveness from the available evidence (substantiated findings). 
 
Hypothesis 7: The more complex the piece of legislation that is evaluated, the lower the quality 
of the evaluation. 
 
4. Methods and data 
 
Data collection 
This research uses a self-constructed dataset of 153 evaluations in which the Commission or an 
external party hired by the Commission retrospectively assessed the effectiveness of European 
regulations or directives. Evaluations focusing on process aspects or side effects of legislation 
only were left out due to this paper’s focus on learning about effectiveness. The dataset starts 




December 2014 because not all evaluations from 2015 and later had been published online 
when the data collection was completed. Three other types of EPL evaluations were discarded. 
Firstly, evaluations of legislation that only regulates the EU institutions or actors outside of the 
EU were left out, as the Commission’s better regulation agenda focuses on legislation that 
affects citizens and companies (European Commission, 2007: 3; 2016: 2). Secondly, we 
discarded all evaluation reports that merely summarize other evaluation reports. Thirdly, four 
EPL evaluations only available in French were left out because reading them would have 
required extensive knowledge of that language. 
The evaluations were collected from various sources: the Commission’s search engine 
for evaluations,4 the Commission’s multi-annual evaluation overview (2010), EU bookshop,5 
annexes to the Commission’s financial reports,6 the Commission’s work programmes,7 and lists 
of evaluations found on websites of the Commission’s DGs. The data collection was checked by 
using an existing dataset of evaluations from expertise centre Eureval, by running Google 
searches for evaluations of major legislation adopted between 1996 and 2010, by searching for 
background documents of legislation in Eur-lex,8 and by discussions with the SG. For a further 
description of the dataset, see Mastenbroek et al. (2016: 1334-1335) (chapter 2 of this 
dissertation). 
 
Operationalization of evaluation quality 
The quality of each evaluation report was measured by coding it with the help of a standardized 
scorecard. This method has the advantage that it allows for studying a large number of 
evaluations in a short amount of time (Forss and Carlsson, 1997: 483). Its disadvantage is that it 
is unfit to judge evaluation processes, which are usually not described in the reports. The 
scorecard method also does not allow for in-depth judgements of the content of individual 
evaluations. Therefore, this paper focuses on characteristics of the reports that can be 
efficiently measured. 
The criterion of a well-defined scope, firstly, was measured using two indicators. The 
first indicator is the presence of a clear problem definition: the report should mention its aim to 




indicator is the presence of a reconstruction of the legislation’s intervention logic: an overview 
of the steps through which the regulation or directive was intended to reach its goals. Such 
reconstructions matter because evaluations that seek to understand a policy’s effectiveness 
should first map how it was meant to work (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 485; Stern, 2009: 70).  
Secondly, concerning accurate data, to check if an EPL evaluation measures 
effectiveness without too many errors, the various types of validity and reliability discussed in 
the theoretical section were measured. Content validity was assessed by checking the 
evaluations for the presence of a clear operationalization: a list of concrete indicators used to 
measure effectiveness. External validity was measured by using two indicators: a representative 
selection of member states and a representative selection of cases within these states. Unless 
all countries or cases were selected, the evaluation had to provide a clear explanation for the 
representativeness of its selection. Reliability was assessed by checking the replicability of the 
evaluations: do the reports provide their questionnaires, lists of respondents and the like, so 
that the research could be repeated? 
The criterion of a robust methodology, thirdly, was assessed by checking the evaluations 
for the presentation of at least some stakeholder opinions regarding legislative effectiveness. A 
second indicator was the use of triangulation: are the evaluation’s findings based on at least 
two different methods of data collection? Triangulation is a sign of methodological robustness 
because it allows for double-checking findings about effectiveness. The following methods were 
counted as substantially different when measuring triangulation: studying existing content, 
direct observations, surveys, focus groups and interviews.  
The criterion of substantiated findings, fourthly, was assessed by checking if the reports 
clearly link their conclusions to their results. Specifically, the evaluations were required to (1) 
contain a conclusion that judges the legislation’s effectiveness and (2) provide clear sources or 
references to data presented earlier in the report in a majority of this conclusion’s paragraphs. 
Only paragraphs that answered research questions were included in this calculation: opening 
paragraphs and paragraphs that merely served to structure the conclusion were not counted. 
Each indicator presented above was measured dichotomously, with evaluation reports 




Twenty cases were coded by both authors of this paper to assess intercoder reliability, which 
was found to be sufficient.9 Table 1 summarizes the indicators of the scorecard. 
 
 
Table 1: Operationalization of evaluation quality 
Quality criterion Indicator(s) 
Well-defined scope Clear problem definition 
Intervention logic reconstructed 
Accurate data Content validity: clear operationalization 
External validity: representative country selection 
External validity: representative case selection 
Reliability: replicability 
Robust methodology Stakeholder consultation 
Triangulation 
Substantiated findings Substantiated conclusions 
 
Operationalization of independent variables 
Politicization (hypothesis 1) was measured by establishing whether or not the evaluated 
legislation was on the Council’s agenda as a B-point, as B-points are handled at the 
political/ministerial level (Häge, 2007: 303). Involvement of the European Parliament 
(hypothesis 2) was measured by assessing the formal procedure used to enact the evaluated 
legislation as stated by Eur-lex.7 In case of the ordinary legislative procedure (former codecision 
and cooperation procedures) this involvement was considered high, while in case of the 
consultation or comitology procedures it was considered low (Häge, 2007: 316). The voting 
procedure in the Council (hypothesis 3) was also measured dichotomously (QMV or unanimity) 
using Eur-lex. The presence of an evaluation clause (hypothesis 4) was measured dichotomously 
(yes/no) by searching each evaluated piece of legislation using specific keywords.10  
Evaluation capacity (hypothesis 5) was measured using interviews with the evaluation 
coordinators of seventeen DGs of the Commission (Van Voorst, 2017: 29-31). Data were 
collected about twelve capacity indicators, but out of these only the presence of a dedicated 
(sub)unit for evaluations (yes/no) and the presence of evaluation guidelines (yes/no) could be 




(hypothesis 6), which could be either internal or external, was deduced from the title page of 
each report. The complexity of the evaluated legislation (hypothesis 7) was measured by its 
number of recitals, as a larger number of explanations is generally required for more complex 
legislation (Kaeding, 2006: 236; Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2010: 501). 
 
Table 2: Operationalization of independent variables 
Type of 
explanation 




Political Politicization Council (H1) 0 = not discussed as B-point 
1 = discussed as B-point 
0 = 64 cases 
1 = 88 cases 
EP involvement (H2) 0 = consultation procedure  
1 = ordinary legislative procedure  
0 = 40 cases 
1 = 112 cases 
Council voting procedure (H3)  0 = QMV 
1 = unanimity 
0 = 129 cases 
1 = 20 cases 
Evaluation clause (H4) 0 = no evaluation clause 
1 = evaluation clause present 
0 = 39 cases 
1 = 113 cases 
Technical Evaluation capacity (H5) 0 = no evaluation unit 
1 = evaluation unit present 
0 = 88 cases 
1 = 65 cases 
0 = no evaluation guidelines 
1 = evaluation guidelines present 
0 = 75 cases 
1 = 78 cases 
Type of evaluator (H6) 0 = internal 
1 = external 
0 = 33 cases 
1 = 120 cases 
Complexity (H7) Number of recitals Mean = 28.8 





Some of the indicators presented above are derived from the evaluated legislation. When 
multiple pieces of legislation were studied by one evaluation, the average score for these pieces 
of legislation was used to code continuous variables and the type of the majority of the pieces 
of legislation was used to code the categorical ones. For example, if an evaluation studied two 
pieces of legislation with an evaluation clause and one piece of legislation without such a 
clause, it was coded as containing a clause. In the rare case of a tie, we used the value of the 
most recent legislation. Table 2 summarizes the operationalization, which has partly been 
derived from chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
 
Method of analysis 
The data presented above were analysed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. One 
assumption of this technique is that the dependent variable is continuous (Miles and Shevlin, 
2001: 62), which is not the case for evaluation quality as measured in this paper. However, if 
the number of categories used to measure an ordinal variable is large enough (e.g. higher than 
seven) it can still be analysed with OLS regression if all other assumptions of this method are 
met (Miles and Shevlin, 2001: 62). We carefully checked for these assumptions and found that 
none of them were violated by our data. We preferred OLS regression over regression methods 
tailored towards ordinal variables because its results are easier to interpret. The variables were 





Figure 1 depicts the variance in the quality of the 153 evaluations studied in this paper. The 
average quality score is 5.6 on a nine-point scale; about 75% of the reports meet the majority 
(five or more) of the criteria. No reports received a score of zero and only five reports received 
a score of one or two. At the other end of the spectrum, two reports11  meet all of the criteria 
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Overall, this assessment of the 153 cases that focus on effectiveness provides a more positive 
picture than an earlier study of 216 EPL evaluations produced by the Commission between 
2000 and 2012, where the average quality score was 4.1 on an eight-point scale, 43% of the 
reports met five or more out of eight criteria and two reports received a score of zero 
(Mastenbroek et al., 2016: 1340). This comparison suggests that the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations that assess effectiveness are of a somewhat higher quality than its ex-post 
evaluations of other aspects of legislation (like transposition, implementation or side effects). 
Table 3 presents the number of EPL evaluations with a positive score per aspect of 
quality. The table shows that there are large differences between the criteria. The vast majority 
of the evaluations apply stakeholder consultation and at least one other data collection method 
(about 76% has a positive score regarding both stakeholder consultation and triangulation), 
which means that the criterion of a robust methodology is generally being met. The criterion of 




include a clear problem definition (89%), only a minority of them goes beyond that by also 
presenting the intervention logic through which the evaluated legislation is supposed to 
achieve its aims (37%). Substantiated conclusions are present in a small majority of 57% of the 
reports, which means that more than four out of ten evaluations have no conclusion that can 
be clearly linked to its collected data. 
 
Table 3: scores for individual quality aspects from high to low 
Indicator Quality Criterion Number of reports with 
positive score (out of 153) 
% 
Triangulation Robust methodology 137 90 
Clear problem definition Well-defined scope 136 89 
Stakeholder consultation Robust methodology 128 84 
Representative country selection Accurate data 107 70 
Clear operationalization Accurate data 98 64 
Substantiated conclusions Substantiated findings 87 57 
Representative case selection Accurate data 65 42 
Intervention logic reconstructed Well-defined scope 56 37 
Replicability Accurate data 48 31 
 
Overall, the criterion of accurate data is met by the smallest proportion of EPL evaluations. 
Although 70% of the reports study all member states or clearly explain their selection of certain 
countries, only 42% of them are fully transparent about how they selected cases within these 
states. This shows that the external validity of many EPL evaluations is questionable: can their 
findings be used to learn about the effectiveness of the legislation in general or do they only 
apply to the specific cases that were studied? Some 64% of the EPL evaluations present a clear 
operationalization that shows how the legislation’s effectiveness was measured, which is 
important for their internal validity. However, few evaluations meets the standard set for 




underlying research. In particular, many of the EPL evaluations present either their interview 
guides, their questionnaires or their lists of respondents, but not all of this information 
together, which makes it impossible to check the data collection if required. 
 
Explanatory analysis 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression analysis. As the table shows, the model with the 
political factors only (model 1) is significant at the 0.05 level, but explains just 6% of the 
variance in the quality of the EPL evaluations. Furthermore, none of the individual independent 
variables included in this model turn out to be significant in the way the hypotheses predicted. 
The level of politicization of the evaluated legislation (hypothesis 1), the procedure through 
which it was enacted by the Council (hypothesis 3) and the presence of an evaluation clause in 
its text (hypothesis 4) do not explain the variance in the quality of subsequent EPL evaluations.  
The voting procedure used in the EP does provide a significant explanation, but its effect 
is the opposite of what we expected based on our theoretical framework (hypothesis 2). On 
average, the quality of EPL evaluations of legislation enacted through the ordinary legislative 
procedure is about one point lower than the quality of EPL evaluations of legislation enacted 
through the consultation procedure. This effect remains significant no matter which of the 
other factors are included in the model. This result suggests that, contrary to our expectations, 
the Commission’s interest to protect its competences does not explain the variation in the 
quality of its EPL evaluations. However, it should be noted that the indicators used to measure 
this interest were fairly general proxies.  
One possible reason for the fact that EPL evaluations of legislation enacted through the 
ordinary procedure are of relatively low quality could be that such legislation is more closely 
scrutinized by the EP than legislation enacted through the consultation procedure (Rasmussen 
and Toshkov, 2010: 92). The Commission could therefore have an incentive not to provide the 
EP with EPL evaluations that can be used for the purpose of this scrutiny. However, more 
(qualitative) research about the mechanisms behind the Commission’s EPL evaluations would 
be needed to assess the plausibility of this hypothesis. 




whole is still significant at the 0.05 level and its explanatory power increases greatly to 0.34. 
This means that the model with all variables included explains about one-third of the variation 
in the quality of the EPL evaluations. Out of the added variables, only the type of evaluator is 
significant (in line with hypothesis 6). On average, external evaluations score almost two points 
higher than internal evaluations on the nine-point scale used in this paper. Based on our 
theoretical framework, the most logical interpretation of this finding is that external evaluators 
produce EPL evaluations of higher quality because they have more specialized expertise than 
the Commission’s internal evaluators. 
Four individual quality aspects correlate significantly with the type of evaluator.12 These  
criteria are listed here together with the proportion of external evaluations versus internal 
evaluations that meets them: (1) a clear operationalization (77% versus 18%), stakeholder 
consultation (87% versus 73%), triangulation (98% versus 58%) and substantiated conclusions 
(66% versus 24%). For the other criteria, the difference between both types of evaluators is 
about 10% or less. Based on these findings, outsourcing evaluations to consultants appears to 
be particularly useful to produce reports the have high internal validity, a robust methodology 
and substantiated findings. In other words, hiring external evaluators may contribute to 
learning by enhancing the quality and the variety of the data that the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations use, as well as the conclusions that are drawn from this information. 
The other three technical variables included in the analysis provide no significant 
explanations. In other words, this paper found no evidence that DGs with more evaluation 
capacity produce better EPL evaluations than other DGs (hypothesis 5), nor do the data show 



























The aim of this paper was to describe and explain the variance in the quality of the 
Commission’s ex-post evaluations that assess legislative effectiveness. To achieve this goal, a 
dataset of 153 ex-post legislative (EPL) evaluations was analysed with the help of OLS 
regression, to test hypotheses derived from two different theoretical views on evaluation 
quality: a political and a technical perspective. 
 Model 1: 
Political factors 
Model 2: 
Political + technical factors 
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N 148   148   
F 3.52 (4, 143)  10.44 (8, 139)  
Significance 0.01   0.00   




 The descriptive results show that the quality of the Commission’s EPL evaluations varies 
considerably. The average quality score of the reports is 5.6 on a nine-point scale. Most of the 
evaluations are based on stakeholder input and other types of data, which indicates that their 
methodology is based on a robust combination of sources. However, the evaluations perform 
less well regarding the clarity of their scope, the accuracy of their data and the foundations 
underpinning their conclusions. The worst aspect of the evaluations’ quality is their replicability: 
less than one-third of the reports contained all the material required to repeat their research. 
The explanatory analysis shows that the type of evaluator is a significant explanation for 
the variation in quality. In other words, external evaluators produce considerably better EPL 
evaluations than the Commission’s internal services, especially regarding the clarity of their 
operationalization, their use of multiple research methods (triangulation) and the extent to 
which their conclusions are substantiated. These findings suggest that the expertise of 
specialized consultants is a key asset to enhance the quality of the evaluations. None of the 
other factors that we studied were found to be significant in the way that we expected.  
This paper has two main limitations. Firstly, it does not prove why certain factors 
influence evaluation quality. For example, do external evaluators deliver more quality because 
they have more expertise (as was suggested by our theoretical framework) or because they are 
more independent than internal evaluators? A second limitation of the paper is that it focuses 
on quality indicators that could be efficiently measured using a standardized scorecard. 
Therefore, criteria related to evaluation processes or the detailed content of reports were 
omitted. One way to address these limitations would be to conduct in-depth case studies on a 
number of specific evaluations, so their quality can be fully analysed and the mechanisms that 








 Some literature about evaluation capacity stresses that this concept is partly political, as it relates to the value 
that organizations attach to evaluation (e.g. Nielsen et al., 2011: 326-327). However, this article discusses political 
influences separately and therefore conceptualizes evaluation capacity as the technical means to evaluate only. 
2 Mayne and Schwartz (2005: 305) label this aspect ‘sound analysis’, but we prefer the name ‘robust 
methodology’, as the former seems more related to the criterion of substantiated findings. 
3 This timeframe aspect of evaluation clauses was not derived from theoretical literature, but from 











9 Cohen’s Kappa was higher than 0.4 for each indicator, indicating a sufficient degree of intercoder 
reliability (Neuendorf, 2002: 143). Intercoder reliability was not measured for the indicators of a clear 
intervention logic and substantiated conclusions. 
10
 ‘evalu*’, ‘repo*’, ‘stud*’ and ‘research’. We also checked the last five articles of each directive or regulation, 
where evaluation clauses are most commonly found. 
11
 The Evaluation of the Measures under Regulation (EC) No 951/97 and the Fitness Check of the Operation and 
Effects of Information and Consultation Directives in the EU/EEA Countries. 
12





Adcock R and Collier D (2001) Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and  
Quantitative Research. The American Political Science Review 95(3): 529-546. 
Böhme K (2002) Much Ado about Evidence: Reflections from Policy Making in the European  
Union. Planning Theory & Practice 3(1): 98-101. 
Boswell C (2008) The political functions of expert knowledge: Knowledge and legitimization in  
European Union immigration policy. Journal of European public policy 15(4): 471-488.  
Bovens M, ‘t Hart P and Kuipers S (2008) The politics of policy evaluation. In: Goodin RE, Rein M  
and Moran M (eds) The Oxford handbook of public policy. Oxford: University Press, pp. 
320-335. 
Bunea A and Ibenskas R (2017) Unveiling patterns of contestation over better regulation  
reforms in the European Union. Public Administration 95(3): 589-604. 
Bussmann W (2010) Evaluation of legislation: skating on thin ice. Evaluation 16(3): 279-293. 
Cecot C, Hahn R, Renda A and Schrefler R (2008) An evaluation of the quality of impact  
assessment in the European Union with lessons for the US and the EU. Regulation & 
governance 2(4): 405-422. 
Chelimsky E (2008) A Clash of Cultures: improving the “Fit” Between Evaluative Independence  
and the Political Requirements of a Democratic Society. American Journal of Evaluation 
29(4): 400-415. 
Coglianese C (2012) Evaluating the performance of regulation and regulatory policy. Report to  
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Conley-Tyler M (2005) A fundamental choice: Internal or external evaluation? Evaluation  
Journal of Australasia 4(1): 3-11. 
Cooksy LJ and Caracelli VJ (2005) Quality, context and use. Issues in achieving the goals of  
meta-evaluation. American Journal of Evaluation 26(1): 31-42. 
Cooksy JM and Mark MM (2012) Influences on evaluation quality. American Journal of  
Evaluation 33(1): 79-89. 





Delahais T (2014) Ex post evaluation of regulation and regulatory policies - The case of EU  
regulation (ECPR conference paper). Available at:  
http://reggov2014.ibei.org/bcn-14-papers/53-71.pdf (Accessed 24 April 2018). 
European Commission (2007) Responding to strategic needs: Reinforcing the use of evaluation  
[SEC(2007)213]. Brussels: European Commission. 
European Commission (2010) Multi-annual overview (2002-2009) of evaluations and impact  
assessments. Secretariat-general, May 2010. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/evaluation/docs/multiannual_overview_e
n.pdf (Accessed 10 July 2015). 
European Commission (2013) Communication from the Commission to the European  
Parliament, the Council, the European economic and social committee and the 
committee of the regions. Strengthening the foundations of smart regulation: improving 
evaluation [COM(2013)686]. Brussels: European Commission. 
European Commission (2015) Better Regulation Toolbox [SWD(2015)111]. Brussels: European  
Commission. 
European Commission (2016) Communication from the Commission to the European  
Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Better Regulation: Delivering better 
results for a stronger Union [COM(2016) 615 final]. Brussels: European Commission. 
Fitzpatrick T (2012) Evaluating legislation: An alternative approach for evaluating EU internal  
market and services law. Evaluation 18(4): 477-499. 
Forss K and Carlsson J (1997) The quest for quality - or can evaluation findings be trusted?  
Evaluation 3(4): 481-501. 
Häge FM (2007) Committee Decision-Making in the Council of the European Union. European 
Union Politics 8(3): 299-328. 
House ER (2008) Blowback: consequences of evaluation for evaluation. American Journal of 
Evaluation 29(4): 416-426. 
Kaeding M (2006) Determinants of transposition delay in the European Union. Journal of  




Lee N and Kirkpatrick C (2004) A Pilot Study of the Quality of European Commission Extended  
Impact Assessments. Impact assessment research centre (working paper). 
Majone G (1999) The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems. West European Politics  
22(1): 1-24. 
Mastenbroek E, Van Voorst S and Meuwese A (2016) Closing the regulatory cycle? A meta- 
evaluation of ex-post legislative evaluations by the European Commission. Journal of 
European Public Policy 23(9): 1329-1348. 
Mayne J and Schwartz R (2005) Assuring the quality of evaluative information. In: Schwartz R  
and Mayne J (eds) Quality Matters: Seeking Confidence in Evaluating, Auditing and 
Performance Reporting. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, pp. 1-17. 
Miles J and Shevlin M (2001) Applying regression and correlation: a guide for students and  
researchers. London: Sage.  
Neuendorf K (2002) The content analysis guidebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Nielsen SB, Lemire S and Skov M (2011) Measuring evaluation capacity: Results and  
implications of a Danish study. American Journal of Evaluation 32(3): 324-344. 
Pollack MA (2008) Member-State Principals, Supranational Agents, and the EU Budgetary  
Process, 1970-2008. Paper prepared for presentation at the Conference on  
Public Finances in the European Union, sponsored by the European Commission Bureau  
of Economic Policy Advisors, Brussels, 3-4 April 2008. 
Poptcheva EM (2013) Library Briefing. Policy and legislative evaluation in the EU. Brussels:  
European Parliament. 
Radaelli CM and Meuwese ACM (2010) Hard questions, hard solutions: Proceduralisation  
through impact assessment in the EU. West European Politics 33(1): 136-153. 
Rasmussen A and Toshkov D (2010) The Inter-institutional Division of Power and Time  
Allocation in the European Parliament. West European Politics 34(1): 71-96. 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board (2018) Regulatory Scrutiny Board - annual report 2017. Brussels:  
European Commission. 





Rossi PH, Lipsy MW and Freeman HE (2004) Evaluation: A systematic approach. Thousand  
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Sanderson I (2002) Evaluation, policy learning and evidence-based policy making. Public  
Administration 80(1): 1-22. 
Scharpf FW (1999) Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic? Oxford: University Press. 
Stern E (2009) Evaluation policy in the European Union and its institutions. In: Trochim WMK,  
Mark MM and Cooksy LJ (eds) Evaluation policy and evaluation practice: New directions  
for evaluation. San Fransisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, pp. 67-85. 
Steunenberg B (2006) Turning swift policymaking into deadlock and delay: National policy  
coordination and the transposition of EU directives. European Union Politics 7(3): 293- 
319. 
Steunenberg B and Rhinard M (2010) The Transposition of European Law in EU Member 
States: Between Process and Politics. European Political Science Review 2(3): 495-520. 
Summa H and Toulemonde J (2002) Evaluation in the European Union: Addressing complexity  
and ambiguity. In: Furubo J, Rist RC and Sandahl R (eds) International Atlas of 
Evaluation. New Brunswick: Transaction, pp. 407-424. 
Torriti J (2010) Impact assessment and the liberalization of the EU energy markets: Evidence- 
based policy-making or policy-based evidence-making? Journal of Common Market 
Studies 48(4): 1065-1081. 
Van Golen T and Van Voorst S (2016) Towards a regulatory cycle? The use of evaluative  
information in Impact Assessments and ex-post evaluations in the European Union. 
European Journal of Risk Regulation 7(2): 388-403. 
Van Voorst S (2017) Evaluation capacity in the European Commission. Evaluation 23(1): 24-41. 
Van Voorst S and Mastenbroek E (2017) Enforcement tool or strategic instrument? The  
initiation of ex-post legislative evaluations by the European Commission. European 
Union Politics 17(4): 640-657. 
Varvasovszky Z and Brugha R (2000) How to do (or not to do) a stakeholder analysis. Health  
Policy and Planning 15(3): 338-345. 




Versluis E, Van Keulen M and Stephenson P (2011) Analyzing the European Union Policy Process.  
Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Weiss CH (1993) Where Politics and Evaluation Research Meet. American Journal of Evaluation  
14(1): 93-106. 
Zwaan P, Van Voorst S and Mastenbroek E (2016) Ex-post regulatory evaluations in the  
European Union: questioning the use of evaluations as instruments for accountability. 



















Chapter 6: Towards a regulatory cycle? The use of evaluative 
information in impact assessments and ex-post evaluations in 
the European Union 
 
Thomas van Golen and Stijn van Voorst 
 
Published as: Van Golen T and Van Voorst S (2016) Towards a regulatory cycle? The use of 
evaluative information in impact assessments and ex-post evaluations in the European Union. 
European Journal of Risk Regulation 7(2): 388-403. 
 
Abstract 
As a part of its Better Regulation agenda, the European Commission increasingly stresses the 
link between different types of regulatory evaluations. Predictions made by impact assessments 
(IAs) could be verified during ex-post legislative evaluations, while ex-post evaluations in turn 
could recommend amendments to be studied in future IAs. This article combines a dataset of 
309 ex-post legislative evaluations (2000-2014) and a dataset of 225 IAs of legislative updates 
(2003-2014) to show how many ex-post evaluations of the Commission use IAs and vice versa. 
This way, it explores if the Commission’s rhetoric of a ‘regulatory cycle’ holds up in practice. 
Building on the literature of evaluation use, we formulate the hypotheses that the timeliness, 
quality and focus of the IAs and evaluations are key explanations for use. Our results show that 
so far only nine ex-post evaluations have used IAs of EU legislation, while 33 IAs have used ex-
post legislative evaluations. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, we find that 
timeliness is a necessary condition of the use of ex-post evaluations by IAs, suggesting that for 
the regulatory cycle to function properly, it is crucial to complete an ex-post evaluation before 
an IA is launched. Future research could repeat our analysis for evaluations of non-regulatory 





During the last sixteen years, the European Commission (EC) has continuously stressed the 
need to improve its regulatory framework (European Commission, 2000; 2007; 2010; 2013), an 
ambition which it reconfirmed most recently in its new guidelines for ‘Better Regulation’ 
(European Commission, 2015a). By reducing the regulatory burden imposed on citizens and 
updating the legislation which remains in force, the Commission claims to promote a 
competitive economy and increase the legitimacy of the EU (European Commission, 2015a: 4).  
Impact assessments (IAs) and ex-post legislative evaluations are two key elements of 
this Commission-wide agenda for Better Regulation1, as they are tools which can help to make 
legislation more ‘evidence-based’ (European Commission, 2015a: 7-9; Radaelli and Meuwese, 
2010: 137-140). IAs are studies of the potential costs and benefits of new legislation and other 
major proposals (European Commission, 2002a: 2), while ex-post legislative evaluations study 
regulations and directives after they have been in effect for some time (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 478).  
In its communications on Better Regulation, the Commission has increasingly stressed 
the need for a ‘regulatory cycle’ in which IAs build on the results of ex-post evaluations and vice 
versa to promote policy learning (European Commission, 2013a: 2-3; 2015b: 288). For example, 
ex-post evaluations can test if the predictions of IAs have come true, advising the repeal of 
legislation which has not achieved the predicted effects. In turn, IAs can study the costs and 
benefits of the amendments which are meant to solve the problems exposed by ex-post 
evaluations (DG INFSO, 2011: 17; DG MARKT, 2008: 51).  
 The question, however, is to what extent the rhetoric of a regulatory cycle holds up in 
practice. Despite the fact that the potential of linking IAs and ex-post evaluation was already 
recognized by the Commission more than a decade ago (European Commission, 2002b: 9), it 
appears that the two types of evaluation often remain unconnected in practice. In 2007, an 
external study of the Commission’s IA system showed that only six out of twenty IAs (30%) 
referred to any kind of interim or ex-post evaluation, a number which includes the use of 
evaluations on unrelated topics (The Evaluation Partnership, 2007: 86). The Impact Assessment 
Board (IAB) (2013: 7) – an institution which checks the quality of IAs – stated that in 2013 only 




These numbers suggest that IAs and ex-post evaluations are only loosely connected, 
although there is a notable lack of more systematic data on the topic from both a descriptive 
and an explanatory viewpoint (Smismans, 2015: 19). This article seeks to fill this gap by 
presenting quantitative data on the presence of a regulatory cycle in the EU. By linking a 
dataset of 309 ex-post legislative evaluations with a dataset of 225 IAs of legislative updates, 
we are able to describe and explain how many ex-post evaluations refer to IAs and vice versa. 
More formally, we formulate the research question of our article as follows: how often are IAs 
and ex-post evaluations of EU law used in subsequent corresponding evaluative instruments 
and how can variance in this regard be explained? By answering this question, we also hope to 
provide some recommendations on how the Commission could strengthen its Better Regulation 
agenda. 
Answering our research question does not only have a practical purpose, but also helps 
to improve academic knowledge. While scholars have published extensively on IAs (e.g. Cecot 
et al., 2008; De Francesco et al., 2012; Meuwese, 2008; Renda, 2006; Torriti and Löfstedt, 2012) 
and to a lesser extent on ex-post evaluations in the EU (e.g. Fitzpatrick, 2012; Højlund: 2014b; 
Stern, 2009), the connection between the two has largely remained ignored (Smismans, 2015: 
19), particularly from a quantitative viewpoint. This article helps to bridge the gap between 
both topics. Hopefully, the numbers we present can be a fruitful basis for future work on both 
IAs and ex-post evaluations in the EU. 
  The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section two provides background 
information about IAs and ex-post evaluations in the EU and how the two types of studies can 
be linked. In section three we present general theories on evaluation use, from which we derive 
a number of hypotheses about why IAs and ex-post evaluations may or may not build on each 
other’s results. In section four our data collection, operationalization and tools for analysis are 
presented. Section five presents both the descriptive and the explanatory results of our 
research. Section six concludes with recommendations on how the link between IA and ex-post 





2. Impact assessment and ex-post legislative evaluation in the EU 
Evaluation in the EU is primarily a decentralized activity in the European Commission. Each 
Directorate-General (DG) has its own evaluation-related staff and plans its own evaluation 
reports (Smismans, 2015: 19). While IAs are usually performed internally, ex-post evaluations 
are often outsourced to external consultants, as the Commission’s staff is too small to perform 
these studies internally and external evaluations are believed to be more objective (Smismans, 
2015: 22). Since 2009 a coordinating function for both IAs and ex-post evaluation lies with the 
Commission’s Secretariat-General (SG) (Smismans, 2015: 7).  
The evaluation system of the Commission has its origins in the field of programme 
evaluation, but from the year 2000 onwards it has increasingly been focused on other types of 
evaluation as well (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 478). After receiving criticism from other EU institutions 
for a lack of accountability and transparency in its legislative process, the Commission launched 
a number of reforms in which evaluation played a key part (European Commission, 2000: 6). It 
became compulsory for new legislation included in the Commission’s work programme and 
other legislation with clear social, economic or environmental impacts to have an underlying IA 
(Luchetta, 2012: 562). Furthermore, each IA was required to include a section on future 
monitoring and evaluation (European Commission, 2002b: 7; 2015a: 49). Since 2006 the quality 
of IAs was checked by the IAB, which was succeeded by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board in 2015 
(European Commission, 2015c). 
Although systematic ex-post evaluation of EU law was also promised at the beginning of 
the new century, this topic only received serious attention in Commission documents from 
2007 onwards (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 478). During that year the Commission launched a 
communication stating that ex-post evaluation should be more integrated in the regulatory 
cycle to provide for Better Regulation (European Commission, 2007: 10). In its recent policy 
documents on Better Regulation, the Commission increasingly stressed that closer links 
between IAs and ex-post evaluations are needed to increase the quality of the entire evaluation 
system (European Commission, 2012a: 3; 2013a: 4, 2015b: 71). The Commission’s High-level 




2012: 12). It remains unclear, however, how much of this rhetoric about a ‘regulatory cycle’ 
holds up in practice.  
One particular aspect of the Commission’s Better Regulation agenda is the ‘evaluate 
first’ principle, which states that an IA for a legislative amendment should always be preceded 
by an ex-post evaluation of the original regulation or directive (European Commission, 2010a: 
5). However, in practice the decision on when to start an IA - and by extension the decision to 
wait for an evaluation or not - lies in the hands of the policy unit or the inter-service group 
responsible for the IA process (Hartlapp et al., 2013: 430). The IAB could remark on the lack of 
references to ex-post evaluations when judging an IA, but this issue alone was unlikely to result 
in a negative opinion, which was only given in case of critical problems (Meuwese and 
Gomtsyan, 2015: 483, 490-491). It is possible that the link to ex-post evaluations will become 
more important now that the IAB has been replaced by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, as this 
institution also has a formal task in judging the quality of evaluations and could thus play a role 
in connecting the two evaluative instruments (European Commission, 2015b: 2-4). However, it 
remains to be seen how this will work out in practice.  
Although the Commission’s Better Regulation guidelines do state the need of linking IAs 
and ex-post evaluations, they do not go into much detail about how this can be achieved 
(European Commission, 2015a: 30). Two DGs have published guidelines for legislative 
evaluation which provide more information on this issue. DG MARKT states that IAs can inform 
evaluators which effects were expected at the time the legislation was made (the intervention 
logic), which could help to formulate research questions (DG MARKT, 2008: 21). In turn, ex-post 
evaluations can suggest amendments to existing legislation that can be studied in more detail in 
future IAs (DG MARKT, 2008: 58). DG INFSO states that IAs can also be useful to find 
stakeholders, as external actors consulted during an IA should ideally be consulted again during 
an ex-post evaluation to see if and why their views have changed (DG INFSO, 2011: 17). 
Furthermore, IAs can provide evaluators with background information on the topic and can 
notify them of potential data sources, indicators for empirical research and methodological 




Looking beyond the Commission, the European Court of Auditors stated that ex-post 
evaluations often describe how policies are implemented in practice, which is useful 
information when drafting an IA (European Court of Auditors, 2010: 40). In a large-scale 
academic study, Cecot et al. stated that the outcomes of ex-post evaluations can also be used 
to judge the quality of the assumptions made by IAs (Cecot et al., 2008: 409). Van Gestel and 
Vranken (2009: 225-228) put this method into practice by using ex-post evaluations in the 
Netherlands to check the accuracy of the ex-ante assessments which the Dutch Council of State 
made for new legislation. The results of their research show that even though ex-ante and ex-
post evaluations cannot always be compared in practice, systematically checking the outcomes 
of ex-ante evaluations with ex-post evaluations can be useful to strengthen ex-ante evaluations 
(Van Gestel and Vranken, 2009: 225-228).  
Despite all these potential ways for IAs to use ex-post evaluations and vice versa, 
existing research on the relation between the two does not provide a very positive picture (The 
Evaluation Partnership, 2007: 13). To explain this lack of a ‘regulatory cycle’ despite the 
Commission’s rhetoric on the importance of this issue, the next section presents a number of 
hypotheses derived from the literature on evaluation use. 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
The connection between IAs and ex-post evaluations can be conceptualised as one specific 
form of evaluation use (De Laat and Williams, 2014: 168). Therefore, this chapter first presents 
some general explanations for evaluation use and discusses if they can also be applied to the 
use of IAs by ex-post evaluations and vice versa. In doing this, we focus on situations where 
both an IA and an ex-post evaluation about legislation actually exist - if this is not the case, this 
form of use is of course impossible to begin with. 
Evaluation use can be defined as the way in which the results from evaluations feed 
back into an organisation and its policies (De Laat and Williams, 2014: 168). In the literature on 
evaluation use there has been an extensive focus on the types of evaluation use 




Højlund, 2014a; Højlund, 2014b; Loud and Mayne, 2014) and explanations for if evaluation 
results are used in organisations (Loud and Mayne, 2014: 7). The latter area is the focus of this 
article, as we are looking for the reasons why IAs may or may not use ex-post evaluations and 
vice versa. Three key explanations from the literature are discussed below: the timeliness of 
results, the quality of evaluations and the similarity of focus (De Laat and Williams, 2014: 158-
162; Smismans, 2015: 15-22).  
A first explanation is the timeliness of evaluation results: an evaluation is more likely to 
be used if it is published before an important decision-making moment and less likely to be 
used if it is presented right after (De Laat and Williams, 2014: 158-160; Højlund, 2014b: 29). 
Case studies about the EU’s cross compliance legislation and gender research programmes have 
shown that timeliness is also important in the context of IAs and ex-post evaluation (Smismans, 
2015: 19). If an ex-post evaluation is only published while an IA of a proposed amendment is 
already being drafted, it is less likely the IA will take the ex-post evaluation into account (Bozzini 
and Hunt, 2015: 64-65; Mergaert and Minto, 2015: 53). In our study, we hope to find out if the 
conclusion of these studies holds true when analysing a larger number of cases. Therefore, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: IAs conducted after an ex-post evaluation about the corresponding legislation is 
published are more likely to use this ex-post evaluation than IAs conducted while an ex-post 
evaluation on the same legislation is still being performed. 
  
When it comes to the use of IAs by ex-post evaluations, timeliness problems are almost 
impossible to occur, as there is a hard requirement for an IA to be published with a legislative 
proposal and an ex-post evaluation only takes place once the legislation has been in force for a 
couple of years. Therefore, hypothesis 1 only goes one way.  
 A second explanation for evaluation use is evaluation quality. If a report is clearly 
written and sound methodological choices are made, it is more likely something will be done 
with its results (De Laat and Williams, 2014: 162). Evaluations of poor quality are unlikely to be 




Laat and Williams, 2014: 162). This explanation could also play a role when it comes to IAs and 
ex-post evaluations, as it is harder to build an IA or ex-post evaluation on earlier research in 
case the quality of this research is lacking. For example, even though IAs are supposed to 
formulate a clear intervention logic specifying causes and outcomes (European Commission, 
2015a: 48), this does not always happen in practice, making it harder for ex-post evaluations to 
refer back to them (Luchetta, 2012: 571; Smismans, 2015: 18). Therefore, the following 
hypotheses are formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 2: IAs are more likely to use ex-post evaluations which are of higher quality. 
Hypothesis 3: Ex-post evaluations are more likely to use IAs which are of higher quality. 
 
A third potential explanation for the (lack of) use of IAs by ex-post evaluations and vice versa 
lies in their difference in focus (Smismans, 2015: 17-23). As the legal and practical requirements 
for IAs and ex-post evaluations differ to some extent, it can be difficult for them to build on 
each other’s results. For example, IAs tend to be more focused on social and environmental 
effects and have to take future circumstances into account, while for ex-post evaluations this is 
not the case. In addition, IAs may be focused on one particular piece of legislation where an ex-
post evaluation sometimes considers an entire policy field (‘fitness checks’) or vice versa 
(Smismans, 2015: 18) and IAs tend to be more focused on coherence rather than effectiveness 
(Smismans, 2015: 23). As these differences in focus are expected to have a negative impacts on 
use (De Laat and Williams, 2014: 162), the following hypotheses are formulated:  
 
Hypothesis 4: The use of ex-post evaluations by IAs is affected negatively by differences in focus 
between the IA and the ex-post evaluation 
Hypothesis 5: The use of IAs by ex-post evaluations is affected negatively by differences in focus 
between the IA and the ex-post evaluation. 
 
Other authors take a more institutional approach to explaining evaluation use. For example, 




internal evaluations are more likely to be used than external ones. However, since the 
institutional setting is largely the same for all the evaluations considered in this article (for 
example, IAs are almost always conducted internally and ex-post evaluations are almost always 
conducted externally), such issues are not relevant for our purpose. The literature on 
evaluation use also mentions a broad dissemination of results and stakeholder involvement as 
key variables for explaining the use of evaluation results: the more actors know about a study, 
the more likely something is done with its outcomes (De Laat and Williams, 2014: 167; EPEC, 
2005: 61). However, since we are only talking about the use of evaluations by other evaluations 
and not about use by external parties, dissemination is not relevant in the context of our study. 
Stakeholder involvement was included as an aspect of quality, as will be explained when our 
operationalization is presented in the next section. 
 
4. Methods and data 
 
4.1 Data collection ex-post evaluations 
We answered our research questions with the help of two self-constructed datasets. The first 
dataset contains 309 ex-post evaluations of regulations and directives conducted or 
commissioned by the European Commission between 2000 and 2014. Since the Commission 
does not have one clear format for ex-post evaluations, we included reports with very different 
kinds of names in our dataset (the most common ones being ‘evaluation’ ‘study’, ‘review’, ‘staff 
working document’ and ‘implementation report’) as long as they have the explicit aim to study 
EU legislation already in force. Background studies to IAs could be included as well, as long as 
they fulfil this criterion. To limit the dataset to accessible legislative evaluations, we excluded 
evaluations focusing entirely on spending activities (even if they do have a legal basis) and five 
reports only available in French. Also excluded were reports that only present the data of other 
evaluations and studies which only concern foreign countries2 or the EU institutions3, as in this 
case there is no link to the Better Regulation agenda. In other words, the legislation needs to 




evaluations by the same evaluator about the same legislation existed (e.g. annual Commission 
reports on a certain regulation), only the most recent one was included. Reports to the Council 
and the EP only presenting the results of other evaluation reports were excluded.  
As the Commission’s online database of evaluations is known to be incomplete 
(Smismans, 2015: 13), the reports were gathered from a number of sources: annual and 
multiannual overviews of evaluations created by the Commission (2010b), the Commission’s 
search engine for evaluations4, Commission work programmes, the EU bookshop5, the annexes 
to Commission’s reports on the financial regulation (2012b; 2013b) and lists of evaluations 
found on websites of the DGs. The data was checked using an existing dataset of the expertise 
centre Eureval, by running Google searches for evaluations of all major legislation adopted 
between 1996 and 2010, by searching for background documents of legislation in Eur-lex and 
by discussing our data-gathering method with an anonymous SG employee. For a more detailed 
description of the data collection methods, see chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
 
4.2 Data collection impact assessments 
The second dataset used for this article contains all 225 IAs related to legislative updates which 
were published between the start of the IA system in 2002 and 2014. Unlike with ex-post 
evaluations, the Commission has a complete database of IAs available online.6 After importing 
all IAs from this source (956 in total) we manually excluded the ones which are not about 
legislation established by the Council or the EP.7 A first selection was made based on the titles 
of the IA, after which cases of doubt were checked in detail. Furthermore, IAs about legislation 
aimed at foreign countries or the EU’s internal structure were excluded during this phase, for 
the same reasons we described in the previous section.  
All 495 remaining IAs were coded for whether they relate to updates of previous 
legislation or to an entirely new regulation or directive. As the EU uses various words for 
legislative updates, we coded all cases termed as ‘amending’, ‘recast’, ‘revision’, ‘repealing’, 
‘simplifying’ and ‘supplementing’ as being updates to previous legislation (225 cases in total). 
The two categories excluded in this way were IAs of ‘new’ and ‘implementing’ legislation (270 




cannot be expected to build on an ex-post evaluation (Impact Assessment Board, 2013: 7). This 
is not to say that IAs related to new legislation can never use data from ex-post evaluations - in 
fact, we encountered four cases where this was so - but in these instances the ex-post 
evaluation was always related to different legislation, so in this case we cannot speak of a 
regulatory cycle. The ‘implementing’ category refers to legislation which codifies an existing 
principle or agreement in the EU’s legislative body. As these principles or agreements were not 
in legislation before and could not have been evaluated ex-post, we excluded them. IAs that 
contained both new or implementing legislation as well as legislative updates were included 
and cases of doubt were checked manually.  
As a final step, the dataset of ex-post evaluations and the dataset of IAs were cross-
referenced to see for which ex-post evaluations an IA on the same legislation was available at 
its moment of publication and vice versa. To cross-reference the datasets we first had to link 
each IA to the correct regulation or directive. This was done by searching for both the number 
of the IA document and the number of the related Commission proposal in the European 
Parliament’s legislative observatory.8  
 
4.3 Operationalization 
Evaluation use, the outcome we wish to explain, was operationalized as a simple reference to 
an IA in the text of an ex-post evaluation and vice versa. The advantage of this method is that it 
allowed for a large-scale quantitative analysis, although it also means we took even very minor 
cases of use into account. To search for references to IAs in the ex-post evaluations, the 
evaluations were manually searched for the keywords ‘impact ass*’, ‘ex ante’, ‘cost-benefit’ 
and ‘cost benefit’, with the methodology sections of twenty report being read in detail to check 
if no keywords were missing. All reports where these search terms yielded results were checked 
manually to see if the references were indeed about IAs. To search the 225 remaining IAs for 
references to ex-post evaluations, we used the keywords ’evaluat*’, ‘ex post’, ‘interim’, ‘mid 
term’ and ‘retrospective’9, with the section on procedural issues (which often states the IA’s 
sources) of twenty reports being read in detail to see if no references were missing. Again, each 




After finishing these initial searches, we also checked a random sample of ten IAs (out of 
225) for the keywords ‘study, ‘report’ and ‘review’, as these words are often used in the names 
of ex-post evaluations. These efforts yielded no additional results and since the amount of work 
required to search every IA for these three keywords would be disproportionate10, we did not 
continue this endeavour. In case an IA did not refer to an ex-post evaluation, but we knew an 
ex-post evaluation was available from cross-referencing our datasets (see the previous section), 
we also checked any publicly available background studies to the IA for links to ex-post 
evaluations. This way, we found three additional references to evaluations. Some of these 
background studies also contained retrospective elements and were included in the sample of 
ex-post evaluations.  
Concerning timeliness (H1), we looked at the number of months between the 
publication of the ex-post evaluation and the publication of the IA. According to the 
Commission’s (2009: 8) official IA guidelines, conducting an IA takes about 12 months, so we 
considered the cases where the number of months was twelve or more to be ‘timely’ and the 
cases where the number of months was less than twelve to be ‘not timely’. Although it is not 
impossible for an IA to make use of an ex-post evaluation published when the IA is already 
under way, it is probably more difficult, as the ex-post evaluation will not be taken into account 
when sources are collected at the very beginning of the IA process (European Commission, 
2015b: 29). Therefore, we believe the threshold of twelve months is justified. 
As for evaluation quality (hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3), it is important to note that 
quality must be grounded in the subject at hand (Widmer, 2005: 43). Since IAs and ex-post 
evaluations have different purposes to some extent - even if there are also similarities - we 
believe judging their quality requires different templates. For example, while ex-post 
evaluations should specify a clear research question, IAs always have the purpose of comparing 
the impacts of different policy options, meaning they have less need to explicitly state their 
purpose. Furthermore, while the reports of ex-post evaluations often contain original research, 
IAs tend to use empirical data from background studies which are not always transparently 
conducted or publicly available. Therefore, it is hard to judge IAs on issues like case selection or 




To judge the quality of IAs, we used an adapted version of the scorecard created by 
Cecot et al. (2008: 418). Since IAs are meant to compare the costs and benefits of policy 
options, this scorecard is focused on the quantification of alternatives. We slightly adapted the 
scorecard by replacing the criteria of monetized costs and benefits with two different aspects: 
the presence of stakeholder consultation and the presence of clear references to sources 
(through footnotes, a methodology section, or some other way). These changes are in line with 
the recent Commission standards for IAs, which emphasize stakeholder consultation and 
methodological soundness (European Commission, 2015b: 49-65). These adaptions to the 
scorecard also ensure that IAs that study subjects which can be quantified but not monetized 
are not put at a disadvantage. Three IAs dealing only with matters of fundamental rights and 
minority rights were coded as missing cases on quality, since for these issues even 
quantification is probably impossible. For all other types of impacts encountered, at least some 
quantification seemed possible.  
For ex-post evaluations, we used a scorecard with eight criteria to judge their 
methodological quality: the presence of a clear operationalization, a clear research goal or 
question, an explanation of selected methods, triangulation, a replicable research design, a 
clear country selection, a clear case selection and a response rate of >50%. All of these criteria 
were weighted equally, thus creating an 8-point scale for quality (for more details, see chapter 
2 of this dissertation). Table 1 summarizes the scorecards used to judge the IAs and evaluations. 
Concerning the focus of the IAs and ex-post evaluations (H4 and H5), we used three 
indicators. First, we looked at the number of legislative acts studied by each IA and ex-post 
evaluation. While most reports are about a single regulation or directive, some ex-post 
evaluations focus on multiple pieces of legislation or even entire policy fields (‘fitness checks’), 
which makes them potentially harder to compare with IAs. Secondly, we looked at the type of 
research question. Due to the nature of IAs, they are almost always focused on comparing the 
costs and benefits of new legislation, but for ex-post evaluations the type of research question 
may vary. We distinguished between evaluations which look at both costs and benefits, 
evaluations which only look at either costs or benefits, and ex-post evaluation which study 




impacts on society which were studied in the IA or evaluation. Working inductively by seeing 
which types of impacts we found in the actual IAs and ex-post evaluations, we distinguished the 
following nine categories: (1) economic impacts, (2) environmental aspects, (3) employment 
impacts, (4) health impacts, (5) safety impacts, (6) customer satisfaction impacts, (7) scientific 
impacts (e.g. academic output), (8) migration impacts and (9) no impacts on society. The 
Commission itself uses a simpler typology of three kinds of impacts (economic, environmental, 
and social), but we found this categorization too limited to map all the variation we observed in 
practice. Therefore, we distinguished between different kinds of social impacts. The final 
category (‘no impacts on society’) was used to cover evaluations only looking at transposition.  
 
Table 1: scorecard for the quality of ex-post evaluations and IAs 
Scorecard for the quality of IAs Scorecard for the quality of ex-post 
evaluations 
1. At least some costs are stated. 
2. At least some costs are quantified. 
3. Provides point estimate or total range of costs.  
4. At least some benefits are stated. 
5. At least some benefits are quantified. 
6. Provides point estimate or total range of benefits. 
7. A measure if provided for net benefits or cost 
effectiveness.  
8. At least one alternative is considered. 
9. Some costs of the alternative are quantified. 
10. Some benefits for the alternative are quantified. 
11. A measure if provided for net benefits or cost 
effectiveness of the alternative.  
12. Stakeholder analysis was used. 
13. Information on sources is consistently provided.  
1. An operationalization is present. 
2. A clear research aim or question is stated. 
3. The methodology is explained. 
4. Methodological tools are provided so that 
the study could be repeated if necessary.  
5. Triangulation of methods is applied. 
6. The selection of member states if clearly 
explained. 
7. The selection of cases within member states 
is clearly explained.  
8. The response rate of questionnaires and/or 
interviews is > 50%. 
Maximum score: 13/13 Maximum score: 8/8 
 
Information on each of the three indicators for focus was found by reading the introduction and 
methodology sections of the evaluations and the ‘impact’ sections of the IAs. For all three of 
the indicators, a comparison was then made between IAs and ex-post evaluations belonging to 




Both authors of this article coded half of the IAs for which we needed data on quality 
and focus. Five cases were coded together beforehand to be sure as few differences as possible 
would occur between the coders, and any cases of doubt were discussed immediately. The 
quality scores of the ex-post evaluations were taken from previous research, where intercoder 
reliability had already been checked and found acceptable (Mastenbroek et al., 2014: 223-225), 
and the focus scores for the dataset of ex-post evaluations were coded by just one researcher. 
No cases were found where more than one ex-post evaluation was referred to in an IA or vice 
versa. Table 2 summarizes the operationalization described in this section. 
 
Table 2: operationalization 
Variable Operationalisation 
IA use  0 = IA is not referred to in text of the ex-post evaluation 
1 = IA is referred to in text of the ex-post evaluation 
Evaluation use 0 = Ex-post evaluation is not referred to in text of the IA 
1 = Ex-post evaluation is referred to in text of the IA 
Timeliness 0 = ex-post evaluation was published 12 months or less before the IA. 
1 = ex-post evaluation was published more than 12 months before the IA. 
IA quality / evaluation quality See Table 1.  
Object focus 0 = IA and ex-post evaluation have a different focus. 
1 = IA and ex-post evaluation have a similar focus. 
Problem definition focus 0 = IA and ex-post evaluation have a different focus. 
1 = IA and ex-post evaluation have a similar focus. 
Impact focus 0 = IA and ex-post evaluation have a different focus. 
1 = IA and ex-post evaluation have a similar focus. 
 
It should be noted that a potential drawback of our study is that legislation can still be altered 
significantly by the Council and the EP after an IA was published by the Commission. This could 
make it harder for ex-post evaluations to use the results of the IA to test if all its predictions 




unfortunately it was impossible to map which legislation was amended significantly by the EP 
within a reasonable timeframe. However, even in case the legislation was amended, the ex-
post evaluation could still use the IA as a source for background information or background 
data. Therefore, this issue should only affect more extensive types of use, such as testing 
predictions made by the IA or using it as a baseline to measure the exact effects of legislation. 
 
4.4 Method of analysis 
As will appear from the results below, the number of ex-post evaluations actively using IAs and 
vice versa is too low to use regression analysis for our explanatory analysis.11 For this reason, as 
well as to gain a better view on which combinations of causal conditions can explain the use of 
IAs by ex-post evaluations and vice versa, we decided to use fuzzy-set Qualitative comparative 
analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2008: 9). This method provides information about which (combinations 
of) explanatory conditions consistently generate necessary or sufficient explanations for the 
outcome (in the case of this article: evaluation use), based on the proportion of cases which 
score on both the causal conditions and the outcome. 
Since most of our explanatory are coded binary, they can be used in fsQCA without 
problem. However, evaluation quality and IA quality are ordinal in nature and have to be 
transformed to vary between zero and one (Ragin, 2008: 85). For such self-constructed scales 
where little theoretical knowledge exists, this can simply be done by coding the lowest possible 
score as zero and the highest possible value as one, with the score in-between being the half-
way point and the other scores being adapted proportionally (Kogut et al., 2004: 123). As is 
common practice in fsQCA, we also included the negation of each condition in our analysis to 











5.1 Ex-post evaluations: descriptive statistics 
Out of the 309 ex-post evaluations in our dataset, an IA on the same legislation was available in 
sixty cases. Out of these sixty evaluations, only ten reports (17%) used the IA which was 
available on their topic, with a further five reports making use of an IA related to different 
legislation. This means fourteen cases of using an IA were found in total. Seven of these cases 
used the IA as a source for background information on their topic, five used data from the IA as 
evidence to draw conclusions from, three actively tested the predictions that the IA made 
concerning the costs and benefits of legislation and two used data from the IA as a baseline to 
measure the amount of change the legislation has caused. These categories are not mutually 
exclusive. One evaluation did not specify how the IA was used in any way.  
Out of the sixty ex-post evaluations where an IA was available, forty cases (67%) are 
from 2012 or later. This makes sense given the fact that IAs were only introduced from 2003 
onwards: older ex-post evaluations are often about legislation enacted before this time. All ten 
references which we found to IAs were also from 2012 and later, so it is too early to make any 
claims about developments over time.  
Furthermore, eighteen ex-post evaluations referred to IAs conducted by national 
authorities. As EU directives must be transposed into national legislation, member states often 
change their laws because of EU requirements and can perform their own IAs accordingly. 
Fourteen of the evaluations referring to national IAs only referred to a report from the UK, 
which confirms this country’s strong tradition in the field of IAs (The Evaluation Partnership, 
2007: 12). One report used an IA from Poland, one report used an IA from Finland, one report 
used an IAs from Cyprus and Malta and one report used IAs from both the UK and Germany. 
We also found ex-post evaluations which referred to IAs prospectively. Seven ex-post 
evaluations included an IA of a proposed amendment within their report, providing full 
integration of both types of evaluation. Seventeen evaluations provided suggestions for a 
future IA in their recommendations, proposing specific changes to the legislation of which the 




evidence from a previous IA of a legislative amendment to support their point. In these cases, 
the Commission had tried to amend the legislation before, but the proposal had been rejected 
by the Council or the EP. However, the IA which was conducted at the time remained available 
to feed into future ex-post evaluations.  
 
5.2 Impact assessments: descriptive statistics 
Out of the 225 IAs related to updating legislation, an ex-post evaluation on the legislation which 
was being updated was available in 51 cases. ‘Available’ means the ex-post evaluation was 
published at the time the IA was completed: ex-post evaluations published after the IA was 
finished were not counted here12. For 33 out of these 51 cases (65%) we found a reference to 
the ex-post evaluation in the IA. 21 IAs used the ex-post evaluation as a source of background 
information to describe their problem, 21 IAs used information from ex-post evaluation as 
evidence and 20 IAs further investigated amendments suggested by an ex-post evaluation. 
Other forms of use were not found. Again, it should be noted that these different types of use 
are not mutually exclusive. Two forms of use could be identified in 17 of the 30 IAs, with 6 IAs 
containing all the three different kinds of use.  
Table 3 provides an overview of the percentage of IAs referring to ex-post evaluations 
per year. The numbers show that there is an increase in the use of evaluations, although to this 
moment the 30% in 2011 is the highest number. 
As mentioned above, there is a formal requirement for IAs to include a section on 
monitoring and evaluation (European Commission, 2015a: 49). We found this requirement to 
be applied well in practice, as only four out of the 225 IAs studied contained no information at 
all on a future ex-post evaluation. However, the IAs that did provide information varied greatly 
in their level of detail, ranging from an extensive description of possible indicators to a simple 







Table 3: number of legislative IAs referring to ex-post evaluation per year  
Year Number of IAs % 
2003 0 0% 
2004 0 0% 
2005 0 0% 
2006 0 0% 
2007 0 0% 
2008 7 23.3% 
2009 1 3.3% 
2010 0 0% 
2011 9 30% 
2012 2 6.7% 
2013 8 26.6% 
2014 6 20% 
Total 33 100% 
 
5.3 Ex-post evaluations: explanatory analysis 
Before presenting the results of the explanatory analysis, it should be emphasized that QCA is 
an asymmetric method. This means that if a certain condition explains a certain outcome, this 
does not imply that the absence of the condition also explains the absence of the outcome 
(Ragin, 2008: 102). The outcomes explained in this section and the next one are respectively the 
use of IAs by ex-post evaluation and the use of ex-post evaluations by IAs, without making any 
claims on how non-use of either type of evaluation can be explained.  
When analysing data with fsQCA, a useful first step is to test if any of the individual 
causal conditions are either necessary or sufficient for the outcome (Ragin, 2008: 120). Table 4 
provides the explanatory analysis for the use of IAs by ex-post evaluations. As the results show, 
neither the quality of the IA (H3) nor the comparability of focus between the IA and the ex-post 
evaluation (H5) are necessary or sufficient conditions for use. In other words, the theoretical 
explanations which we derived from the literature do not appear to explain whether or not ex-
post evaluations build on IAs of corresponding legislation.  
 A simple look at our data reveals similar results, as no clear patterns emerge. Out of the 




the other four scored five points or less. While we found that the IAs generally studied a much 
broader range of impacts than the ex-post evaluations (this was so in 36 out of 60 cases, or 
60%), in particular when it comes to taking employment and environmental aspects into 
account, this issue shows no clear relationship with the fact if the IA is used. When it comes to 
object of study, it was the ex-post evaluations which generally had a broader scope. While 11 
out of 60 cases (12%) showed an ex-post evaluation which studied multiple pieces of legislation 
linked to an IA which was related to just one regulation or directive, the opposite situation 
never occurred. However, this condition also seems unrelated to whether or not an ex-post 
evaluation puts its corresponding IAs to use. The hypothesis of Smismans that the different 
scope of IAs and ex-post evaluations hinders the regulatory cycle is therefore not sustained by 
our data (Smismans, 2015: 17-22). 
  
 
Table 4: results of QCA analysis for ex-post evaluations. Proportions > 0.80 indicate a causal factor might be a 
necessary or sufficient condition; proportions lower than 0.80 indicate a causal factor is unlikely to be a necessary 
or sufficient condition. The tilde (~) represents the negation of a given variable. 
 
 
Variable Proportion cases cause > use of IA 
(necessary conditions) 
Proportion cases use of IA > cause 
(sufficient conditions) 
IA quality 0.60 0.21 






















Besides looking at the individual relations, fsQCA can also be used to analyse combinations of 
conditions. However, for the use of IAs by ex-post evaluations, this too yields no significant 
results. No single combination of conditions consistently leads to the use of IAs – in fact, 
consistency scores do not go above 0.28, while QCA generally requires a consistency of at least 
0.80 to take a closer look at a combination of conditions (Ragin, 2008: 125). 
 
5.4 Impact assessments: explanatory analysis 
Table 5 provides the outcome of the explanatory analysis for individual conditions which might 
explain the use of ex-post evaluations by IAs. As the results show, timeliness (H1) is a necessary 
condition for use: if an ex-post evaluation is used, we can be almost sure that it was published 
at least a year before the IA. Out of the 33 IAs which used an ex-post evaluation, only four cases 
were untimely (12%), while for the 18 IAs which did not use the available ex-post evaluation, 
this was seven cases (39%). This result is in line with the finding of Bozzini and Hunt (2015: 64-
65) and Mergaert and Minto (2015: 53 that for the regulatory cycle to function, evaluations 
must be available in time. However, timeliness does not seem to be a sufficient condition: even 
if an ex-post evaluation is published more than a year before the IA, there are still 
circumstances in which it is not used in the IA at all. 
However, if timeliness occurs in combination with a number of other conditions, it also 
appears to be a sufficient condition for triggering evaluation use. The results of the analysis 
show one specific combination of conditions which is sufficient: the presence of a timely 
evaluation, the presence of a high-quality evaluation, the presence of a similar focus of IA and 
ex-post evaluation in terms of the number of legal acts that are studied and the similarity of the 
problem definition, and the absence of a similar focus in terms of the impacts which are 
studied. All eight IAs where this combination of conditions occurs score positively on evaluation 
use and the combination covers about a quarter of the total amount of cases where an IA uses 
an ex-post evaluation (coverage: 0.23). In other words: if an evaluation is of high quality, is 
produced in time and looks at the costs and benefits of the same legislation as the IA, it is very 





Table 5: results of QCA analysis for IAs. Proportions > 0.80 indicate a causal factor might be a necessary or 
sufficient condition and have their level of significance provided in parenthesis. The asterisk (*) shows a result is in 
fact significant. Proportions lower than 0.80 indicate a causal factor is unlikely to be a necessary or sufficient 
condition. The tilde (~) represents the negation of a variable.  
Variable Proportion cases cause > use of 
ex-post evaluation (necessary 
conditions) 
Proportion cases use of ex-post 
evaluation > cause (sufficient 
conditions) 
Timeliness 0.91 (0.046)* 0.71 
~Timeliness 0.09 0.27 
Quality ex-post 0.57 0.67 
~Quality ex-post 0.43 0.58 
Comparison of 
object focus 

















We have no logical explanation for the fact that a focus on similar impacts between IA and ex-
post evaluation was absent in each of the eight cases mentioned above. After all, there is no 
reason why looking at different kinds of impacts would contribute to triggering evaluation use. 
But at the very least we can conclude that IAs and ex-post evaluations do not have to look at 
similar types of impacts for the ex-post evaluation to be used. Just like we saw in section 5.3 for 
the sample of ex-post evaluations, our sample of 51 IAs shows that IAs generally look at a 
broader range of impacts than the ex-post evaluations. This is the case for 31 out of 51 IAs 
(61%). In particular, IAs tend to look at environmental and employment impacts more often 
than ex-post evaluations do. Nevertheless, we found eight cases in which an IA used 




the costs and benefits of legislation for society. This shows it is very well possible for an IA to 
use an ex-post evaluation which approached its topic from a completely different angle.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This article started with the question how often IAs and ex-post evaluations of EU law are used 
in subsequent corresponding evaluative instruments and how variance in this regard can be 
explained. The Commission’s increasing focus on a ‘regulatory cycle’ as a part of its Better 
Regulation agenda raises the question whether or not we can observe a link between IAs and 
ex-post evaluations of EU law empirically. Combining a dataset of all IAs of legislative updates 
with a dataset of all ex-post legislative evaluations, we have provided a first quantitative 
assessment of this question. 
Concerning the ex-post legislative evaluations, we found that in sixty out of 309 cases an 
IA on the same legislation was available, but only ten evaluations actually use the IA in their 
report. Most of these studies used the IA as a source for background information or evidence to 
support their conclusions, although a small number of evaluations also tested the assumptions 
made in the IA. Concerning the use of ex-post evaluations by IAs, we found that for 51 out of 
225 IAs a prior ex-post evaluation on the same legislation existed, but only 33 of those IAs 
actually used the available ex-post evaluation in their report. This means the proportion of IAs 
making use of an available ex-post evaluation (65%) is much larger than the proportion of ex-
post evaluations making use of an available IAs (17%). However, even for IAs there are still 35% 
of the cases where no use is made of an available ex-post evaluation.  
One explanation for this difference could be that an IA of a legislative amendment is 
usually conducted right after an ex-post evaluation of the previous legislation, which means 
that the memory of the ex-post evaluation is still fresh. Another potential explanation is that 
IAs are often conducted internally, making it easier for the Commission to stimulate the use of 
ex-post evaluations than in the opposite situation. A third possible explanation is that it may be 
harder for ex-post evaluations to use IAs than the other way around, as IAs are often conducted 




little connection with the legislation which actually entered force. This problem was already 
recognized by the EP in their resolution (2010/2016(INI)) on IAs back in 2011. Although the 
Inter-institutional Agreement on Better Law-making of 2003 stated that for substantive 
amendments the Council and EP should conduct their own IA, this principle appears not to have 
been applied in practice. An article in the recent proposal for a new Inter-institutional 
Agreement between the EU institutions shows that this problem is once again acknowledged: 
‘the three institutions aim to ensure that information on the impacts of the act as adopted is 
available, and can be used as a basis for subsequent evaluation work’ (European Commission, 
2015d: 6). To find out which of the three mechanisms stated above hinders the use of ex-post 
evaluations by IAs in reality, more research is needed. In any case, a practical recommendation 
for the Commission is to require external evaluators to state whether they used the 
corresponding IA in their analysis and why (not).  
As for our explanatory analysis, we found that timeliness is a necessary condition for the 
use of ex-post evaluations by IAs: an evaluation must be published at least a year before the IA, 
otherwise it is very unlikely to be used. The quality of the ex-post evaluation and the similarity 
of its focus between IA and evaluation did not turn out to be significant on their own. However, 
when an evaluation is timely, is of high-quality and looks at the costs and benefits of exactly the 
same legislation as the IA, we can expect is to be used. Since timeliness is so important, a 
practical recommendation for the Commission is to actively enforce the ‘evaluate first’ principle 
which it has emphasized in the last few years (European Commission, 2010a: 5; 2015b: 17).13 
Since IAs can take a year or more to conduct (European Commission, 2009: 75), it can be 
tempting to already launch the IA process before an ex-post evaluation is completed, but our 
research shows this is not a good idea if the Commission takes the idea of a ‘regulatory cycle’ 
seriously. Starting the IA process only after an ex-post evaluation is finished significantly 
increases the chance that the evaluation is used and the opportunity is taken to learn from how 
the regulation or directive has functioned in the past. 
For the use of IAs by ex-post evaluations, our analysis did not reveal any (combinations 
of) conditions which are sufficient or necessary for evaluation use to occur. This indicates that 




One alternative could be to look at more political models of evaluation, suggesting that 
evaluation results may be used only when they are in line with preferred outcomes (Bovens et 
al., 2008: 320).  
Three other possibilities for future research are worth noting. In the first place, due to 
the Commission’s rhetoric about a ‘regulatory cycle’, our study has been limited to legislative 
IAs and evaluations. Therefore, quantitative analysis of the relation between ex-ante and ex-
post evaluations of spending activities still seems a fruitful field for further investigation. 
Secondly, while our research focused mostly on the retrospective use of IAs by ex-post 
evaluations and vice versa, the prospective side could be worthy of further study. For example, 
follow-up research could study how often the plans for ex-post evaluations which are stated in 
IAs are executed in empirical reality. This too is an aspect of the so-called regulatory cycle. As a 
third option, this type of research could be repeated in the near future when the effects of the 
new Better Regulation Guidelines are in full force. Especially as the focus on the coupling 
between ex-ante and ex-post evaluative information is stricter enshrined in the Better 
Regulation Toolbox (European Commission, 2015b: 28, 254). this could lead to a more visible 
use of the information the evaluative instruments of the EU generate. When repeating this 
research it could uncover if the relationship between ex-ante and ex-post instruments has 




 From 2010 until 2014 the Better regulation agenda was called ‘Smart Regulation’. For the sake of consistency, in 
this article we only use the name Better Regulation, which was used in official communication before 2010 and is 
used again since 2015. 
2
 To implement this principle, we excluded all legislation initiated by the following DGs and services: DEVCO, ECHO, 
FPI, ENLARG. 
3
 With this we refer to any regulation or directive which is only binding for EU civil servants or for the legal 
behaviour of the institutions of the EU. 
4
 ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/search/search.do (accessed 28-09-2015). 
5
 Bookshop.europa.eu (accessed 28-9-2015). 
6
 This overview of the Commission’s IAs is/was available at ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/cia_2014_en.htm (accessed 28-09-2015). 
7







 The legislative observatory can be found at www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/search/search.do? (accessed 28-09-
2015). 
9
 The research was done with Adobe Acrobat Reade, using an advanced search on the folders containing the IAs. 
Folders were divided per year. 
10
 Using the three keywords ‘report, ‘review’ and ‘study’ could generate 10.000+ hits per year. This could lead to 
roughly 100+ hits per IA. 
11
 Since we have five explanatory conditions, we would need fifty positive cases for regression analysis. 
12
 Furthermore, note that some IAs refer to ex-post evaluations of individual policy programmes or action plans. 
Such evaluations were not counted even if the instrument they study has a legal basis. 
13
 It should however be noted that the Commission leaves some discretionary room to ignore the ‘evaluate first’ 
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Abstract 
The European Commission has repeatedly emphasized that the results of ex-post legislative 
(EPL) evaluations should be used to improve the quality of its legislative proposals. This article 
aims to explain the variation in such instrumental use of EPL evaluations by the Commission. 
Three high-quality EPL evaluations with varying levels of use were studied in-depth to assess the 
influence of political factors on evaluation use. The results show that, contrary to expectations, 
EPL evaluations may be used instrumentally even if their recommendations are opposed by 
important political actors in the legislative process. This article also shows that a lack of salience 
of the policy field to which an EPL evaluation belongs in the eyes of the Commission could, in 
combination with the institution’s ambition to reduce its legislative output, be a sufficient 
condition for the non-use of that evaluation. 
 
1. Introduction 
In its official communications, the European Commission (2015: 7; 2016: 2) has repeatedly 
promoted the idea of evidence-based policy: policy decisions should be based on objective 
information whenever possible. One important source of such information is ex-post legislative 
(EPL) evaluations: reports that retrospectively assess the functioning of European legislation 




Commission to make informed decisions about legislative amendments (European Commission, 
2015: 254; Fitzpatrick, 2012: 479). In both the academic literature and this article, such use of 
evaluations to make informed decisions about policy improvement is labelled instrumental use 
(Cousins and Leithwood, 1986: 346).1 
Various academics have discussed to what extent the Commission uses evidence 
instrumentally in practice. Whereas some research reveals that the Commission often uses 
scientific evidence to improve legislative proposals (e.g. Rimkuté and Haverland, 2015: 433), 
other studies have shown that its instrumental use of evaluations is limited due to its politicized 
environment and because of technical constraints (e.g. Böhling, 2014: 118; Boswell, 2008; 
Højlund, 2014; Torriti, 2010: 1078). Until now, such empirical research about the Commission’s 
use of evaluations has focused on programme evaluations (e.g. De Laat and Williams, 2014; 
Højlund, 2014) and ex-ante legislative evaluations (e.g. Radaelli, 2007; Torriti, 2010). Conversely, 
the Commission’s EPL evaluations have rarely been studied (but see Fitzpatrick, 2012; 
Mastenbroek et al., 2016; Zwaan et al., 2016). Therefore, little is known about what factors 
affect the Commission’s use EPL evaluations. 
This omission is unfortunate for two reasons. Firstly, due to its lack of financial and 
communicative tools, legislation is the Commission’s main policy instrument (Lodge, 2008: 282). 
This makes it important to study if and how the Commission’s legislative proposals are 
influenced by sources of knowledge like EPL evaluations. Secondly, EPL evaluations tend to 
receive more attention from politicians than evaluations of other policies, since legislation 
affects the entire public and is usually discussed in parliament (Zwaan et al., 2016: 688). In 
theory, this makes it likely for the instrumental use of EPL evaluations to be affected by political 
conditions. For these reasons, this article answers the following research question: ‘to what 
extent and how do political conditions affect the European Commission’s instrumental use of EPL 
evaluations?’  
By answering this question, this article contributes to the ongoing debate about the 
Commission’s nature. Originally, the Commission was perceived as a technocratic institution, 
aimed at impartial problem-solving (Wille, 2010: 1098). Nowadays, the Commission is perceived 




2014: 1; Wille, 2010: 1100). This political perspective on the Commission can be linked to a 
political view on evaluation use (e.g. Contandriopoulos and Brousselle, 2012: 63-64; Cousins and 
Leithwood, 1986: 347; Johnson et al., 2009: 379; Weiss, 1993: 95-103). Based on these views, it 
can be expected that necessary conditions for the Commission’s use of EPL evaluations are that 
they do not contradict the preferences of the policy-makers, veto players or interest groups 
involved in the European legislative process. 
To test these expectations, we conducted an in-depth analysis of three EPL evaluations 
with varying levels of instrumental use. Extensive document analysis and nineteen in-depth 
interviews with various actors were used to collect data about the impact of various political 
conditions on the Commission’s use of EPL evaluations. Technical explanations for evaluation 
use were controlled for, which allowed us to better study the impact of these political 
conditions. 
Contrary to our expectations, our results show that the absence of political opposition to 
specific evaluation results is not a necessary condition for use. Instead, we found a lack of 
salience of the evaluated policy field, combined with a commitment to limit legislative output, 
to be a sufficient condition for non-use. If the Commission’s political top does not prioritize a 
policy field, it is unlikely to follow-up on recommendations from EPL evaluations that require 
new legislative initiatives.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
Political explanations 
Since the 1970s, the evaluation literature has increasingly discussed how political conditions, 
next to technical ones, affect evaluation use (Johnson et al., 2009: 385). This literature generally 
argues that evaluation use is inherently political, as evaluations allocate praise or blame and 
may result in policy changes. Actors who feel threatened by evaluations may therefore try to 
prevent their use or to selectively use those results that fit their agenda (Lederman, 2012: 162; 




 The literature discusses several specific political conditions that affect instrumental 
evaluation use. A first condition is policy-makers’ preferences (Lederman, 2012: 162; Weiss, 
1993: 97-98), with preferences being defined as actors’ beliefs about the feasibility and/or 
appropriateness of policies (Bunea, 2013). Even when an evaluation recommends certain policy 
changes, policy-makers may oppose these changes on moral grounds (Weiss, 1993: 97-98) or 
because they doubt their feasibility. Evaluations are often unable to change such deeply rooted 
policy beliefs and may therefore remain unused (Weiss, 1993: 97-98).  
The literature also shows that the political-institutional context of an evaluation affects 
its use (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986: 354-355; Shulha and Cousins, 1997: 196). Evaluation 
results are only one type of input that affects decisions about evaluation use: policy-makers are 
also likely to consider the position of other actors involved in the decision-making process. Since 
policies often result from complex negotiations between actors, policy-makers may be unwilling 
to reopen discussions about them when evaluations recommend to do so (Weiss, 1993: 95), 
even when they do not object to these recommendations in principle. In particular, we expect 
evaluation results not to be used instrumentally if they oppose the preferences of veto players, 
as policy-makers must always reckon with the views of actors that can formally block their 
proposals.  
Interest groups are another group of actors whose input may affect evaluation use. Such 
groups may have no formal veto over policy proposals, but they can put pressure on policy-
makers to ignore or implement evaluation results, either directly via lobbying or indirectly via 
the media. To produce a policy that satisfies a wide range of actors, policy-makers may prioritize 
such interest group preferences over evidence from evaluations (Shulha and Cousins, 1998: 198; 
Weiss, 1993: 95-98). 
A further political condition that may affect use is the interest of politicians and civil 
servants to protect their financial resources (Johnson et al., 2009: 385; Weiss, 1993: 95). Policy 
evaluations often recommend budgetary reallocations. Policy-makers may ignore such 
evaluation results if they view them as a threat to their own financial position. 
A final relevant political condition is the media coverage of an evaluation (Weiss 1993, 




that are high on the public agenda are likely to be acted upon. Policy-makers are therefore more 
likely to pay attention to and be influenced by evaluations when they have been covered by the 
media (Henry and Mark 2003: 303). 
 
Political explanations and the Commission 
Although the Commission is officially a neutral institution (Wille, 2010: 1098), research 
increasingly shows that it (partly) functions as a political actor in reality (e.g. Hartlapp et al., 
2014; Wille, 2010: 1100). Concerning evaluations specifically, the Commission has been shown 
to ignore results from impact assessments when this was required by negotiations with the 
European Parliament (EP) and the Council (Torriti, 2010: 1078) and to selectively use evidence 
from programme evaluations that legitimize its pre-existing views (Boswell, 2008: 472). Based 
on this, we expect political considerations to also affect the Commission’s use of EPL 
evaluations. Below we specify how and to what extent the political conditions discussed above 
are relevant to explain the use of EPL evaluations by the Commission. 
Policy-makers’ preferences are expected to matter in the context of this article. In our 
study, the Commission is the only decision-maker, as it has the sole right of initiative for most 
EU legislation and is therefore the only actor to decide about the initial follow-up of EPL 
evaluations (European Commission, 2015: 297-298). We expect the absence of opposing 
preferences within the Commission to an evaluation’s recommendations to be a first necessary 
condition for use, since the Commission operates on the basis of a political programme (e.g. 
Juncker, 2014) and may be unwilling to deviate from this programme when evaluation results 
contradict it. Since the Commission is not a unitary actor (Hartlapp et al., 2014: 2), we will 
consider the preferences of its two main parts involved in EPL evaluations: the directorate-
general (DG) that manages the evaluation and the Commission’s political top that ultimately 
decides about legislative proposals.  
The preferences of veto players are also expected to matter for the Commission, as there 
are two actors that can block its legislative proposals: the Council and the EP. The Commission 
may consider it useless or needlessly provocative to propose legislation that these institutions 




absence of opposition to an evaluation’s recommendations from the EP or the Council to be a 
second necessary condition for use. 
Interest group preferences may be especially influential in the context of this article, as 
the Commission actively consults such groups during most EPL evaluations (European 
Commission 2015: 280). Existing research shows that interest groups influence many of the 
Commission’s decisions, although their success depends on their resources (Bunea, 2013: 567). 
Whereas it is common that some interest groups oppose an evaluation’s recommendations, we 
expect that the Commission will not implement recommendations that are opposed by all major 
interest groups involved in a topic. This makes the absence of such opposition a third necessary 
condition for evaluation use. 
The interest to protect financial resources is presumably irrelevant for our study due to 
our focus on evaluations of legislation (i.e. non-spending activities). Media coverage is also 
expected to be unimportant for our study, as media coverage is generally low for EU policies - 
outside of some sensitive policies not discussed in this article (Princen, 2011: 940). However, 
this expectation about media coverage will be tested in our empirical analysis. 
 
Technical conditions 
Besides political conditions, the literature about evaluation use also discusses several technical 
explanations. ‘Technical’ explanations refer to the quality of evaluation products and processes. 
Existing research shows that these factors influence use because policy-makers only trust 
evaluation results that they perceive as robust (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986: 358; Johnson et 
al., 2009: 389; Lederman, 2012: 162). Firstly, since evaluations are a form of applied research, 
their methodological quality matters (De Laat and Williams, 2014: 158-160; Johnson et al., 2009: 
379). Secondly, the credibility of the evaluator is important: policy-makers put more trust in 
evaluations published by practitioners with a sufficient reputation (Johnson et al., 2009: 379). 
Thirdly, an evaluation’s relevance matters: evaluations are only likely to be used if their content 
is required by potential users (Johnson et al., 2009: 379).  
Fourthly, stakeholder involvement is important, as policy-makers can be expected to only 




and William: 2014: 165; European Commission, 2015: 280). Finally, communication quality 
matters: the more an evaluator stays in contact with an intended user during and after an 
evaluation process (preferably informally), the more likely it is that an evaluation’s findings will 
be relevant for the intended user and will therefore be used (Johnson et al., 2009: 379). Thirdly, 
the timeliness of an evaluation matters, as evaluation results can only be used if they are 
available before important decision-making moments (De Laat and Williams, 2014: 158). As 
mentioned, these technical conditions will be controlled for in this study.  
 
3. Methods and data 
 
Case selection 
Our study is an in-depth analysis of the Commission’s use of three specific EPL evaluations. 
Three steps were taken to select these cases out of a dataset of 313 cases (updated version of 
the dataset described in chapter 2 of this dissertation). 
Firstly, to select evaluations for which use is likely from a technical perspective, we only 
considered cases that meet the criteria for a ‘good’ evaluation product and process described 
above. Concerning methodological quality, we only selected evaluation reports containing a 
clear operationalization and problem definition (internal validity), a representative country 
selection (external validity) and data triangulation (reliability). Regarding credibility, only 
evaluations by consultants who conducted at least five other EPL evaluations for the 
Commission were considered, as this indicates that the Commission trusts their work. 
Concerning relevance, we only selected evaluations that recommend clear legislative 
amendments. Regarding stakeholder involvement, we only selected evaluations presenting 
stakeholder opinions (for details about these quality criteria, see chapter 5 of this dissertation). 
Secondly, only evaluations published between 2008 and 2012 were considered. 
Evaluations from before 2008 were conducted prior to the introduction of the Commission’s 




cases would be outdated. For evaluations published after 2012, it was too likely that decisions 
concerning their use had not been made yet. 
Thirdly, after intensively scrutinizing the 12 remaining cases, three evaluations were 
selected. In our first case (the seed and plant propagating material (S&PM) evaluation), the 
Commission’s proposal was congruent with all of the evaluation’s recommendations (high level 
of use), in our second case (the consumer protection cooperation (CPC) evaluation) the 
Commission’s proposal mostly followed the evaluation’s recommendations (medium level of 
use) and in our third selected case (the animal welfare evaluation) the Commission took no new 
legislative action at all, even though the evaluation recommended this (low level of use). The 
first two cases therefore allow us to study if the absence of opposition by influential actors is a 
necessary condition for use, and if so, to trace the mechanisms behind this effect. If no such 
causal relation is found, the comparison with the third case allows us to find other factors 
conditioning the Commission’s instrumental use of EPL evaluations. 
The three selected evaluations offered the advantage that they were all initiated by DG 
Health and Food Safety (SANTE), so their organizational context was held constant. The 
Commission also recognized all three cases as full evaluations.2 Details about the three selected 
cases are provided in Table 1. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
We collected our data via document analysis and semi-structured interviews. Commission 
proposals for legislative amendments (if available) were studied along with any documents 
leading up to them. Such documents usually included (1) an action plan based on the 
evaluation’s results, (2) a roadmap for legislative reform, (3) a report on stakeholder 
consultations, (4) an ‘inception impact assessment’ about the expected consequences of policy 
options and (5) a legislative proposal together with the final impact assessment (IA) (European 
Commission, 2015: 297-306). The document analysis allowed us to identify which of the 
evaluations’ suggestions had been followed up by the Commission and which suggestions it had 





Table 1: details about selected cases 
Case 
number 
Evaluation name Subject Publication 
date 
Author Level of 
use 
1 Evaluation of the Community 
acquis on the marketing of seed 
















2 External evaluation of the 
Consumer Protection 










3 Evaluation of the EU Policy on 
Animal Welfare and Possible 
Policy Options for the Future 











Detailed explanations for these decisions were subsequently gathered via interviews, as we 
required open questions and follow-up questions to determine the preferences of various 
actors. To avoid the risk of socially desirable answers we interviewed a broad variety of 
respondents and guaranteed their anonymity. 
In total, we conducted 19 interviews, when possible face-to face (eight cases) and when 




Commission’s civil servant who had coordinated the evaluation. Regarding the animal welfare 
evaluation, we also spoke to the Commission’s Secretariat-General (SG), as other interviews 
showed it had been involved in this case. Additionally, for each case, we interviewed two 
respondents from different parties in the EP and two external stakeholders that had provided 
input for each evaluation and that represented significantly different interests (respectively 
small seed producers and large seed producers, consumer organizations and national consumer 
authorities (NCAs), and animal welfare NGOs and farmers). We did not interview the Council, as 
this actor did not finish discussing our second and third case at the time of writing. For each 
case we also interviewed one of the consultants that conducted the evaluation. 
 
Operationalization 
Instrumental evaluation use, our outcome variable, refers to the consideration and 
implementation of an evaluation’s recommendations by its intended user to improve policies 
(Cousins and Leithwood, 1986: 346). Therefore, we checked during the interviews if the 
Commission (the intended user) had considered the evaluation’s recommendations when 
deciding about future policies. Furthermore, for each major legislative amendment 
recommended by the three evaluations, we checked via both document analysis and interviews 
if any subsequent legislative proposal from the Commission implemented this change. To limit 
our article’s scope, recommendations about legislative implementation or minor clarifications to 
legislation were ignored.  
 Concerning the political explanatory conditions, the Commission’s policy preferences 
were measured by asking our respondents what amendments to the evaluated legislation the 
Commission considered necessary before and after the evaluation was conducted. Also, for 
each of the major recommendations identified, we checked if it was controversial for the parts 
of the Commission involved in the evaluation’s follow-up (the managing DG and the 
Commission’s political top) and if/how this had affected the evaluation’s use.  
Concerning veto player preferences and interest group preferences, respondents were 
asked to what extent each recommendation was in line with the views of the EP, the Council 




decisions. ‘Major interest groups’ were defined as collectives of interests (like producers and 
consumers) that were consulted during the evaluation. We checked the views stated by 
respondents with official documents when possible. 
Concerning media coverage, respondents were asked if the evaluation was covered by 
any mainstream media up until the Commission’s decision about proposing amendments. 
Additionally, we analysed if the evaluations were covered by Politico/European Voice.3 Finally, 
respondents were asked if other factors had influenced the evaluation’s use. 
Our assessment of the evaluations’ technical quality was checked by asking the 
respondents to judge the internal validity (absence of systematic errors), external validity 
(generalizability), reliability (absence of random errors) and relevance of the final evaluation 
report, plus the credibility of the evaluator and the extent to which stakeholders had been 
involved. The timeliness of the evaluation was mapped by asking respondents if the evaluation 
was available to all relevant actors within the Commission when it decided about legislative 
amendments (Swanborn, 2007: 323). Communication quality was operationalized by asking 
respondents how often the evaluator had in-depth contact with the Commission during the 
evaluation process and if informal contact was also possible (Swanborn, 2007: 324). 
 
4. Results 
Below we first present the assessment of our technical conditions. We then show how each of 
our cases ‘scored’ on the political conditions identified above. After summarizing our results at 
the end of this section, we proceed with an in-depth analysis. 
 
Technical controls 
Almost all respondents who remembered the evaluations in detail confirmed that they 
observed high standards of validity, reliability, the credibility of the evaluator, relevance and 
stakeholder involvement. The sole exception was the S&PM evaluation: some respondents 
believed that this evaluation lacked data about small seed producers (interview 1A, 1D) and/or 




concerned some specific elements of the evaluation and other respondents did not support 
these criticisms (interview 1B, 1E). 
 Concerning timeliness, the interviews confirmed that all the evaluations were available 
to the Commission before it decided about legislative amendments. Regarding communication 
quality, in all three cases, there was frequent formal and informal contact between the 
Commission and the evaluator. These results confirm that the use of our three evaluations was 
not impeded by lacking quality. 
Furthermore, none of the respondents believed that the results of the evaluations were 
changed significantly due to pressure from the Commission. The fact that the respondents were 
promised anonymity and that many of them moved to new jobs since the evaluations were 
completed lends some credibility to these claims, although we cannot exclude that the 
Commission may have subtly influenced the evaluations’ findings. 
 
Case description 1: S&PM evaluation 
The EU’s 12 directives on seed and plant propagating material (S&PM legislation) set the criteria 
that plant varieties must meet before they may be placed on the European market. The 
legislation aims to level the playing field for seed producers and to improve agricultural 
productivity by requiring the registration of plant varieties in national and European catalogues. 
This in turn requires varieties to meet standards on Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability (DUS-
criteria) and, in the case of agricultural crops species, standards on Value for Cultivation and Use 
(VCU-criteria). Furthermore, the legislation requires national authorities to inspect the quality of 
individual S&PM lots (Arcadia International et al., 2008: 25-26). 
As a part of the Commission’s Better Regulation Agenda, the EU’s S&PM legislation was 
evaluated in 2008 to suggest how its effectiveness and efficiency could be improved (Arcadia 
International et al., 2008: 2). Table 2 lists the evaluation’s eight recommendations for major 






Table 2: follow-up of the recommendations of the S&PM and the CPC evaluation. Grey cells indicate that proposals 






























































































Recommendations S&PM evaluation 







   
2 Make the rules for uniformity of varieties more flexible for niche markets.        
3 
Make the VCU rules evolve to adapt to types of agriculture developed for 
specific uses and to test varieties created by new technologies.  
      
4 Adapt the requirements for the marketing of seeds to defined categories.       
5 Identify links between EU seed law and food legislation.       
6 Integrate EU plant health and seed legislation.       
7 
Grant CPVO (Commission institution) the ability to check variety 
denominations and the right to adopt quality requirements for DUS testing. 
   
 
   
8 Reinforce provisions to inform seed users.       
Recommendations CPC evaluation  
1 Enhance the Commission’s role in the CPC network (p. 17) 
N.A. 
 
      
2 Expand the scope of the regulation’s annex (p. 9).       
3 Give additional minimum powers of NCAs (p. 13).       
4 Clarify NCAs mutual obligations (p. 17).       
5 Establish procedural standards for applying NCAs minimum powers (p. 13).       
6 Establish observatory to assist NCAs (p. 18).       







The S&PM evaluation represents a high level of use. Respondents from both the Commission 
and other organizations confirmed that the Commission took the evaluation’s findings seriously 
when deciding about the future of the S&PM legislation (interview 1A, 1B, 1E). Table 2 also 
shows that the Commission followed up almost all of the evaluation’s recommendations in its 
legislative proposal (COM(2013)262) and the preceding documents. Only recommendations 3 
and 8 were ignored in some of these documents, but they were addressed through delegated 
acts (European Commission, 2013: 5, 34). 
Concerning the Commission’s policy preferences, the Commission already perceived the 
need to amend the S&PM legislation before the evaluation took place, as member states had 
notified it of various problems (like lacking harmonization) with the existing directives (interview 
1A, 1B). However, according to respondents representing the Commission and the evaluator, 
the Commission did not have strong preferences about how the legislation should be amended 
(interview 1A, 1B). The Commission viewed the legislative process as a technical matter, using 
the evaluation to identify potential policy improvements (interview 1A). One other respondent 
slightly disagreed with this and stated that the Commission had preferences in line with 
recommendations 1 and 7 before the evaluation was conducted, but mainly because these 
solutions had already been suggested by stakeholders (interview 1E).  
Concerning veto player preferences, the EP viewed the Commission’s legislative proposal 
as too beneficial for large seed companies and rejected it in March 2014 (e.g. resolution A7-
0112/2014). On the other hand, the Council generally supported the Commission’s views. Some 
countries (like France) objected to replacing twelve directives on different products with one 
regulation, but overall there was little controversy among the member states (interview 1A, 1B, 
1E). 
Concerning interest group preferences, large seed producers generally supported the 
legislative proposal (interview 1D, 1E). However, many NGOs representing small and biological 
seed producers criticized the proposal for how it handled recommendation 2. Most of these 
NGOs wanted the DUS-criteria to be abolished altogether for niche market seeds (interview 1A, 
1B, 1D, 1E). Whereas the Commission’s proposal allowed such seeds to be recognized as 




the criteria and procedures to apply for this exception as too demanding and opposed the 
existence of any compulsory registration of niche market seeds on principle (interview 1A, 1D, 
1E; IFOAM EU Group, 2013: 6-11).  
The interviews and the media analysis showed that media coverage was entirely absent 
for this evaluation. 
 
Case description 2: CPC evaluation 
The EU’s Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Regulation 2006/2004 aims to enhance the 
enforcement of certain European consumer protection legislation (as listed in the regulation’s 
annex) by increasing cooperation among national consumer authorities (NCAs). For this 
purpose, the regulation establishes mechanisms through which NCAs can request each other’s 
assistance, including an IT platform for posting alerts. The regulation also establishes the 
minimum powers that national authorities must have to be able to assist each other. 
Furthermore, the regulation creates a European network that coordinates the activities of NCAs 
(the CPC network) (ICF GHK et al., 2012: 4). 
 Article 21a of the regulation states that it must be evaluated after five years. 
Accordingly, an external evaluation of the regulation was completed in 2012, which produced 
seven recommendations concerning major amendments (ICF GHK et al., 2012: 6-18). Table 2 
lists these recommendations and shows which subsequent Commission documents included 
plans for their implementation. 
The CPC evaluation represents a medium level of instrumental use. All respondents 
believe that the Commission seriously considered the evaluation’s results when deciding about 
possible amendments (interview 2A-2E). The legislative proposal published by the Commission 
in May 2016 (COM(2016)283) ignored the final two recommendations listed above, but included 
plans to implement the other five. 
Concerning the Commission’s policy preferences, the interviews showed that 
recommendations 1 and 3 were longstanding priorities of the Commission, as it viewed more 




market. However, the Commission did not have strong preferences regarding the other 
evaluation results (interview 2C, 2E). 
Concerning veto player preferences, the EP supported most of the evaluation’s 
recommendations as being helpful to enhance consumer protection (e.g. resolution A8-
0077/2017). However, both the EP and the Council put forward amendments to remove the 
Commission’s right to initiate infringements (recommendation 1), as this proposal was viewed 
as threatening to national sovereignty. Most member states also opposed the proposed 
expansion of minimum powers (recommendation 3), as these powers may be difficult to handle 
for smaller NCAs. Furthermore, many countries opposed the content of some proposed 
minimum powers (like forcing infringers to compensate consumers) because legally moving 
these powers to their NCAs would be costly for them (interview 2B, 2C, 2E). 
Concerning interest group preferences, consumer associations supported all the 
evaluation’s recommendations because they viewed them as beneficial for consumer protection 
(BEUC, 2016). Business associations only objected to the proposed minimum powers to shut 
down websites. Our media analysis and the interviews revealed that the evaluation received 
almost no media coverage (interview 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E). 
 
Case description 3: animal welfare evaluation 
Legislation is one of the EU’s instruments to improve animal welfare. Various European 
directives protect cattle and experimental animals, for example by banning unfriendly farming 
methods and regulating space allowances, but most other animal types are not covered by 
existing EU legislation. 
In 2006 the Commission published its first animal welfare strategy. In the context of this 
strategy an external evaluation of the entire EU animal welfare policy was completed in 2010. 
Our research only concerns the part of the evaluation about legislation, which recommended to 
consider expanding the scope of EU animal welfare legislation to protect all animal species (GHK 
and ADAS UK, 2010: 6).  
The Commission (2012: 6) followed up on the evaluation with a second animal welfare 




considered in 2014. Respondents confirmed that DG SANTE took the evaluation seriously when 
drafting this strategy and that it would have been willing to take different decisions if the 
evaluation’s results had recommended this (interview 3A, 3D).  
However, when DG SANTE prepared an early draft of a legislative proposal in 2014 it was 
informed by the SG that the proposal should wait until a new Commission would enter office in 
November. After this happened, the SG told DG SANTE that the existing animal welfare strategy 
should be fully implemented before new animal welfare legislation could be considered (even 
though one aspect of this strategy was considering new legislation) (interview 3A, 3D). Most 
respondents therefore believe the implementation of the evaluation’s recommendation to be 
blocked by the SG (interview 3A, 3C, 3D, 3E), although the SG states that no such decision was 
formally taken (interview 3F). 
 Concerning the Commission’s policy preferences, the animal welfare unit of DG SANTE 
always supported further measures to improve animal welfare, including legislation. At the top 
of DG SANTE and in the SG animal welfare legislation was never considered a priority, but there 
was little active opposition to the idea either before 2014 (interview 3A, 3D).  
Concerning veto player preferences, both the interviews and various resolutions (e.g. A7-
0216/2012) show that the EP strongly supports stricter animal welfare legislation (interview 3A, 
3C, 3D). The Council is more divided about the topic, with countries in North(western) Europe 
generally supporting new legislation and some countries with much agriculture (e.g. Greece) 
opposing it.  
Concerning interest group preferences, farmer associations opposed new animal welfare 
legislation because it could lead to additional costs. Animal rights groups were also sceptical 
about the idea of an integrated animal welfare law, as they feared it would include more self-
regulation and no stricter welfare standards (interview 3D, 3E). Our interviews and media 








Summary of the cross case comparison 
Table 3 summarizes the three cases and their ‘scores’ on the explanatory conditions. The CPC 
case has been split into two groups of recommendations that differ in their level of use; in the 
other cases, the level of use of the recommendations was relatively similar.  
Our theoretical framework predicted that the absence of opposition to an evaluation’s 
recommendations from the Commission, the EP, the Council and major interest groups would 
be a necessary condition for use. However, as Table 3 shows this is not the case. The S&PM and 
CPC evaluations are two cases where the Commission implemented respectively all and many 
recommendations in a legislative proposal, despite significant opposition from respectively the 
EP plus interest groups and the Council. The results do confirm our expectation that media 
coverage was absent in all cases. 
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To explain these findings, the next section zooms in on the steps in the follow-up process of 
each evaluation when specific recommendations were included in or discarded from the 
Commission’s plans. For the first two cases, this allows us to see why the predicted mechanisms 









Case analysis 1: S&PM evaluation 
As described above, the S&PM evaluation was entirely followed up by the Commission despite 
opposition from the EP and various NGOs regarding the topic of niche markets. To explain this, 
we must consider the Commission’s contact with these actors throughout the follow-up 
process. DG SANTE’s communication with the EP was mostly handled by its top-level civil 
servants, while the details about the evaluation’s follow-up were decided by its plant health 
unit. This unit received positive feedback on its plans from the member states via the 
comitology system, but had no contact with the EP. Accordingly, it was surprised when the 
proposal was rejected by the EP in 2014 (interview 1A, 1C, 1E). Therefore, the mechanism 
linking opposition by the EP to non-use that we predicted was not triggered. 
The upcoming elections of May 2014 and a critical lobby by NGOs representing small 
seed producers and biological farmers both contributed to the proposal’s rejection by the EP 
(interview 1A, 1B, 1C, 1E). The Commission’s plant health unit had been in contact with these 
NGOs during the follow-up process of the evaluation and had, as mentioned in the case 
description, made some concessions to their views. However, in general the unit wished to base 
its proposal on the evaluation and other evidence, which it felt the NGOs did not provide. The 
Commission also expected that the NGOs would support the proposal in the end because it 
would be better for them than no change at all (interview 1A). Whereas some NGOs did indeed 
take this position, others opposed the amendments on principle (interview 1D). In conclusion, 
the Commission did not reckon with political opposition from the EP and significant interest 
groups because it was relatively unaware of the former and it (falsely) thought it could pacify 
the latter.  
The Commission could have relaunched the proposal after its rejection, as some further 




However, this option was complicated by the fact that seed legislation had no direct link to the 
priorities of the new Juncker Commission (the economy, human rights, migration) (Juncker, 
2014). Strict procedural requirements would therefore apply to any new proposal (e.g. a new 
impact assessment would need to be produced), for which the plant health unit does not 
currently have the resources (interview 1A, 1C). 
 
Case analysis 2: CPC evaluation 
As described above, most of the recommendations of the CPC evaluation were implemented in 
a legislative proposal from the Commission despite significant opposition from especially the 
Council. As one respondent stated, the Commission’s proposal was ‘highly ambitious’ because it 
deliberately ignored objections from the member state (interview 2C). The explanation for this 
is that the Juncker Commission considered consumer protection a key priority to encourage the 
European economy (Juncker, 2014: 6). When this Commission entered office it dropped many 
nearly completed legislative proposals to demonstrate its commitment to its Better Regulation 
Agenda, but the fledgling CPC proposal continued because it was considered a high priority 
(interview 2C, 2E). 
Conversely, Table 3 also shows that the last two recommendations of the CPC evaluation 
were ignored by the Commission despite not going against the preferences of any influential 
actors. How can this be explained? Recommendation 6 (creating an observatory) was still 
mentioned by the Commission’s documents in mid-2014, but had been dropped by October 
2015 (during which period the Juncker Commission entered office). This change was solely 
caused by budgetary reasons: unlike most other recommendations of EPL evaluations, 
establishing an observatory would cost much manpower to implement. The Juncker 
Commission had to reduce its civil service from the outset, and any remaining extra capacity for 
consumer protection was envisaged to be spent on the Commission’s increased role in the CPC 
network (interview 2A, 2B, 2C). This situation appears to be a rare case where the interest to 
protect financial resources, which we predicted to be unimportant in our theoretical framework, 




Recommendation 7 was not followed up because the Commission considered it to be 
contradictory: the evaluation first states that the objectives of the regulation must be clarified, 
but then states that its current objectives are ‘appropriate and relevant’ (interview 2A). Other 
respondents also read this recommendation in various ways, confirming its indistinctness 
(interview 2B, 2C, 2E).  
 In conclusion, the fact that some recommendations of the CPC evaluation were not 
followed up by the Commission is best explained by their exceptional characteristics rather than 
by any fundamental opposition from political actors. Conversely, the recommendations that 
were relatively controversial have all been followed up because the Juncker Commission viewed 
them as essential to its political priorities. 
 
Case analysis 3: animal welfare evaluation 
As was discussed above, the animal welfare evaluation’s recommendation to consider legislative 
changes was not followed up in the end, despite the fact that it was supported by the 
responsible Commission DG and the EP. Based on Table 3, an intuitive explanation for this lack 
of use seems to lie in the opposition of various member states and interest groups.  
However, for three reasons, none of the respondents believe that this opposition was 
influential. Firstly, the idea of new animal welfare legislation was blocked by the SG in 2014, 
while member states and interest groups only seem to have lobbied about this topic at the DG-
level during that time (interview 3D, 3E, 3F). Secondly, various respondents believe that an 
integrated animal welfare law could have been “sold” to sceptical countries if it had been 
presented as a simplification effort, with controversial discussions about stricter welfare 
standards being moved to the comitology system (interview 3A, 3B, 3D). Thirdly, all interest 
groups state that they were much surprised when the idea of new animal welfare legislation 
was dropped in late 2014 (interview 3D, 3E). 
So what does explain the lack of use of the animal welfare evaluation? As in the two 
other cases, the answer lies in the Juncker Commission’s tendency to focus on its political 
priorities: the economy, human rights and migration (Juncker, 2014; interview 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, 




many proposals that had no link to these topics, including the draft proposal for new animal 
welfare legislation (interview 3C, 3D). 
In conclusion, the choice not to propose new animal welfare legislation had less to do 
with political preferences concerning the specific topic and more with general shifts in the 
Commission’s priorities, although according to some respondents the fact that animal welfare 
was already considered relatively unimportant by the top of DG SANTE and the SG may also 
have contributed (interview 3A, 3D). The evaluation could not change this situation, as such 
reports are almost never read at the top of the Commission (interview 3F). 
 
6. Conclusion  
This article started with the question to what extent and how political conditions affect the 
European Commission’s instrumental use of EPL evaluations. Based on nineteen in-depth 
interviews and extensive document analysis, we traced possible reasons for variation in the 
levels of use of three evaluations that were all of high technical quality. 
 Our expectation that the absence of opposition to an evaluation’s recommendations 
from major political actors is a necessary condition for their use by the Commission was falsified 
by our findings. In our first two cases, the Commission implemented all or most of the 
evaluations’ recommendations, despite significant opposition from actors like the EP, interest 
groups and the Council. In the first case, the Commission was unaware of the EP’s opposition 
and falsely thought it could pacify interest groups with concessions; in the second case, the 
Commission considered legislative changes too important to reckon with the Council’s 
opposition. In our third case, opposition to the evaluation’s findings from interest groups and 
the Council hardly seemed to have influenced the Commission’s decision to ignore its results.  
Instead, we found that a lack of salience of the policy field to which an EPL evaluation 
belongs in the eyes of the current (Juncker) Commission appears to be a sufficient condition for 
non-use. In other words, if the evaluated legislation has no direct relation to one of the 
Commission’s priorities, the institution is reluctant to propose amendments even when an 




priorities and therefore received a legislative proposal, whereas our third case did not and 
therefore received no follow-up. In our first case, a legislative proposal was already dropped 
before Juncker entered into office, but attempts to relaunch this proposal were also hindered 
by the fact that seed legislation is no political priority. 
What do these findings imply about the instrumental use of EPL evaluation in the 
Commission and in general? As our theoretical section explained, the existing literature on 
instrumental evaluation use (in the Commission and in general) describes various political 
factors which may impede such use, like the prevalence of pre-existing policy beliefs and the 
need to safeguard compromises. However, this existing literature pays little attention to the fact 
that political actors may also have a symbolic interest to reduce their policy output. Since EPL 
evaluations often recommend changing legislation to improve it, they essentially request policy-
makers to frequently propose legislative amendments. In the case of the Commission, such 
recommendations contradict its plans to propose little legislation outside of its priority fields. 
This contradiction leads to reduced possibilities for evaluation use. 
 Our findings suggest that this political interest to limit legislative proposals should be 
considered when studying the Commission’s instrumental use of evidence. As national 
executives may also commit themselves to limit their legislative output in the context of better 
regulation agendas, this condition may also be relevant for explaining other policy-makers’ use 
of EPL evaluations. 
 Our study has two noteworthy limitations. Firstly, due to our focus on the Commission, 
we did not systematically assess the wider impact of EPL evaluations on legislative outcomes. 
Our first case showed that even when EPL evaluations affect the Commission’s legislative 
proposals, they may not influence the final outcomes of EU legislative processes, as NGOs and 
other actors that disagree with evaluation results may still lobby against proposals based on 
them at the Council or EP. For future research, a more in-depth assessment of such processes 
would be recommended. 
A second limitation lies in our case selection. Since we only studied high-quality 
evaluations, our conclusions may not apply to evaluations that fail to meet certain technical 




representativeness of our results could be limited, even though the selected cases covered a 
wide range of policies. For future research, it is therefore recommended to use a larger number 
of cases to study whether a lack of salience combined with a commitment to reduce legislative 
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Abstract 
Evaluations may perform a key role in political systems, as they provide a basis for parliaments 
to hold their executives accountable. This is equally the case in the European Union. Yet, several 
factors may work against the use of European Union evaluations for accountability purposes. 
Members of the European Parliament work under great time pressure and executives may have 
little incentives to produce high-quality evaluations. This article therefore addresses the 
question of to what extent and when members of the European Parliament use ex-post 
legislative evaluations. We present an analysis of 220 evaluations, studying how many were 
referred to in parliamentary questions. Our main finding is that 16% of the evaluations are 
followed up through questions. However, the parliamentary questions hardly serve 
accountability aims. Members of the European Parliament mostly use evaluations for agenda 
setting purposes. The main variable explaining differences in the use of evaluations is the level 








In response to concerns about the democratic deficit of the European Union (EU) and the lack of 
accountability of its institutions, increasing attention has been paid to the accountability of the 
European Commission. When the Santer Commission resigned in 1999 after allegations of fraud 
and mismanagement, this increasing attention was followed by action: the succeeding Prodi 
Commission implemented serious reforms to increase the Commission’s accountability (Wille, 
2010: 194). 
To increase its political accountability, the Commission has become more tightly 
connected to the European Parliament (EP) (Curtin, 2007). Various reforms have provided the 
EP with a range of instruments to hold the Commission accountable (Wille, 2012: 387), even 
though the executive powers of the Commission are limited, as it is not in charge of the day-to-
day implementation of EU policies. The Commission is, however, responsible for initiating and 
formulating new policies and for monitoring and enforcing implementation, as well as 
evaluating EU policies. 
 The increasing powers of the EP have been followed by stronger demands on the 
Commission to submit reports about EU policies to the EP (Curtin, 2009: 256-257). Especially 
promising in this respect are ex-post evaluations of EU programmes and legislation. Most 
legislation adopted nowadays includes a requirement for an evaluation, focusing either on the 
implementation process or actual impacts (Bussmann, 2010: 280).2 In theory, these evaluations 
provide rich information on the fulfilment of policy goals and the responsibilities of actors 
involved (Corbett et al., 2011: 318-319). 
Despite the theoretical potential of ex-post evaluations for political accountability, 
existing research indicates that the EP does not actively use EU programme evaluations. A study 
by the Commission demonstrates that ‘most evaluations are used only by the officials 
[administrators] directly involved in the implementation of the interventions that are evaluated’ 
(EPEC, 2005, quoted in Stern, 2009). A recent study of the evaluation of the LIFE programme 
found that use mainly takes place in the Commission, and not in the EP (Højlund, 2014). Also, 






decision-making; evaluation can help the Commission ‘to improve agenda setting and policy 
drafting’. 
Yet, these findings on the limited use of evaluations by the EP could relate to the fact 
that existing research on evaluation use in the EU focuses on programme evaluations, which 
mostly focus on the fate of individual programmes and projects in particular member states 
(Højlund, 2014: 436). Given the EP’s role as a legislator, the situation could be different for 
evaluations of a more regulatory nature, focusing on the fate of EU legislative policies in the 
member states. The idea that parliaments are more interested in ex-post legislative (EPL) 
evaluation would be in line with the finding of Bussmann (2010: 280-282) that parliaments 
increasingly want to know how the legislation they enact is carried out by the executive. At the 
same time, it must be noted that Impact assessments (IAs), which can be seen as ex-ante 
legislative evaluations, are not often used by the EP either: Poptcheva (2013: 4-5) found that 
out of 12.000 EP Committee documents in the 2004-2009 parliamentary term, only one 
document explicitly referred to a Commission IA. A study by the European Court of Auditors 
(2010: 21) came to similar conclusions. 
 The scant existing literature thus suggests that the EP hardly uses ex-post programme 
evaluations and IAs. This article changes perspective, turning to the question of to what extent 
and under which conditions the EP uses EPL evaluations to hold the Commission politically 
accountable. To answer this question we analyse the extent to which Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) ask questions based on EPL evaluations. We do so for a period of roughly 
three parliamentary terms. This way, we seek not only to add to the literature on EU evaluation 
use, but also to develop the quantitative knowledge base for understanding accountability in 
the EU, which is currently rather weakly developed in the literature (Brandsma, 2013b).  
 
2. Accountability in the EU 
Bovens (2010: 947-948) distinguishes between authors who view accountability as a virtue of 
individual actors versus authors who view accountability as a mechanism that structures the 






common and often linked to a political concept of accountability based on the principal-agent 
(P-A) paradigm. Several EU scholars define accountability as a social relation in which an agent is 
held to account for his actions to a principal (cf. Curtin, 2007, 2009; Curtin et al.: 2010). 
 In the EU political system, several P-A relationships exist. Most prominently, the member 
states act as a collective principal that delegates power to the Commission and the Court of 
Justice (Pollack, 1997: 203). Increasingly though, the Commission is also seen as an agent of the 
EP (Curtin, 2007; Proksch and Slapin, 2010). This P-A relationship is central to this article. 
Accountability, from a P-A perspective, is an important ex-post mechanism for a principal 
to cope with the risk that the agent deviates from the principal’s intentions and interests (Blom-
Hanssen, 2005: 631; Curtin, 2007: 525; Pollack, 1997: 108), in addition to administrative 
procedures and mechanisms that limit the scope of the agent’s activity ex-ante.  
 According to Curtin (2009: 257) a proper accountability mechanism requires three steps: 
first, the principal must have sufficient information about the fulfilment of responsibilities by 
the agent (Stufflebeam and Shinkfield, 2007: 163). In general, legislatures have an information 
deficit vis-a-vis the executive, given their lack of expertise and resources (Brandsma, 2013a: 4). 
Partly, they can compensate for this by acquiring general information about the executive’s 
preferences, allowing them to properly judge information they receive from the executive on 
specific issues. In the case of the EU, this is more difficult because the executive is not directly 
linked to the legislature through political ties. Accordingly, information exchange between the 
legislature and executive takes place in a formalized way, for example through parliamentary 
questions or EP committee meetings (Proksch and Slapin, 2010).  
Over time, the EP has strengthened its general information rights (Brandsma, 2013a: 5). 
The Commission must submit myriad reports to the legislature, including evaluations (Curtin, 
2009: 256-257). The 2010 Inter-Institutional Framework Agreement, which describes the 
Commission’s responsibilities towards the EP,3 includes a number of principles on the exchange 
of information.  
 Second, the agent must be given the chance to explain its actions, for example through a 






or to make a statement in the plenary (Corbett et al., 2011: 319-320; Curtin et al., 2010: 258-
261). Parliamentary questions provide another forum for the Commission to explain its actions. 
Third, the principal must be able to sanction or reward the agent in order to steer its 
behaviour. Here, it is important to note that the EU political system has a formal separation of 
powers: the College of Commissioners is selected by the European Council, although its 
appointment is subject to approval by the EP. This separation of powers means that there is no 
such thing as a ‘vote of no confidence’ for individual Commissioners as a direct sanctioning 
mechanism. While the EP can censure the Commission as a whole, the supermajority 
requirement to do so makes this very hard (Proksch and Slapin, 2010). The options for the EP to 
sanction the Commission are therefore limited to holding back budgets or blocking or amending 
its proposals. Alternatively, the EP can ask the Commission to take action via parliamentary 
questions or resolutions, which often convey a clear political message (Brandsma, 2012: 79). 
 
3. Ex-post evaluation as a tool for accountability 
A potential tool for the EP to hold the Commission accountable are ex-post evaluations. Such 
evaluations may provide the information necessary for an accountability process to function 
(Stufflebeam and Shinkfield, 2007: 163). Enabling accountability is generally considered one of 
the three substantive aims of ex-post evaluation in the public sector, next to learning how to 
improve existing policy and generating more general knowledge of a policy’s intervention logic 
(Bovens et al., 2008: 322; Patton, 2008; Vedung, 1997: 101).  
Accountability is also one of the key aims of evaluation at the EU level according to 
academic observers (Stame, 2008: 124; Stern, 2009: 71). In the words of Versluis et al. (2011: 
207), ‘evaluation is fundamental to the EU, given the need for accountability … and 
performance’. The link between evaluation and accountability also transpires from Commission 
documents. While the Commission originally presented evaluations as a tool to increase policy 
effectiveness (European Commission, 2001: 10) it gradually stressed the potential of evaluations 
to enhance accountability. In the Commission’s 2004 Evaluation Guide (European Commission, 






acknowledges this accountability function. In its 2001 resolution on the Commission’s ‘White 
Paper on European governance’ (resolution A5-0399/2001) it argued that the Commission 
needs to be more transparent and prove its worth to the European public. The need for the EP 
to better scrutinize the executive is also underlined in a ‘library briefing’ for the EP by Poptcheva 
(2013), who stresses the need for ex-post evaluations to improve accountability.  
While there is increasing attention to accountability, EU ex-post evaluation originally 
focused on the spending activities of policy programmes, in particular in relation to the EU’s 
Structural Funds (Bachtler and Wren, 2006; Levy, 2001; Stern, 2009). The European Court of 
Auditors has played an important role in this (mainly financial) system for reporting and 
evaluation (Curtin, 2007: 553; Versluis et al., 2011: 210). While the role of the Court was 
originally linked to the EP’s power of discharge over the EU budget, it soon ‘developed into a 
fully-fledged audit office’, focusing on sound financial management (Laffan, 1999: 254).  
Since the late 1990s, a more general interest in ex-post evaluation has grown due to an 
increasing focus on budgetary stringency, effective programme execution and accountability 
(European Commission, 2007: Annex 1; cf. Bauer, 2006). Nowadays, legislation is also evaluated, 
although it should be noted that most legislative evaluation takes the shape of IAs, which are 
carried out ex-ante (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 478; Summa and Toulemonde, 2002: 411). In sum, the 
Commission has made great investments in its evaluation system (Fitzpatrick, 2012; Højlund 
2014; Stame, 2008; Stern, 2009). Even though EPL evaluations are less common than IAs, earlier 
research (Mastenbroek et al., 2016) has shown that 33% of the EU’s major directives and 
regulations from the period 2000-2002 have been evaluated ex-post. 
 
4. Theoretical framework 
Despite the potential of EPL evaluations for accountability, they often remain unused (Fleisscher 
and Christie, 2009; Patton, 2008). To understand why this is the case, we take the general 
literature on ‘evaluation use’ as a starting point, using the seminal review article by Cousins and 
Leithwood (1986) as suggested by Højlund (2014),5 who analysed the use of the evaluation of 






different types of factors to the specific goals of evaluations. Based on this literature we develop 
four hypotheses about the use of evaluations for accountability purposes.6 Cousins and 
Leithwood (1986) distinguish between two broad sets of explanations for evaluation use. The 
first set, labelled evaluation implementation, focuses on the characteristics of the evaluation 
and evaluation process. These explanations are fairly ‘rationalistic’ in nature, as they perceive 
evaluation as a value-neutral process. This set includes the quality, credibility and relevance of 
an evaluation to a user, as well as the quality of communication between the evaluator and 
client (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). The second set of explanations concerns characteristics of 
the decision setting in which an evaluation is used. This set of factors is more political in nature, 
which is highly relevant for our purpose of analysing political accountability. 
 
Evaluation implementation: rationalistic factors 
Our first two hypotheses are grounded in the assumption that evaluation use depends on the 
characteristics of the evaluation or evaluation process (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986; Johnson 
et al., 2009). Evaluation use is, first of all, argued to be a function of evaluation quality (Cousins 
and Leithwood, 1986: 347). Low-quality evaluations make the user vulnerable to criticism, which 
reduces the chances of use (Cooksy and Caracelli, 2005: 31; EPEC, 2005: 39-40). Meta-
evaluations show that the methodological quality of evaluations is not always guaranteed; in 
some examples less than half of the evaluations meet minimal standards of quality (Datta, 2006: 
434; Forss and Carlsson, 1997: 490). The quality of EU evaluations is also disputed (Mastenbroek 
et al., 2016; Versluis et al., 2011: 224).  
 While evaluation quality can be an impediment to use by administrators closely involved 
in the evaluated policy, we believe this to be less of a concern for principals in the case of 
political accountability; we expect those principals to be interested primarily in the conclusion 
of an evaluation. To the extent that MEPs care about the quality of the evaluation process, we 
expect them to mainly care about the objectivity of the results (Poptcheva, 2013). This is in line 
with Cousins and Leithwood (1986: 347), who argue that the objectivity of an evaluation affects 






authors (Rossi et al., 2004: 36; Stufflebeam and Shinkfield, 2007; Vedung, 1997), who argue that 
evaluations intended for accountability purposes should be conducted by external researchers, 
who are likely to be more independent. Studies on EU IAs also support this view, suggesting that 
MEPs consider the independence of evaluations before deciding to use them - often affecting 
use in a negative way (Poptcheva, 2013). According to Stern (2009: 70-72), there is a widespread 
belief that the Commission advocates objectivity in its evaluations on paper, but not in 
practice.7 Not surprisingly, one of the alleged reasons for the very little use of IAs by MEPs is 
their distrust in the objectivity of the information (Poptcheva, 2013). On this basis we formulate 
the following hypothesis for the use of EPL evaluations: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Evaluations of European legislation conducted by external companies are more 
likely to be used for accountability purposes by MEPs than evaluations that are conducted 
internally by the Commission.  
 
Furthermore, Cousins and Leithwood (1986: 347) argue that evaluation use is a matter of 
relevance to the user; evaluations that do not match the goals of their audience are less likely to 
be used (Toulemonde, 2006). When it comes to using evaluations for accountability purposes, 
various scholars suggest that evaluations must be aimed at finding out if a policy has worked, 
rather than how it can be improved: accountability evaluations need to focus on outcomes 
rather than on processes (Lehtonen, 2005: 170-171; Rossi et al., 2004; 36; Stufflebeam and 
Shinkfield, 2007: 161). When it comes to holding the Commission accountable, however, this 
distinction seems less relevant, as the Commission has important responsibilities in particular in 
supervising the implementation process. We therefore expect MEPs to care equally about both 
outcome and process evaluations.  
 We do expect MEPs to be affected by the clarity of the evaluation results. Cousins and 
Leithwood (1986: 347) argue that evaluation use is contingent on communication quality: the 
clarity of the results to the evaluation audiences. In reality, evaluations compete with other 






a hard time deciding what information is important (Linter and Vaccari, 2005: 23). We therefore 
expect that evaluations, in order to be used by MEPs, must either be short or have concise 
executive summaries (Forss and Carlsson, 1997: 495). This leads to the following hypothesis:8 
 
Hypothesis 2: Evaluations that are short or have a concise executive summary are more likely to 
be used by MEPs for accountability purposes than lengthy evaluations or evaluations without a 
concise executive summary.  
 
The decision setting: political factors  
The ‘evaluation implementation’ perspective is fairly ‘rationalistic’ in nature, working from the 
conception of evaluation as providing value-neutral information (Bovens et al., 2008: 325). 
However, this view is disputed in the literature on evaluation use. Evaluation, crucially, is argued 
to be a political venture: it is ‘nothing but the continuation of politics by other means’ (Bovens 
et al., 2008: 321). Arguably, this is especially true in the EU, ‘where a plethora of actors and 
institutions are fighting to champion their own agenda and their preferred course of action’ 
(Versluis et al., 2011: 223). We therefore need to bring in more political explanations - which are 
found in the realm of the ‘decision setting’ explanations (Cousins and Leithwood, 1986).  
One important characteristic of the decision setting is the importance attached to an 
evaluation (Johnson et al., 2009: 385). Especially in accountability relationships, this importance 
is affected by the risks for the principal that the agent does not deliver the task for which it was 
delegated power (‘moral hazard’). Benjamin (2008: 335-336) suggests that the significance and 
the nature of this risk provides different incentives for evaluation use. 
 The accountability relationship is affected, first, by the significance of the principal’s risk. 
Here, the basic question is: ‘How costly is possible shirking by an agent to the principal?’. 
According to Benjamin (2008), the significance of the risk increases the need to hold an agent to 
account, which, in turn, increases the chances of evaluation use. We expect the significance of 
this risk for MEPs to depend partly on issue salience, that is, the relative importance attached to 






selective and give priority to certain issues. We expect that the salience of a policy issue to 
MEPs will affect the perceived significance of the risk that this policy does not work, and thus 
the need to hold the Commission accountable. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the salience of a piece of legislation to MEPs, the higher the chances 
that an evaluation of the legislation is used by MEPs for accountability purposes. 
 
The importance attached to an evaluation is also affected by the nature of a principal’s risk. In 
this case the question is: ‘Is there a possible conflict of interest between principal and agent?’ 
(Benjamin, 2008).9 Here, rivalries and power struggles play a role (Johnson et al., 2009: 385). In 
this regard, it is important to return to the fact that the EU has a formal separation of powers. 
This results in a situation where the EP and Commission can act relatively independently of each 
other to pursue their interests during the legislative process (e.g. Nugent, 2010: 206). In a 
situation of a conflict of interests, we expect MEPs to be more concerned with holding the 
Commission accountable. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The more conflict during the legislative process, the higher the chances that 
an evaluation of the legislation is used by MEPs for accountability purposes. 
 
5. Methods and data 
The preceding hypotheses are tested using a dataset of 220 EPL evaluations commissioned or 
carried out by the Commission (updated version of the dataset used in chapter 2 of this 
dissertation).10 The evaluations were gathered from multiple sources: Directorat-General (DG) 
websites, Commission evaluation documents (European Commission, 2010a), Commission work 
programmes (European Commission, 2010b), the Commission’s evaluation search engine,11 
systematic Google searches and searches for Commission reports on legislation through the 







Dependent variable  
We operationalized our dependent variable ‘use of an evaluation for accountability purposes’ 
by turning to parliamentary questions asked by MEPs. The reason for this is that European 
parliamentary questions (EPQs) have been recognised as one of most visible and easy 
instruments available to MEPs to hold the Commission accountable (Proksch and Slapin, 2010: 
60; Wille, 2010: 60). While the literature suggests that the extent to which parliamentary 
questions are used for accountability purposes in national politics is low because MPs mainly 
use them for attention, Proksch and Slapin (2010: 60) argue that this is different for the EU. 
According to them, the second-order nature of EP elections and little media attention for EU 
politics provide few incentives for MEPs to use questions for personal publicity or to gain votes. 
Accountability and information are therefore a much more important function of EPQs.  
For all EPL evaluations in our dataset, we first searched for corresponding EPQs, using 
the EP’s website on parliamentary questions and declarations.13 For three parliamentary terms 
(1999-2004, 2004-2009 and 2009-2014) we searched for EPQs referring to the evaluations in 
our dataset.14 The EPQs that resulted from this search were read to make sure that reference 
was indeed made to the evaluations included in our dataset. For our initial analysis we adopted 
a broad understanding of accountability purposes. We included questions in which evaluations 
were used to ask additional information, to demonstrate shortcomings and to give the 
Commission a chance to explain its actions and responsibility, as well as questions that ‘steer’ 
the Commission by summoning it to change existing legislation. In the latter case there is a close 
empirical link between retrospective and prospective parliamentary scrutiny (Wille, 2010). This 
broad definition is in line with the existing literature on the quantitative measurement of 
accountability (Brandsma, 2013b). The dependent variable was measured as a dichotomous 
variable: an evaluation either has or has not been referred to in EPQs. 
 
Independent variables 
Starting with the rationalistic variables, we analysed whether the evaluations were carried out 






of the evaluation reports gathered. This resulted in a dichotomous variable. To measure the 
clarity of the reports, we assessed whether an executive summary of no more than 10 pages 
was included in or attached to the report; reports with under 10 pages of main text scored 
automatically on this condition (Mastenbroek et al., 2016). 
 Continuing with the political variables, we measured issue salience to MEPs by counting 
the total number of so-called recitals attached to the legislation evaluated. Proposals for EU law 
always include texts that set out various arguments - recitals - for why regulatory action is 
needed. It is suggested in the literature that more recitals indicate a higher salience of a piece of 
legislation (e.g. Warntjen, 2012: 171). This is a continuous variable. The degree of conflict was 
measured by counting the number of amendments proposed by the EP to the original 
Commission proposal underpinning a piece of law. While not all amendments have (equal) 
political significance, the total number of amendments is seen as indicative of the conflict 
between the Commission and the EP (Franchino, 2000: 75). This variable is also continuous. The 
different variables and their expected effect on the referral to evaluations in EPQs are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Method of analysis 
Since our dependent variable is dichotomous (EPL evaluations being referred to or not referred 
to in EPQs), and our independent variables are either categorical or continuous, we chose to use 











Table 1: Overview of independent variables 
Variable Indicator Measurement 
Expected 
effect on use 





0 = internal evaluation 





Number of pages of 
executive summary 
or of report of max. 
10  
0 = evaluation is longer than 10 
pages and does not have a 
summary of less than 10 
pages  
1 = evaluation is shorter than 10 
pages or contains a summary 





Issue salience  Total number of recitals + 





To show to what extent evaluations are used, we first provide some descriptive results. Of the 
220 EPL evaluations included in our dataset, 49 (22.3%) were referred to in EPQs. More 
specifically, 29 evaluations were referred to once, seven were referred to twice, seven were 
referred to three times and two were referred to four times. Four evaluations appeared even 
more often: Immigration and Asylum legislation (five times); the Tobacco Products Directive 
(eight times); animal welfare legislation (10 times); and, finally, the Data Retention Directive (19 






 Figure 1 shows the number of EPL evaluations and evaluations being referred to in EPQs 
per year. While we see an increase in the number of EPL evaluations being published, there 
appears to be no clear trend in referral to evaluations in EPQs. 
 
Figure 1: Number of evaluations and evaluation being referred to in EPQs 
 
Explanatory analysis 
Turning to the explanatory analysis, we estimated a model containing only the rationalistic 
variables and a full model also including the political variables However, the loglikelihood ratio 
tests indicated that both the models were not significant. 
Finding these insignificant results for our model, we decided to take a closer look into 
the operationalization of our dependent variable. In line with quantitative accountability 
studies, we initially included all EPQs referring to an evaluation. To verify whether this is 






questions asked. Working inductively, we identified four types of questions. The first type 
includes questions about evaluation follow-up: ‘What has the Commission done or is it doing 
based on the evaluation report?’ (62 questions). The second type of questions concerns 
evaluation content: ‘Why are certain topics included, excluded or treated in a specific way in the 
evaluation?’ (19 questions). Two other types of questions are related to the evaluation process, 
dealing with evaluation timing: ‘Is the Commission planning an evaluation or when will this 
evaluation take place?’ (27 questions) - and evaluation stakeholders - ‘Why were certain actors 
included or excluded during the evaluation process?’ (six questions). Remarkably, no questions 
at all were of a truly retrospective nature, focusing on the performance of past policies or the 
fulfilment of specific responsibilities by the Commission. 
On the basis of the different types of questions, we decided to narrow down the EPQs 
indicative of ‘evaluation use for accountability purposes’. To test our hypotheses, we included 
only those EPQs that contained follow-up questions about evaluations, believing that these 
relate the most to the responsibility and behaviour of the Commission in relation to the 
legislation evaluated. Table 2 presents the results of the new analysis. 
The loglikelihood ratio test indicates once again that the model containing only the 
rationalistic variables is not significant. However, this changes when we add the political factors: 
in that case, the model becomes significant at the 0.05 level. In the full model, the effect of the 
presence of a clear executive summary and the number of recitals, while pointing in the 
expected direction, remains insignificant. This is also the case for the effect of the type of 
evaluator, which, moreover, points in the opposite direction compared to what we expected. 
However, we do find that the number of amendments has a significant effect on the use of 
evaluations: the analysis shows that in terms of predicated probabilities, the chances of an 
evaluation being used increases by 2.1% for every extra amendment proposed, holding all other 
variables at their average values. This finding is in line with our hypothesis that evaluations of 
politically sensitive policies - leading to more conflict during the legislative stage - are more 
likely to be referred to by MEPs for accountability purposes than less sensitive policies. 






recitals, did not have an effect on evaluation use. A possible explanation for this could be that 
the salience of a policy is less stable than the level of conflict; the number of recitals in a piece 
of legislation may therefore be less indicative of a policy’s significance at the time that an 
evaluation is published. Another explanation, of course, could be that salience alone is simply 
not a good indicator of the significance that MEPs attach to the risk that a policy does not work. 
The analysis thus shows that it is only the level of conflict between the EP and the Commission 
during the legislative stage that significantly increases the chances that MEPs use ex-post 
evaluations for accountability purposes. 
 
Table 2: Results of the logistic regression 
 Rationalistic model Full model 
 B (SE) Sig. Exp(B) B (SE) Sig. Exp(B) 
Constant -1.69 (0.36) 0.00 0.18 -2.18 (0.49) 0.00 0.113 
External 
evaluator 
-0.13 (0.39) 0.74 0.88 -0.13 (0.40) 0.74 0.877 
Concise 
summary  
0.15 (0.40) 0.71 1.16 0.27 (0.42) 0.53 1.306 
Recitals    -0.01 (0.01) 0.34 0.988 
Amendments    0.02 (0.01) 0.00 1.016 
       
 N = 205 
Chi Square = 
0.24 
Sig = 0.89 
  N = 205 
Chi Square = 11.41 
Sig = 0.02 
  
 
When we further analyse the residuals - identifying those cases with a studentized residual 
greater than 215 - it becomes clear that most of the evaluations that are referred to in EPQs but 
cannot be explained by our model concern post-material issues such as the protection of 
consumers and the environment. Table 3 presents these evaluations. This analysis sustains the 












Amendments Political Group  
Evaluation of the Transport of Dangerous Goods  2.10 12 Greens (1) 
Report on Noise Operation Restrictions at EU 
Airports  
2.15 20 
ALDE (1), S&D 
(1)  
Evaluation of the Environmental Noise Directive  2.00 36 S&D (3) 
Fitness Check Water Policy 2.09 99 ALDE (2) 
Study of Directive 2001/29/EC on the 
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society 
2.17 58 
S&D (1), EPP 
(1) 
Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family 




Report on the application of Directive 94/80/EC 
on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate 
in municipal elections by citizens of the Union 
residing in a Member State of which they are 
not nationals 
2.09 25 ALDE (1) 
First Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum 2.00 38 
PPE (2), ALDE 
(1), GUE/NGL 
(1)  
Expert study on the issues arising from a 
reduced time frame and the options allowed for 
submitting recapitulative statements 
2.40 0 ALDE (2) 
Interim Evaluation of the European chemical 
market after the introduction of REACH 
-2.15 351 None 
Operation and effects of information and 
consultation directives in the EU/EEA countries. 
Fitness check 
2.02 35 S&D (1) 
Second report on the implementation of 
regulation on civil aviation security 
2.08 14 EPP (1) 
Report on the operation of Regulation (EC) no 
1185/2003 on the removal of fins of sharks on 
board vessels 







While it is recognised in the evaluation literature that evaluations are often used for political 
purposes (e.g. Weiss et al., 2005), various broader models on agenda-setting and policy change 
are worth turning to for explaining evaluation use. Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams (MS) 
model, for example, directs our attention to the fact that evaluations in and by themselves do 
not result in agenda-setting. More commonly, evaluation results need to be picked up by actors 
in the political stream, for instance, by MEPs asking EPQs, to get the issue onto the EU political 
agenda (for an application to the EU setting, see, e.g., Ackrill and Kay, 2011). Somewhat 
differently, the punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgartner et al., 2014) directs our attention 
to the fact that evaluations can change the policy image around which a so-called policy 
subsystem is structured. When actors become aware that the current way of looking at a policy 
problem or solution is flawed, this could result in a destabilization of the policy subsystem (for 
an application to the EU setting, see, e.g., Princen, 2013). Based on these models, MEPs are 
expected to ask questions about evaluations when alternative policies are available or when 
they want to make sure that evaluation results are not ignored.  
More in general, the agenda-setting literature could be used to shed light on the 
questions of why and when EPQs are used for agenda-setting as compared to other pathways of 
agenda-setting, or under which conditions they are used to specify or expand an issue based on 
an evaluation outcome (e.g. Cobb et al., 1976; for an application to the EU setting, see Princen 
and Rhinard, 2006). 
 
7. Conclusion  
Although various EU institutions stress the potential of ex-post evaluations for holding the 
Commission accountable, little is known about the actual use of ex-post legislative (EPL) 
evaluations for accountability purposes. By analysing EPQs that explicitly refer to EPL 
evaluations, we developed a measure of accountability activities, and the use of ex-post 
evaluations in this process. Our analysis showed that out of 220 evaluations analysed, 49 (22%) 
evaluations were referred to in EPQs, of which 34 (16%) evaluations were used to steer the 






use of EU IAs by MEPs and when we consider that research on evaluation use is difficult as MEPs 
may not always explicitly refer to evaluations in their questions.  
At the same time, our analysis revealed a clear forward-looking agenda setting outlook 
rather than a backward-looking attitude of MEPs when it comes to making use of EPL 
evaluations. Surprisingly, we found no retrospective use of evaluations at all: instead, MEPs go 
beyond demonstrating the Commission’s shortcomings and ask about action that must be 
taken. While the literature provides a range of factors that impact evaluation use, our analysis 
showed that the variances in the questions about the follow-up of evaluations can be explained 
best by the political conflict between the EP and the Commission during the legislative stage. 
We expected this to be indicative of the nature of the risk of the Commission shirking away from 
tasks delegated to it by the EP. In line with our expectation, this factor increases the chances 
that evaluations are used by MEPs.  
While the significance of a policy was not found to have a significant effect, we believe 
that political factors are most important for evaluation use for accountability purposes. Both the 
fact that our rationalistic factors had no impact on evaluation use - especially as we remained 
close to the meaning of these variables in our measurement - and our outlier analysis pointed in 
the direction of political explanations. Identifying which other political factors are important for 
explaining evaluation use for accountability purposes by MEPs will require further research. 
Given the forward-looking use of evaluations, it is advised, as suggested earlier, to also turn to 
the literature on agenda-setting and policy change. In this respect, a first avenue for further 
research on the impact of evaluations would be to investigate how the Commission responds to 




 This article was part of a symposium on ‘Accountability in the Post-Lisbon European Union’ directed by Gijs Jan 
Brandsma, Eva Heidbreder and Ellen Mastenbroek. 
2
 These evaluation can be carried out by the Commission or by the member states.  
3
 This document is a good example of a negotiated agreement between European actors that has mostly served to 









 Annex C of the guide (European Commission, 2004: 75) further describes what this information should be about: 
an ex-post evaluation should assess causality and make clear if the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance 
and sustainability have been met in a certain intervention. The Commission recommends external evaluations for 
the purpose of accountability, as they would be more independent (p. 14). If accountability is the aim, the 
judgment should be entirely with the evaluator and not with the steering group (p. 89). 
5
 Højlund (2014) takes the article by Johnson et al. (2009) as a second starting point. This article confirms the 
framework of Cousins and Leithwood, but adds the impact of participatory evaluation techniques to evaluation use. 
As this review article explicitly excluded accountability studies (2009: 380) it is not used here as a starting point, 
although we do refer to the article at times. 
6
 The available data does not allow for testing all these factors in a single model. We therefore selected the factors 
we expected to have a particularly strong impact on the use of evaluations for accountability purposes. 
7
 In the past, Commission officials have admitted that too much involvement of policy implementers in evaluation 
studies can affect the objectivity of the evaluation and its conclusions (EPEC, 2005: 41).  
8
 Cousins and Leithwood (1986) also argue that the findings of an evaluation matter. In our view, however, there 
will not be a difference between evaluations with positive or negative findings, as both may lead to parliamentary 
questions, depending on the preference of an MEPs regarding a particular issue. Another aspect of evaluation 
implementation we do not take on board is timeliness of the report, as this cannot be reliable measured. 
9
 Please note that personal characteristics, commitment to evaluation and information needs of MEPs (Johnson et 
al., 2009: 356) are not relevant for our purposes, because the unit of analysis are evaluations, not MEPs. We also do 
not include the availability of competing information, which cannot be reliably measured quantitatively. 
10
 The original dataset contains 216 evaluations. During the data collection for this study four evaluations were 






 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html#sidesForm. Last accessed 10 January 
2015. 
14
 We used a Boolean search term that was tailored for every single evaluation. The search term was: ‘(evaluation 
OR study OR report OR review OR assessment) AND ([legislation number] OR [key-words from evaluation report]).’ 
Searching before 1999 would be useless as our dataset of evaluations starts in 2000. 
15
 In the cases with a positive number >2, the predicted chances of an evaluation being followed up were slight, 
whereas in reality EPQs were asked. In cases with a negative number <2, the predicted chances were high, but 
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Chapter 9: Discussion and conclusion 
 
Stijn van Voorst 
 
1. Research aims 
This dissertation started with the aim of assessing to what extent the European Commission’s 
system for ex-post legislative (EPL) evaluations is fit to contribute to learning and accountability. 
As was illustrated by the seed and plant propagating material evaluation that was described in 
the introduction (Arcadia International et al., 2008), as well as by other cases mentioned 
throughout this dissertation, there are many problems that may plague EPL evaluations and 
therefore make them unfit to achieve their purposes. Some evaluations are initiated just two or 
three years after legislation enters into force, which may be too soon to fully assess its effects 
on society; in other cases evaluations are only initiated after decades or not at all. Whereas 
some evaluations are of high quality, others lack even a basic description of their research aims 
and methodologies. Some EPL evaluations are used extensively by the Commission when 
drafting legislative proposals; others produce findings that receive no serious attention from 
any EU institution. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation provided a general overview of the Commission’s system 
for EPL evaluations. The six subsequent chapters sough to describe and explain the variation 
that was found among these evaluations in more detail. Specifically, these chapters answered 
the three central research questions that are described below. 
The first research question was how the variance in the initiation of the Commission’s 
EPL evaluations can be explained (chapter 4). The underlying assumption of this question is that 
a system of EPL evaluations can only contribute to learning and accountability if it meets the 
requirement of systematic initiation: all major legislation should be evaluated periodically and 






lead to the improvement of specific laws even if this requirement is not met, in that case they 
will not enhance legislative quality as a whole (OECD, 2015: 120). If the Commission conducts 
EPL evaluations selectively it could also create the impression that it decides what legislation to 
evaluate based on political motives (Radaelli and Meuwese, 2010: 146). Such a reputation could 
harm the credibility of all its subsequent evaluations. 
The second research question of this dissertation was how variance in the quality of the 
Commission’s EPL evaluations can be explained (chapter 5). The underlying assumption of this 
question was that because evaluations are a form of applied research (Pawson and Tilley, 1997: 
p. xiii), they must meet standards of methodological rigor to contribute to learning (OECD, 2015: 
121; Mayne and Schwartz, 2005: 1). If the Commission’s EPL evaluations are not valid and 
reliable, any decisions that take these evaluations into account are based on misleading 
information. Furthermore, a lack of methodological quality can create the perception among 
decision-makers that evaluation findings misrepresent reality, which makes it less likely that 
such findings will be used for learning in the future (Mayne and Schwartz, 2005: 6). 
The third research question addressed by this dissertation was how the variance in the 
use of the Commission’s EPL evaluations can be explained (chapter 6-8). The assumption 
underpinning this question is that evaluations only contribute to aims like learning and 
accountability if their results are seriously considered by decision-makers and other political 
actors (Klein Haarhuis, 2016: 13; Mayne, 2014). In other words, even if the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations meet the standards of systematic initiation and high quality described above, their 
results still need to feed into the legislative process to lead to anything but theoretical 
knowledge (Højlund, 2014). 
To explain the variation in the initiation, quality and use of the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations, this dissertation assessed the effects of a broad range of independent variables. 
Chapter 3 focused on one of these factors: the variation in evaluation capacity of the 
Commission’s directorates-general (DGs). The data presented in this chapter were used for the 






The second section of this conclusion answers the three research questions described 
above, by summarizing the main findings of the preceding chapters. Section 3 discusses the 
implications of these results for existing theories about the European Commission and policy 
evaluations. The fourth section of this conclusion places the findings in a broader context by 
comparing the Commission’s system for EPL evaluations to various national evaluation systems. 
Section 5 discusses three limitations of the dissertation and describes an agenda for future 
research; in section 6 a number of practical recommendations for the EU institutions are 
provided. This conclusion ends with some overall reflections about the Commission’s system for 
EPL evaluations in section 7. 
 
2. Answers to the research questions 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive and explanatory results of the chapters of this dissertation. 
Both this table and the text of this section only present the most recent data related to the 
three research questions specified above. The results about initiation and quality from chapter 2 
are omitted because more up-to-date versions of these findings were discussed in chapter 4 and 
5 of this dissertation; the data from chapter 3 are not mentioned separately either because 
their main purpose was to measure independent variables that were used in other chapters. 
Starting with the initiation of EPL evaluations (research question 1), chapter 4 of this 
dissertation showed that out of the 277 major European regulations and directives published 
between 2000 and 2004, only 116 (about 42%) had been evaluated at the end of 2014. Although 
it is theoretically possible that some of this legislation was evaluated after 2014, the chances of 
this are small because almost no legislation is evaluated after more than ten years.1 Therefore, 
it can be deduced that more than half of the major pieces of EU legislation from 2000-2004 have 









Table 1: overview of research results 
Chapter Topic Main descriptive results Significant explanations 
4 Initiation of EPL 
evaluations 
116/277 (42%) major EU directives 
and regulations from 2000-2004 have 
been evaluated by the Commission. 
1. Type of legislation 
2. Legislative complexity 
3. Evaluation clause 
4. Evaluation capacity 
5 Quality of EPL 
evaluations 
115/153 (75%) EPL evaluations that 
assess effectiveness meet five or more 
out of nine criteria for quality. 
Type of evaluator 
6 Use of EPL 
evaluations by IAs 
33/51 (65%) IAs for which an EPL 
evaluation was available used it. 
Timeliness 
6 Use of IAs by EPL 
evaluations 
10/60 (17%) EPL evaluations for which 
an IA was available used it. 
None found 
7 Instrumental use 
of EPL evaluations 
by the Commission 
Results from EPL evaluations are 
entirely followed up in some cases, 
partly followed up in other cases and 
not followed up in other cases. 
Salience of the 
evaluation’s policy field in 
the eyes of the current 
Commission. 
8 Accountability use 
of EPL evaluations 
by the European 
Parliament 
49/220 (22%) EPL evaluations were 
referred to in EP questions. 34/220 
(16%) EPL evaluations were used to 
steer the Commission’s behaviour. 
Level of conflict between 
the EP and the 








As was explained in chapter 4, one of the reasons why systematic initiation is important is that 
the credibility of an evaluation system decreases if evaluations appear to be selectively 
conducted for political reasons. Therefore, the low initiation rate presented above raises the 
question whether or not the Commission decides what legislation to evaluate based on its own 
political interests. To study this question empirically, chapter 4 tested the hypothesis that the 
Commission is less likely to initiate an EPL evaluation when the risk that its competences could 
be reduced is higher (as measured by proxies concerning the legislative procedures used in the 
EP and the Council). This hypothesis was rejected, which means that no evidence was found for 
the presence of this type of political considerations. 
Four other factors, however, do affect the variance in the initiation of EPL evaluations by 
the Commission. Firstly, the type of legislation matters: directives are more likely to be 
evaluated than regulations. Secondly, the chances that a piece of legislation is evaluated 
increase with its complexity. Both of these explanations suggest that the Commission may 
prioritize evaluating legislation that grants more freedom to the member states, because for 
such legislation the risk of non-compliance is higher. In other words, EPL evaluations may partly 
be initiated by the Commission to make its task of enforcing EU legislation easier. 
 A third significant explanation for the variance in the initiation of EPL evaluations by the 
Commission is the presence of evaluation clauses. Legislation containing a provision that 
requires it to be evaluated within a given number of years is significantly more likely to be 
evaluated than legislation without such a provision. However, the Commission does not always 
meet the deadlines or fulfil the other demands specified by such clauses. A fourth significant 
explanation for the initiation of EPL evaluations is the evaluation capacity of the responsible DG. 
DGs with a specialized unit for ex-post evaluation and/or specific guidelines for EPL evaluations 
evaluate a significantly higher proportion of their legislation than other DGs. Therefore, the 
presence of sufficient capacity to evaluate appears to make it easier for DGs to meet the 
requirement of systematic initiation, although it is also possible that DGs that initiate more EPL 






 Concerning the topic of quality (research question 2), chapter 5 of this dissertation 
showed that the vast majority (75%) of the Commission’s 153 evaluations that address 
legislative effectiveness meet five or more out of criteria on which they were assessed. Some 
76% of these evaluations use both stakeholder input and other research methods, which 
suggests that their methodology is built on a robust comparison of different data sources.  
However, the evaluations perform less well regarding other aspects of quality. Whereas 
almost all reports (89%) have a well-defined scope in the sense of clearly specified research 
questions, less than 40% of them go beyond this by also describing the intervention logic of the 
legislation that they evaluate. Between 40% and 70% of the EPL evaluations meet criteria like 
the presence of a clear operationalization (internal validity), a clear country selection and a clear 
case selection (external validity) and the presence of substantiated conclusions. By far the worst 
aspect of the evaluations’ quality is their replicability: only 31% of the reports contained or 
referred to all the material that would be required to repeat the underlying research (like 
interview guides and lists of respondents). 
 How can this variance in quality be explained? The explanatory analysis of chapter 5 
revealed the type of evaluator as the key determinant: EPL evaluations conducted by external 
consultants are of significantly higher quality than evaluations conducted internally by the 
Commission. This suggests that the technical expertise of external parties is a crucial asset when 
it comes to properly evaluating EU legislation. The evaluation capacity of the Commission’s DGs, 
the complexity of the evaluated legislation and various political conditions were found to have 
no effect on the variance in quality. 
 As for the use of the Commission’s EPL evaluations (research question 3), chapter 6 of 
this dissertation revealed that out of the 51 impact assessments (IAs) published between 2003 
and 2014 for which a prior EPL evaluation was available, 33 cases (65%) made use of at least 
some information from that EPL evaluation. This shows that the use of the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations for improving legislative proposals (a type of learning) occurs relatively frequently 
when it is possible. However, in many cases the IA only included some basic references to the 






EPL evaluations by IAs turned out to be timeliness: if the EPL evaluation is not available at least 
a year before an IA is published, it is almost never used.  
 Chapter 7 of this dissertation also discussed the use of EPL evaluations for improving 
legislative proposals, this time with a focus on political explanations. Based on in-depth case 
studies of the seed law evaluation mentioned above and two other evaluations concerning 
consumer protection and animal welfare, this chapter showed that opposition from key 
stakeholders like the European Parliament (EP), the Council and major interest groups does not 
prevent the Commission from using the results of EPL evaluations. However, the salience of the 
evaluated policy field in the eyes of the Commission did turn out to be a necessary condition for 
use. In other words, EPL evaluations dealing with policy fields unrelated to the political priorities 
of the current Commission are unlikely to affect legislative proposals, whereas EPL evaluations 
addressing policy fields that fit with these political priorities can influence the exact content of 
plans for legislative amendments. 
 Whereas chapter 6 and 7 of this dissertation focused on the use of the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations for policy improvement, chapter 8 discussed their use for a second purpose: 
enhancing accountability towards the legislature (Højlund, 2014: 444; Vedung, 1997: 102-108). 
The chapter showed that the EP rarely uses EPL evaluations to hold the Commission 
accountable: just 49 out of the 220 EPL evaluations studied in this chapter (22%) were referred 
to in the EP’s questions to the Commission at least once. In 34 out of 220 cases (16%), such 
questions served to steer the Commission’s behaviour. These numbers suggest that the use of 
EPL evaluations for accountability purposes by the EP is uncommon - especially considering the 
fact that the results of most of these evaluations are summarised in official communications 
from the Commission that are received and discussed by parliamentary committees. However, 
not all EP questions explicitly mention their sources, so it is possible that more of these 
questions are based on EPL evaluations than the data suggest. 
 Variation in the extent to which EPL evaluations were used in EP questions turned out to 
be best explained by the degree of conflict about the evaluated legislation between the 






the odds that an evaluation was referred to in EP questions. A theoretical explanation for this 
relation is the nature of the risk faced by the EP: when members of the EP perceive that the 
Commission may deviate from its wishes when implementing legislation, they become more 
likely to closely scrutinize the institution. For such scrutiny, EPL evaluations are a potential 
source of information. By contrast, technical factors like the quality and relevance of the EPL 
evaluations were found to have no effect on the use of these evaluations in EP questions. The 
salience of the evaluated legislation in the eyes of the EP also provided no significant 
explanation. 
 
3. Theoretical implications 
The chapters of this dissertation have discussed the effects of various political and technical 
variables on the initiation, quality and use of the Commission’s EPL evaluations. Whereas the 
explanatory power of these individual factors has been summarised above, the broader 
implications of the findings have not yet been addressed. This section therefore places the 
results of this dissertation in the context of some general theories about the interests of the 
European Commission and about evaluation systems. The first subsection below discusses the 
findings in relation to existing theories about the Commission’s interests in protecting its 
competences and encouraging European integration. Subsection two focuses on other 
theoretical implications related to political interests, which were found inductively based on the 
case studies about evaluation use. In the third subsection the theoretical implications of the 
findings about technical explanations are discussed.  
 
Political explanations: protection of competences and encouraging EU integration 
Since EPL evaluations assess the functioning of government policies, they inherently take place 
in a political environment (Bovens et al., 2008; Weiss, 1993). Due to this political setting, 
evaluation results usually benefit some actors and put others at a disadvantage, for example 
because they allocate praise or blame for certain policy outcomes or (re)open debates about 






factors can therefore be expected to affect the Commission’s EPL evaluations and were taken 
into account throughout this dissertation. Such factors have been defined as interests that 
actors have in (not) conducting evaluation-related activities like initiating an evaluation, 
investing in its quality and using its results. 
To discuss the effects of the Commission’s political interests on its evaluation activities, 
these interests must first be specified. One commonly used branch of theory that addresses the 
motives of political actors is public choice. According to this theoretical framework, civil 
servants mainly aim to maximize their budgets (e.g. Niskanen, 1971), whereas politicians seek to 
maximize votes (e.g. Dunleavy, 1991). However, as various scholars in the field of EU 
governance have argued, these views cannot be directly applied to the Commission, as that 
institution is not directly elected and operates on the basis of a fixed budget that is mostly spent 
on agriculture and regional development (Tallberg, 2003: 28; Majone, 1996: 65). Furthermore, 
in the context of this dissertation budgetary maximization is not very important because most 
EPL evaluations do not concern financial incentives.  
Rather than presenting the Commission as a maximizer of voters or budgets, the 
literature that views the Commission as a rational actor generally argues that the institution 
seeks to protect and/or expand its competences (Majone, 1996: 65; Nugent and Rhinard, 2016: 
1201; Pollack, 2008: 9; Tallberg, 2003: 28). Hartlapp et al. (2014: 1-14) call this the perspective 
of the Commission as a ‘competence seeker’, in contrast to viewing the institution as a ‘policy 
seeker’ or a technocratic institution. Theoretically, the Commission has an incentive to maximize 
its competences because this makes it easier to pursue its policy aims (Majone, 1996: 65; 
Pollack, 2008: 9). Furthermore, the Commission frequently faces threats and opportunities 
related to the scope of its powers upon which it needs to act. For example, during the last 
decade the Commission has succeeded in strengthening its role in budgetary oversight, while its 
ability to produce secondary legislation in certain policy fields has been reduced due to 
increased oversight by the EP (Nugent and Rhinard, 2016).  
Especially when their findings are negative, EPL evaluations may open discussions about 






avoid evaluations to prevent criticism (‘blame avoidance’) (Van Thiel, 2016). Therefore, chapter 
4 of this dissertation tested the hypothesis that the chances of an EPL evaluation being initiated 
by the Commission are lower for policies for which there is a higher risk that the evaluation’s 
results could lead to legislative amendments that reduce the institution’s competences. 
Furthermore, chapter 5 tested the hypothesis that the quality of the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations is lower under such circumstances. The quantitative analyses presented in these 
chapters falsified both of these hypotheses. In other words, no evidence was found in line with 
the theory that the Commission primarily seeks to protect and/or expand its own competences. 
Chapter 7 of this dissertation addressed the question whether or not the Commission’s 
use of EPL evaluations can be explained by the extent to which the results of these reports are 
in line with its pre-existing preferences about the evaluated legislation. In two out of the three 
analysed cases, the Commission held the pre-existing belief that its own competences should be 
increased. However, the qualitative data presented in this chapter suggested that these 
preferences had no significant impact on the Commission’s subsequent decisions about the use 
of the evaluations. In other words, the case studies also provided no evidence in line with the 
hypothesis that the Commission would be primarily motivated by the protection or expansion of 
its competences. 
Besides the issue of competence maximization, a part of the literature about the 
Commission argues that the institution is (also) driven by its intention to enhance European 
integration (e.g. Nugent and Rhinard, 2016: 1208; Pollack, 2008: 9; Tallberg, 2003: 28). This 
issue is partly related to the increase of competences, as more European integration can lead to 
increased powers for the Commission, but it can also be a motivation of its own when the 
institution considers itself to have an inherent responsibility to promote European integration.  
One task related to the promotion of European integration is the Commission’s role as 
the ‘guardian of the treaties’: an enforcer of member state compliance with EU legislation 
(Steunenberg, 2010: 359; Tallberg, 2003: 28). As has been argued at various points in this 
dissertation, EPL evaluations are one potential tool to fulfil this task, since they may provide the 






This purpose is not mentioned as one the official functions of EPL evaluations in the 
Commission’s better regulation documents (2013: 2; 2015: 259), which focus on the aims of 
learning and the Commission’s own accountability towards other institutions. However, the 
need to enforce legislation can be expected to play a role in the practice of EPL evaluations if 
the Commission is indeed motivated by its interest in encouraging integration. 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation therefore tested the expectation that the Commission is 
more likely to evaluate a piece of legislation when the resulting EPL evaluation is more useful 
for enforcement purposes. The results showed that the Commission indeed prioritizes 
evaluating policies for which the chances of non-compliance by the member states are higher, 
such as directives and complex legislation. These findings suggest that the enforcement of EU 
legislation indeed plays a role in the Commission’s initiation of EPL evaluations. 
To summarize, whereas the results of this dissertation are not in line with the theoretical 
image of the Commission as a ‘competence seeker’, they do present some evidence that the 
institution aims to enforce European integration when taking decisions about EPL evaluations. 
 
Political explanation: the intention to reduce legislative output 
In addition to the findings discussed above, the case studies conducted for this dissertation 
inductively revealed another factor that affects the Commission’s evaluation-related activities: 
its intention to reduce its legislative output. This explanation is closely related to recent 
developments in the Commission’s activities. 
When it entered into office at the end of 2014, the Juncker Commission announced its 
intention to focus its efforts on a limited number of policy fields (like the economy, migration 
and human rights - see Juncker, 2014). As a result, the Commission (2016: 2-3) now launches 
only dozens of legislative proposals annually, whereas this number was in the hundreds in the 
past. One alleged reason for this shift was to combat Euroscepticism by convincing citizens and 
companies that the EU can be ‘be small on small issues’ (i.e. not to overregulate society) 






pressure from the European Council to restrict its legislative activities than was the case for its 
predecessors (Nugent and Rhinard, 2016: 1205-1206).  
Chapter 7 of this dissertation suggested that this drive to reduce legislative output 
strongly affects the Commission’s use of EPL evaluations. An in-depth analysis of three high-
quality EPL evaluations showed that the recommendations of such reports are unlikely to be 
implemented when they concern policy fields that are no priorities of the current Commission 
(like plant health and animal welfare). In other words, the salience of the policy field to which an 
EPL evaluation belongs appear to be a necessary condition for the use of its results. This 
imposes a political constraint on the Commission’s use of EPL evaluations: the conclusions of 
such reports may be used when drafting legislative proposals, but only if the political top of the 
Commission wishes to take action in that policy field to begin with. 
These results about the use of EPL evaluations have some broader implications for the 
Commission’s better regulation agenda. On the one hand, a key element of this agenda is to 
strengthen evidence-based policy: the legislation proposed by the Commission should be based 
on objective information, for which EPL evaluations are one potential source (European 
Commission, 2013: 5; 2015: 253; 2016: 2, 7). On the other hand, the better regulation agenda 
also implies that the EU should be careful not to produce too much new legislation, as the 
burdens that such rules impose on society should remain as small as possible (2012: 4-5; 2015: 
254; 2016: 6-7). These two aims of the better regulation agenda potentially clash in the case of 
EPL evaluations. Most of these evaluations recommend some changes to legislative texts to 
improve them, which usually requires the Commission to propose amendments. To follow-up 
on such recommendations is in line with evidence-based policy, but can go against the aim of 
reduced legislative output. Chapter 7 of this dissertation suggested that the Commission 
currently prioritizes the second aim over the first. 
This tension between evidence-based policy and deregulation is not unique to the 
Commission: better regulation agendas in general have multiple aims that may conflict with 
each other and shift over time (Bunea and Ibenskas, 2017: 593; Radaelli, 2007: 192-193). 






pressure to reduce its legislative output (Nugent and Rhinard, 2016: 1205-1206). This pressure 
may limit the institution’s use of EPL evaluations and should therefore be taken into account to 
fully understand the dynamics of evidence-based policy within the Commission. 
 
Technical explanations 
Besides political explanations, this dissertation also discussed the effect of various technical 
variables on the initiation, quality and use of the Commission’s EPL evaluations. In the context 
of this research, ‘technical’ factors refer to practical prerequisites that affect the functioning of 
evaluations. These factors are rooted in a rational and apolitical perspective on evaluations, 
which means that evaluations are seen as tools that can produce objective information when 
they follow the right procedures and involve the right actors (Bovens et al., 2008: 325). Unlike 
the political influences discussed above, the technical factors studied in this dissertation were 
mostly derived from general literature about policy evaluations (e.g. Cooksy and Mark, 2012; 
Nielsen et al., 2011; Rossi et al., 2004).  
The exact technical variables that were studied in this dissertation varied somewhat 
from chapter to chapter, depending on the topic at hand. The technical variable that was most 
consistently discussed is evaluation capacity: the presence of organizational resources that are 
meant to support evaluated-related activities (Nielsen et al., 2011: 325; Stockdill et al., 2002: 
14). Existing theories predict that evaluation capacity positively affects the initiation, quality 
(Cooksy and Mark, 2012: 81) and use (Stockdill et al., 2002: 14) of evaluations, as it allows for 
more investments in every stage of an evaluation process, from data-collection (Nielsen et al., 
2011: 327) to the presentation of a final report (Rossi et al., 2004: 414).  
Chapter 3 of this dissertation described the capacity of the Commission’s DGs to conduct 
EPL evaluations. These findings were subsequently used in chapter 4 and 5 to test the 
hypotheses that the variation in the initiation and quality of EPL evaluations between DGs 
depends on the variation in their evaluation capacity. The results confirmed that DGs with more 






evaluate a higher proportion of their legislation than other DGs. However, the findings also 
showed that the EPL evaluations of these DGs are not of significantly better quality. 
The research conducted for this dissertation found that the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations are affected by various other technical factors as well, such as the presence of 
evaluation clauses and the timeliness of the evaluations. These variables have been listed per 
topic in Table 1. Overall, the presented findings are in line with the theoretical view that high-
quality policy evaluations are more likely to be initiated and used when a number of practical 
prerequisites are met. In other words, the practice of EPL evaluations in the Commission is 
affected not only by political conditions, but by technical factors as well. 
 
4. Comparison with other evaluation systems 
The findings presented above show that the Commission’s EPL evaluations are far from perfect 
in terms of their initiation, quality and use. However, so far this conclusion only discussed these 
evaluations in absolute terms: their relative merits when placed next to evaluations from other 
political systems remain unclear. Therefore, to properly contextualize the results of this 
dissertation, this section compares the Commission’s system for EPL evaluations to some 
national systems for such evaluations. 
 For this assessment the Commission will be compared to the member countries of the 
OECD. Such a comparison is worthwhile because the OECD (2015: 122) actively promotes the 
institutionalization of EPL evaluations, which makes its members relatively likely to have 
systems for such evaluations in place. In 2015 the OECD published its most recent ‘regulatory 
policy outlook’, which assessed (among other topics) to what extent its 34 member countries 
and the European Commission possess a system for EPL evaluations. This report serves as the 
basis for the comparisons made in this section. 
Overall, the OECD (2015) is critical of the practice of EPL evaluation in its member states. 
It states that most of these countries do not have structures in places that support such 
evaluations (p. 129), that most national EPL evaluations do not fully assess the economic and 






supervised (p. 132-133). Out of the 35 political entities studied in the OECD’s report, only seven2 
had systematically initiated EPL evaluations that went beyond administrative burden 
calculations during the years before 2015 (OECD, 2015: 16). The European Commission is among 
this small group (OECD, 2015: 30, 158-159). 
By implication, the remaining 28 countries do not systematically conduct EPL 
evaluations. In most of these countries some EPL evaluations take place on an ad hoc basis, but 
formal procedures for their initiation, quality and use are missing, unclear or rarely applied in 
practice (OECD, 2015: 142-211). For example, although the French government has produced 
initiation procedures (National Assembly of France, 2015: 100-101), methodological guidelines 
(Scientific Council for Evaluation, 1994) and quality assurance systems (National Council of 
Evaluation, n.d.) for ex-post evaluations, none of these documents and procedures address 
legislative evaluations specifically. In practice, French EPL evaluations are mostly conducted in 
the context of ad hoc modernization programmes launched by the government (Government of 
France, n.d.; OECD, 2015: 162). 
 In comparison with these countries that have no clear standards for EPL evaluations in 
place, the Commission’s initiation, quality and use of such evaluations is more systematic by 
default. But how does the Commission perform when compared to the few OECD countries that 
do have systematic procedures for EPL evaluations? Whereas an in-depth study of the 
similarities and differences with each of these countries would go beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, a comparison with one particular example can be made. The Netherlands is 
suitable for such an assessment, as its systems for EPL evaluations and evaluation clauses have 
been subject to extensive empirical research (Klein Haarhuis and Niemeijer, 2009; Klein 
Haarhuis, 2016; Von Meyenfeldt et al., 2017; Veerman et al., 2013). The Netherlands is also 
comparable to the European Commission in that it started to develop an evaluation system for 
spending activities in the late 1980s, after which it gradually developed ex-post evaluations for 
legislation and other activities in the subsequent decades (Leeuw et al., 2009: 90-97). 
There are two main types of EPL evaluations in the Netherlands: legislative evaluations 






Policy reviews, secondly, evaluate all government actions in a certain policy area - which usually 
includes legislation (Regeling Periodiek Evaluatie-onderzoek, 2014; Klein Haarhuis, 2016: 10). 
This makes such reviews somewhat comparable to fitness checks at the EU level, which also 
assess whole policy areas (European Commission, 2015: 254). 
 Regarding the initiation of EPL evaluations in the Netherlands, firstly, it is difficult to find 
numbers that are entirely comparable to the data about the Commission presented in this 
dissertation. However, some impressions can be gained by studying the total number of EPL 
evaluations as compared to the number of legislative proposals in both political systems.  
The Dutch Ministry of Justice lists 43 legislative evaluations that were completed by 
government departments in 2013 and 2014 (Knowledge Centre Legislation and Legal Affairs, 
n.d.), which is less than the 87 EPL evaluations completed by the Commission’s DGs during 
those years according to the dataset used for this dissertation. Furthermore, a meta-evaluation 
of policy reviews commissioned by the Ministry of Finance showed that the Dutch government 
had completed 23 of such reports in early 2017 (Von Meyenfeldt et al., 2017: 5), which is a 
much less than the 47 fitness checks that had been published by the Commission in 2014 
(Smismans, 2015: 14). At first sight this variation cannot be explained by the differences in total 
legislative activity between the Netherlands and the EU. For example, in 2013 and 2014 the 
Dutch government sent respectively 229 and 256 bills to parliament (Tweede Kamer der Staten-
General, n.d.), whereas these numbers were respectively 66 and 120 for the Commission, which 
has reduced its legislative activity even further since then (European Commission, 2016: 3). 
Therefore, the Dutch government also appears to initiate fewer EPL evaluations than the 
Commission in relative terms. 
Furthermore, there appear to be fewer legal obligations to initiate EPL evaluations for 
the Dutch government than for the Commission. In 2013 only 10-20% of Dutch primary laws 
included an evaluation clause (Klein Haarhuis, 2016: 11; Veerman et al., 2013), which is 
significantly less than the 60% (165/277) of major EU laws from 2000-2004 that were found to 
contain such a clause in chapter 4 of this dissertation. In the absence of an evaluation clause, 






budgetary programmes of individual ministries. However, research has shown that such 
programmes may not be complied with in practice, depending on the priorities of the Dutch 
cabinet (Klein Haarhuis, 2016: 11). 
Regarding the quality of Dutch EPL evaluations, secondly, a meta-evaluation of 75 of 
such evaluations showed that 81% of them contain a clear problem definition and 85% of them 
apply a combination of research methods (triangulation) (Klein Haarhuis and Niemeijer, 2009: 
410). This is a little worse than the Commission’s EPL evaluations studied in chapter 5 of this 
dissertation, of which 89% contain a clear problem definition and 89% use multiple research 
methods. On the other hand, the Dutch study also showed that 85% of its evaluations clearly 
define their concepts (Klein Haarhuis and Niemeijer, 2009: 410), which is much more than the 
61% of the Commission’s EPL evaluations that were found to contain a clear operationalization. 
Based on this comparison, it appears that Dutch EPL evaluations perform worse than the 
Commission’s EPL evaluations in some respects, but perform better regarding other criteria. 
However, it should be noted that the data may not be entirely comparable, for example 
because of differences in the studies’ timeframes. 
Other meta-evaluations also assessed the quality of Dutch EPL evaluations. For example, 
a recent report about the evaluation capacity of Dutch ministries suggested that this quality 
varies greatly between departments (Klein Haarhuis, 2016: 7). Furthermore, a recent meta-
evaluation criticized the quality of Dutch policy reviews. Even though these reviews often meet 
a number of formal requirements concerning their problem definition and independence, most 
of them do not properly assess the effectiveness and efficiency of policies (Von Meyenfeldt et 
al., 2017: 6). Earlier research from the Court of Auditors of the Netherlands (2012: 15) also 
showed that many Dutch ex-post evaluations falsely claim to study effectiveness. The quality 
standards used by these meta-evaluations are not always quantified and differ somewhat from 
the ones used in chapter 5. Therefore, their conclusions are more difficult to compare to the 
results of this dissertation than the findings of Klein Haarhuis and Niemeijer (2009). However, 






evaluations varies considerably from case to case, as is the case with the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations at the EU level.  
 Concerning the use of Dutch EPL evaluations, thirdly, both legislative evaluations and 
policy reviews must be sent to parliament; policy reviews are expected to be discussed by the 
Council of Ministers as well (Klein Haarhuis, 2016: 13; Ministry of Finance, 2014: 2). Empirical 
research shows that even though these procedures are usually complied with, the Dutch 
government and parliament do not fully utilize most EPL evaluations in practice. Although Dutch 
politicians and civil servants seem increasingly interested in EPL evaluations as instruments for 
accountability, their use of such evaluations for learning is much less common (Klein Haarhuis, 
2016: 13). 
 All in all, the comparison presented above reveals that many of the issues with the 
initiation, quality and use of the Commission’s EPL evaluations discussed in this dissertation also 
occur in the Netherlands. In particular, research shows that the quality and use of Dutch EPL 
evaluations varies greatly from case to case, similar to the situation at the EU level. Although 
the initiation of EPL evaluations in the Netherlands is more difficult to assess, the Commission 
appears to produce more evaluations than the Dutch government annually and evaluation 
clauses are more common in EU legislation than in Dutch legislation, even when the total 
legislative activity of both political systems is taken into account. 
In conclusion, this section has shown that the Commission’s system for EPL evaluations 
performs well in relative terms. Most OECD countries do not have systematic procedures for EPL 
evaluations at all, which means that the Commission outperforms them by default. 
Furthermore, even the few OECD countries that have systematic procedures for EPL evaluations 
in place appear to face problems concerning their initiation, quality and use, which shows that 
such issues are not unique to the Commission. Therefore, when considering the shortcomings of 
the Commission’s system that are discussed in this dissertation, it should be remembered that 







5. Limitations and recommendations for future research 
The research that was conducted for this dissertation necessarily has some limitations, which 
need to be discussed to fully clarify the value of the conclusions that were drawn. Therefore, in 
this section the three main drawbacks of this dissertation are discussed. Furthermore, for each 
of these limitations some recommendations are provided about how future research could 
solve them. 
 
Limitation 1: causal mechanisms  
The first limitation concerns chapter 4 and 5 of this dissertation, which discussed the initiation 
and quality of the Commission’s EPL evaluations (research question 1 & 2). These topics were 
studied with the help of two self-constructed datasets of 277 pieces of major legislation and 313 
evaluations. This quantitative approach allowed this dissertation to provide a unique, 
comprehensive overview of the previously unexplored topic of EPL evaluations in the EU. It also 
allowed for drawing valid and reliable conclusions about what factors explain the initiation and 
quality of such evaluations. However, the drawback of this quantitative approach is that the 
mechanisms that underpin these causal relations remain obscure (George and Bennett, 2005: 
21; Lieberman, 2005: 339-340). In other words, it is not always clear why certain variables affect 
the initiation or quality of EPL evaluations. Although the fact that both topics were studied 
based on hypotheses derived from theory reduces this problem to some extent, it does not 
entirely remove the issue. 
 For example, as explained above, the complexity of EU legislation turned out to have a 
positive relation with its chances of being evaluated. Based on the theoretical literature used in 
chapter 4 (e.g. Coglianese, 2012: 11; Stame, 2008: 128-130), the explanation for this seems to 
be that the Commission prioritizes evaluating legislation for which the implementation is likely 
to be problematic, as more complexity makes it more difficult to establish if member states 
comply with EU rules. However, it is also possible that the Commission is more likely to evaluate 
complex legislation due to its REFIT programme, which aims to use EPL evaluations (and other 






254; 2016: 6-7). In such situations, there are multiple reasons why one variable may affect 
another. Quantitative research is often unable to take all these explanations into account, as it 
usually focuses on a limited number of variables that provide the most plausible explanations 
for a phenomenon (Lieberman, 2005: 435). 
 Another disadvantage of the quantitative approach is that some variables cannot be 
observed directly on a large scale. This problem may result in conceptual stretching: the proxies 
used to measure certain variables may not fully cover the abstract concepts that they are 
supposed to represent (Lieberman, 2005: 435). For example, in this dissertation the risk that an 
EPL evaluation could threaten the Commission’s competences was measured via two 
characteristics of the EU’s legislative process: the level of EP involvement and the voting 
procedure in the Council. These indicators assess the circumstances in which the Commission is 
likely to face a strategic risk when conducting EPL evaluations rather than the risk itself, as the 
latter is difficult to measure directly. As a result, the way in which this concept was measured 
may have affected the findings of chapter 4 and 5 to some extent. 
 To address this issue of conceptual stretching and to fully assess the mechanisms behind 
the initiation and quality of the Commission’s EPL evaluations, future research could use case 
studies and other qualitative methods (George and Bennett, 2005: 21; Lieberman, 2005: 439-
440). One useful approach could be to use the quantitative data that underpin this dissertation 
(or a later update of this data) to select interesting cases (like typical cases, deviant cases and so 
forth) for in-depth studies (Lieberman, 2005: 343-344). Semi-structured interviews with civil 
servants of the Commission and other relevant actors could be used to find the most plausible 
mechanisms behind causal relations. 
 
Limitation 2: wider impact of the Commission’s EPL evaluations 
A second limitation of this dissertation relates to chapter 6-8, which discussed the use of EPL 
evaluations for learning by the Commission and for accountability purposes by the EP (research 
question 3). In reality, the Commission and the EP are just two of the actors that may use 






and the member states, has not been studied in this dissertation, except for some discussion of 
the influence of these actors on use by the Commission in chapter 7. 
 This omission is important because theoretically speaking, there are good reasons for 
these stakeholders to use the Commission’s EPL evaluations. The Council can be seen as one 
chamber of the EU’s legislature (next to the EP) and as such it has the task to hold the 
Commission accountable (Bovens et al., 2010: 29). EPL evaluations can be a source of 
information to properly fulfil such accountability functions (Højlund, 2014: 429; Luchetta, 2012: 
563; Summa and Toulemonde, 2002: 409). The way in which the Council and the member states 
use the Commission’s EPL evaluations (as well as other ex-post evaluations) therefore seems to 
be an unexplored topic that warrants future research. 
 Somewhat related to this issue is the fact that this dissertation has focused solely on the 
use of EPL evaluations for learning and accountability. In reality, evaluations can be used for 
other aims as well, including strategic and conceptual ones (Vedung, 1997: 102-111). Strategic 
use refers to an actor using an evaluation to further his own interests. Although chapter 7 and 8 
of this dissertation addressed strategic elements of use to some extent, these chapters 
conceptualized such strategic elements as threats to instrumental and accountability use rather 
than as a type of use of its own. Conceptual use refers to using evaluations for long-term 
knowledge building (Mayne, 2014: 3; Vedung, 1997: 110-111), which is a topic that this 
dissertation has not discussed at all. 
 To address the point that the long-term consequences of the Commission’s EPL 
evaluations have been ignored so far, future research could focus on their influence rather than 
just their use. The concept of influence refers to the impact of evaluations in the broadest sense 
of the word (Herbert, 2014: 389-394; Johnson et al., 2009: 378; Henry and Mark, 2003: 310). 
Influence matters because evaluations that remain unused in the short term may still have an 
impact in the long run (Herbert, 2010: 390). For example, chapter 7 of this dissertation showed 
that the evaluation of the EU’s animal welfare policy from 2010 remained unused because it did 
not fit with the priorities of the Juncker Commission. However, the idea of an animal welfare 






groups and civil servants. Possibly, they can use the evaluation’s arguments once again when a 
new Commission enters into office. In this case and others, evaluations that remained unused in 
the short term may still have an impact in the long run via the diffusion of ideas and the change 
of political agendas (Henry and Mark, 2003: 298). It would be interesting to study to what 
extent and under what circumstances the Commission’s EPL evaluations can have such effects.  
 
Limitation 3: timeframe of the research 
A third potential limitation of this dissertation concerns its timeframe. As was explained in the 
preceding chapters, only EPL evaluations published until 2014 have been studied in this 
research, because not all evaluations completed from 2015 onwards had been published at the 
time the data collection was completed. The disadvantage of this decision is that it raises the 
question to what extent the results still represent the current situation in 2018. 
The Juncker Commission, which entered into office at the end of 2014, repeatedly stated 
that is wished to step up the Commission’s efforts concerning EPL evaluation (e.g. Juncker, 
2014: 6; European Commission, 2016: 2). In particular, it placed its better regulation efforts 
under the responsibility of the first vice-president (Frans Timmermans) and it published new 
guidelines concerning the initiation, quality and use of EPL evaluations (among other topics) in 
2015 (European Commission, 2015: 253-298). Theoretically, these activities may have altered 
the practice of EPL evaluations in the Commission to some extent. 
Some of the evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that such changes have 
been limited. As was explained in chapter 3, in early 2015 most evaluation coordinators in the 
DGs did not think that the new better regulation guidelines would lead to more or better EPL 
evaluations in the near future. In their view, that would require additional resources, which 
were not available.  
Furthermore, the total number of EPL evaluations that the Commission produces 
annually does not seem to have increased significantly since 2014. As was explained in the 
introduction, the better regulation guidelines from 2015 limited the Commission’s official 






Commission, 2015: 289-290). All external evaluations must now be translated into such 
documents. The Commission’s register4 contains four of these ‘new-style’ evaluations from the 
end of 2015 and 23 of such cases from both 2016 and 2017.5 These figures cannot be entirely 
compared to the numbers of evaluations from before 2015 that were presented throughout this 
dissertation, since at that time the Commission’s EPL evaluations still took many different forms. 
However, these data suggest that at least there has been no large increase in the Commission’s 
output of EPL evaluations. 
 On the other hand, there is evidence that the Commission’s EPL evaluations have 
changed in two particular ways since 2014. Firstly, the role of the Commission’s secretariat-
general (SG) has been strengthened. Most evaluation coordinators interviewed for chapter 3 
believed that the growing importance of this institution would be the most important change 
resulting from the better regulation guidelines of 2015. The fact that all EPL evaluations must 
now be produced as staff working documents gives the SG an increased role in their 
management, as it always checks such files before their publication (European Commission, 
2015: 288). The better regulation guidelines of 2015 also strengthened the SG in other ways, for 
example by formalizing its role in the steering groups for fitness checks (European Commission, 
2015: 263).  
Since the SG is closely related to the Commission’s president (Kassim, 2018: 788, 794), 
the former’s enhanced role in EPL evaluations could also strengthen the level of political control 
over these evaluations. Some evidence for such increased political steering was presented in 
chapter 7, which showed that the Commission’s use of EPL evaluations has reduced since 2014 
because its political leadership is only willing to propose legislative amendments for topics that 
fit with its priorities. The animal welfare evaluation that was described in this chapter 
exemplifies how the SG can block the follow-up of results of EPL evaluations that do not fit with 
the agenda of the Commission’s president.  
A second change to the Commission’s EPL evaluations since 2014 is the increased role of 
the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. Since 2015, this semi-independent institution has the official task 






all IAs and a growing selection of ex-post evaluations, some of which concern legislation 
(Regulatory Scrutiny Board, 2018: 11). These checks and the associated feedback may have a 
positive effect on the quality of the evaluations. 
 In conclusion, although the Commission’s EPL evaluations have remained similar in many 
regards since the data collection for this dissertation was completed, they have changed in the 
extent to which they are affected by the SG and the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. Therefore, 
future academic research could focus on the impact that these institutions have on the 
initiation, quality and use of EPL evaluations. Possibly, the growing role of the SG has increased 
the impact of political factors on the evaluations and the growing role of the RSB has increased 
their quality. However, more data would be needed to test these hypotheses. 
 
6. Practical implications 
Besides the theoretical issues discussed above, the results of this dissertation also have some 
implications for the practice of EPL evaluations in the EU. Therefore, based on the findings of 
the research, this section provides three recommendations for the EU’s institutions.  
The findings presented above showed that the Commission’s EPL evaluations do not 
always contribute to learning and accountability in practice, due to a combination of political 
and technical impediments. Nevertheless, the idea that EPL evaluations should contribute to 
such aims is useful as a normative standard (Sanderson, 2002: 7) and therefore underpins the 
three recommendations described below. EU legislation potentially affects millions of citizens 
and companies. In order to make rational decisions about how to improve these effects, 
institutions like the Commission require systematic evidence about how legislation works in 
practice, which ex-post evaluations can potentially provide (Böhme, 2002: 99; Sanderson, 2002: 
3, 5). Therefore, the Commission’s system for EPL evaluations should encourage learning and 
accountability as much as possible within its political and technical constraints. 
The first recommendation relates to the results about evaluation clauses presented in 
chapter 4. These findings show that the presence of such clauses significantly increases the 






suggest that the Commission only complies with about 56% of these clauses. Therefore, the 
presence of an evaluation clause is not a sufficient condition to ensure that an EPL evaluation 
will be initiated. To further improve the effectiveness of such clauses, it would be useful to have 
an institution that keeps track of their follow-up.  
Such a role could be fulfilled by the civil service of the EP or the Council, as these 
institutions often insert or amend evaluation clauses in EU legislation to ensure that they 
remain informed about its implementation (Summa and Toulemonde, 2002: 410). Therefore, 
they have an interest in checking the extent to which the Commission complies with evaluation 
clauses. Furthermore, the Council and the EP have the formal possibility to ask the Commission 
about its plans to conduct EPL evaluations (see chapter 8 for details about the extent to which 
the EP does this in practice). Although the EP recently published an overview of review and 
evaluation clauses in EU legislation (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2017), at the 
time this dissertation was completed it had not systematically checked to what extent the 
Commission complies with these provisions.6 Outside of the legislature, the Commission’s own 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board could potentially keep track of the follow-up of evaluation clauses, as 
during the last few years it has increasingly functioned as a semi-independent watchdog for EPL 
evaluations (Regulatory Scrutiny Board, 2018: 11). 
The second recommendation concerns evaluation capacity. Since chapter 4 of this 
dissertation shows that DGs that invest more resources in EPL evaluations evaluate a higher 
proportion of their legislation, it is recommended for the Commission to encourage the 
development of further evaluation capacity. One way to do so would be to stimulate the 
production of guidelines about how to conduct EPL evaluations in specific policy fields. Chapter 
3 of this dissertation showed that only DG MARKT (now DG GROWTH) and DG CONNECT had 
such guidelines in 2014, even though evaluation coordinators in almost all of the DGs 
considered them to be valuable. Evaluating legislation is generally a complex activity 
(Bussmann, 2010: 281; Klein Haarhuis and Niemeijer, 2009: 404; Klein Haarhuis, 2016: 7), 
especially in the EU (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 480-481), so the development of sufficient technical 






When considering this recommendation to increase evaluation capacity, it should be 
remembered that the effect of such measures is likely to depend on the demand for 
evaluations, which is a political matter (Nielsen et al., 2011: 325). In other words, if EPL 
evaluations are not valued by the top of an organization they are unlikely to be conducted or 
used, even when the resources to do so are available. However, when a political will to evaluate 
exists, the presence of sufficient means to evaluate can be an important factor. Therefore, the 
Commission should develop specialized evaluation units and guidelines whenever possible if its 
aims to systematically initiate EPL evaluations. 
The third recommendation relates to the findings about timeliness and evaluation use. In 
recent years the Commission (2013: 3; 2015: 7) has repeatedly promoted the idea that the EU’s 
legislative process is a ‘regulatory cycle’, in which the results of EPL evaluations feed into the 
impact assessments that assess the merits of new legislative proposals. The findings of chapter 
6 show that this regulatory cycle can only function properly if the findings of EPL evaluations are 
available at least a year before the IA is completed. In those cases where an EPL evaluation was 
published when the IA process was already ongoing, its results were almost never used. 
Therefore, if the Commission wishes to strengthen the link between IAs and EPL evaluations, it 
is recommended to strictly observe its ‘evaluate first’ principle, which states that no IA for 
legislative amendments can be started before the existing EU legislation about its topic has 
been evaluated (European Commission, 2015: 256). An exception to this rule are cases where an 
EPL evaluation and an IA are produced ‘back-to-back’ (as one report), as in these situations the 
IA can use the evaluation’s results by default (Regulatory Scrutiny Board, 2018: 29). 
 
7. Concluding reflections 
This dissertation started with the purpose to assess to what extent the Commission’s system for 
EPL evaluations contributes to accountability and learning. During the last two decades, the 
Commission has repeatedly promised to systematically conduct and use high-quality evaluations 
to improve its legislation and to make its decisions more transparent towards citizens, 






2013; 2015; 2016). This dissertation presented a first large-scale academic attempt to scrutinize 
to what extent these promises have been fulfilled. 
The results revealed that the Commission’s considerable ambitions regarding EPL 
evaluations are more than mere window dressing. In particular, most of the evaluations studied 
in this dissertation turned out to meet a number of important quality criteria, like a clear 
delineation of their topic, the use of a broad range of data collection methods and the presence 
of substantiated conclusions. When results of EPL evaluation are available they also turned out 
to be used in subsequent IAs more often than not, in line with the Commission’s promise of a 
‘regulatory cycle’. EPL evaluations appear to be especially influential in determining the details 
of new legislative proposal once the Commission has decided to take action in a certain policy 
field. 
Furthermore, this dissertation showed that several important improvements to the 
Commission’s EPL evaluations have taken place over time. For example, chapter 3 revealed that 
the number of DGs with specialized units, training and guidelines for (EPL) evaluations has 
increased step by step since 2000. Chapter 2 and chapter 4 showed that the proportion of 
evaluated legislation appears to increase over time, chapter 6 revealed that the number of IAs 
that build on EPL evaluations has steadily grown since 2003 and this conclusion noted that the 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board increasingly provides a semi-independent check on the quality of 
these evaluation. These facts highlight that the Commission’s system for EPL evaluations has 
very much evolved since its inception, mostly in a positive direction. 
On the other hand, this dissertation also showed that the Commission still does not fully 
meet the standards of systematic initiation, quality and use that were described in the 
introduction. In particular, the results pointed out that only a minority of major EU regulations 
and directives appear to be evaluated by the Commission and that the external validity and 
reliability of the evaluations that do take place is questionable. Furthermore, since the Juncker 
Commission took office in 2014 the use of EPL evaluations in policy fields that are no political 






In conclusion, whereas the Commission’s current system for EPL evaluations contributes 
to learning and accountability to some extent, significant further developments regarding the 
initiation, quality and use of these evaluations appear to be necessary for these benefits to 
become more systematic. Hopefully, the specific findings and recommendations presented in 
this dissertation can contribute to such improvements. In this day and age when EU legislation 
increasingly affects that day-to-day activities of citizens and companies and is frequently 
criticized by Eurosceptic actors, it is all the more important to ensure a continuous stream of 
reliable information about the functioning of such legislation is available. If EPL evaluations can 
fulfil this function, they may contribute to step-by-step improvements to the effects of 
legislation, the democratic accountability of the EU’s institutions, and the legitimacy of the 




 Out of the 313 EPL evaluations included in the full dataset used for this dissertation, approximately forty (12.7%) 
were initiated more than ten years after the legislation that they study had been published. This is assuming that 
evaluations were initiated at least one year before their publication. 
2
 The OECD report does not mention the names of the seven political entities to which it refers on  
p. 16. The graph on p. 30 suggests that they may be Australia, Belgium, Canada, the EU, Germany, Mexico and the 
UK. However, the individual country profiles provided at the end of the report (p. 142-211) suggest that Hungary, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States have systems for EPL evaluations in place as well, while this is 
not so much the case for Belgium. Furthermore, the country descriptions mention that Austria, Estonia, Korea, 
Latvia and Poland have recently (i.e. after 2010) established systems for EPL evaluations that have yet to fully 
develop in practice. Therefore, it is not entirely clear which countries are in the frontrunner group, but the 
Commission is among them regardless of whether the graph or the country profiles are considered. It should also 
be noted that some countries (e.g. Israel) have strict procedures for evaluating administrative burdens created by 
regulations. However, since such assessments differ greatly from evaluations of the effectiveness of legislation, 
they are not treated as full EPL evaluations by either the OECD report or this dissertation. 
3
 In Dutch, the two types of evaluations are respectively called ‘beleidsevaluaties’ and ‘beleidsdoorlichtingen’. 
4
 This data regarding the number of the Commission’s EPL evaluations during 2015-2017 were received on 6 
January 2018 from Thomas van Golen LLM MA, who is thanked for his kind help in this regard. The data were 
collected by searching for all staff working documents and applying the filter ‘evaluation’ via the search engine of 











The results of this search were manually checked for unique EPL evaluations, as the full list also includes summaries 
and types of evaluations that are outside of the scope of this dissertation. 
5
 Other sources for the Commission’s EPL evaluations that were used to build the datasets for this dissertation are 
no longer available to check these numbers with. At the time of writing (January 2018), the Commission’s search 
engine was still available online (http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/search/results.do), but it only 
contained evaluations until early 2016. Annual evaluation overviews of evaluations were terminated since 2013, as 
was confirmed via e-mail contact with an evaluation coordinator from the SG (Miroslava Janda) at 7 October 2014. 
The recent annual reports of the Commission’s Regulatory Scrutiny Board (e.g. 2018) contain some details about 
selected EPL evaluations, but provide no total number of such reports. 
6
 This information about the EP’s role in checking evaluation clauses was confirmed by the unit responsible for ex-
post evaluation of the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), via an e-mail message from EPRS-
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